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This document synthesizes the results of the research made on the European security 
market. It deals with questions of interest regarding the provision of security goods and 
services for protecting society from terrorism and organised crime. It explores issues 
such  as  market  revenues,  demand  and  supply,  industrial  capabilities,  technology, 
research  and  development,  innovation,  business  strategies,  competition  as  well  as 
market structure, agents’ conduct and economic performance. 
 
The research has been based upon desk analysis of open source information related to 
the  security  market.  Economic  theory  and  critical  analysis  has  been  applied  to 
understand the gathered information, derive knowledge, point out key issues and assess 
trends and drivers that will likely shape the sector’s future. 
 
The study is the outcome of the working package number 5 included in the research 
project  A  new  Agenda  for  European  Security  Economics  (EUSECON).  This  project 
with code number 218195 has been financed by the European Commission within the 
7
th European Research Framework Programme. The task has been performed by the 
company ISDEFE according to the scope and work plan described in the EUSECON 
proposal. 
 
The author wishes to express his appreciation to all the individuals that have provided 
input and valuable comments to this study, including anonymous referees. Any flaws or 
omissions contained in this document are solely the responsibility of the author. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Security is a fundamental good without which societies can hardly prosper and enjoy 
freedom
1. Investment in security affords relevant benefits by means of the prevention 
and reduction of damage to life and property and a better resilience to quickly recover 
from a security incident. This investment also diminishes the likelihood that the incident 
spills over into other areas and ends up disrupting key functions in a society strongly 
interdependent. An adequate investment in this area enhances the citizens’ confidence 
and the general welfare of society. Yet, benefits reaped from security are somewhat 
intangible  and  not  easy  to  measure,  because  the  cost  savings  from  prevented  (and 
avoided)  security  breaches  cannot  be  directly  observed  since  such  breaches  never 
occurred. 
 
Security can be improved through the provision of specialised services, such as cash 
and valuables transport, as well as material means, such as large intelligence databases 
or personal protective equipment. These goods and services can contribute to reduce the 
vulnerability of society to terrorism and organised crime and mitigate the consequences 
of an attack. The collection of economic agents that produce these goods and services is 
what is known as the security industry. 
 
The most appropriate measure of success in this economic sector is the ability to find 
and offer affordable solutions to security issues that improve the citizens’ feeling of 
confidence. Whilst security enhancing measures always entail a sort of societal burden, 
returns  are  also  provided  through  the  creation  of  jobs,  industrial  capabilities, 
shareholders’ profits and innovations applicable in other economic sectors. In short, this 
type of spending has a positive effect on the overall industrial and technological base of 
society, contributing to economic wealth in the long run. 
 
The security industry has a long history, but the terrorist attacks during the first decade 
of this century, technological advances and a society more sensible to security issues 
have stimulated the growth of this market. This environment has also awakened the 
interest  of  having  a  better  knowledge  of  this  economic  sector.  However,  studies 
regarding  this  industry  do  not  abound  and  information  concerning  economic  data, 
market conditions, industrial capabilities, structure of the industry, conduct of agents, 
and performance is often scarce or absent. Hence, some action to reduce this knowledge 
gap seems to be desirable. 
 
OBJECTIVE OF THE SURVEY 
 
The present survey aims at increasing the knowledge available on this market. It has 
been the result of two years research based on the collection of available information, its 
analysis, evaluation and fusion in order to raise understanding and develop knowledge. 
The study has taken a comprehensive approach addressing the different customers and 
suppliers and other agents as well as the main security goods and services provided. The 
research  has  been  financed  by  the  European  Commission  within  the  7
th  European 
                                                 
1  Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says: ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty 
and security of person’. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Research  Framework  Programme  under  the  research  project  A  new  Agenda  for 
European Security Economics EUSECON (reference number 218195). 
 
SCOPE OF THE SURVEY 
 
Before starting the analysis, it seems worthwhile to set the scope and the boundaries of 
the survey in order to determine which undertakings should be included or excluded 
from the research. For such a purpose, a definition of the sector would be helpful. 
 
Definition of the sector 
 
Research carried out on the available literature to find a common accepted definition of 
the security sector has been unsuccessful. Only a short definition of security economics 
Brück et al. (2009: 8) has been encountered. It states: 
 
‘Security economics is understood as those activities affected by, preventing, dealing 
with and mitigating insecurity including terrorism, in the economy’. 
 
This definition has been used to further develop a pragmatic, objective and somewhat 
comprehensive definition of the industry. 
 
The  security  industry  is  understood  as  the  industry  that  supplies  the  products  and 
services specifically used by the human being to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, 
reduce, palliate and deal with the threats and consequences that undesired events have 
on our society. These consequences may be summarised in terms of damage to people’s 
life, health, property or other assets, including information. 
 
The first part of the definition identifies the goods and services required in activities 
aimed at diminishing risk, and in case it materialises, mitigate its consequences. No 
explicit distinction is made on the beneficiaries, since it may be the citizen, a social 
group, or even society as a whole. The main effects of security incidents are briefly 
summarised making an explicit reference to information since it may be a potential 
target of cybercrime. 
 
The most important but also problematic part of the definition is the term ‘undesired 
events’. These events can be distinguished by uncertainty, and their ability to create fear 
or insecurity on human beings with regard to welfare loss. Whilst this feeling is to some 
extent subjective and may be caused by many events, some events are feared more than 
others. Interviews may aid to highlight these different perceptions as can be seen in 
figure 1. 
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Figure 1. What do European Union citizens fear? 
Source: Eurobarometre, Sondage no. 58.1 Oct./Nov. 2002. 
 
Based on the above figure, five main sources of insecurity can be identified: armed 
conflicts,  terrorism,  organised  crime,  diseases/pandemics,  and  natural  or  man-made 
disasters. As can be seen, the two most relevant sources are terrorism and organised 
crime. The industry related to these two sources is largely common since most products 
and  services  apply  to  both  needs.  Commonalities  are  also  shared  with  the  defence 
industry, but differences also exist in terms of customers, products, and technologies. 
 
This survey will focus on the industry that addresses threats associated with terrorism 
and organized crime. The reason behind this approach is on the one hand that it faces 
the most relevant sources of insecurity, and on the other hand that it is an industry with 
its own idiosyncrasy that has not been surveyed with the same depth as the defence 
industry (see for example Gansler 1980, Markusen 1999 or Hartley 2007). This does not 
mean,  evidently,  that  the  analysis  of  the  industries  which  confront  other  kind  of 
insecurities may not also deserve economic studies akin to the present one. 
 
Terrorism  can  be  defined  as  the  premeditated  use  or  threat  to  use  violence  by 
individuals  or  subnational  groups  in  order  to  obtain  a  political  or  social  objective 
through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims. 
Incidents that have no specific political or social objective shall be deemed as criminal 
rather than terrorist acts (Enders and Sandler, 2006:3). 
 
Terrorist actions are commonly aimed at casualty-rich and newsworthy targets as for 
example official sites like embassies or military installations, critical infrastructures, 
symbols and historical attractions like prominent monuments and iconic buildings, high 
ranking public officers like diplomats or judges, and crowded spots like public places, 
entertainment complexes, shopping malls or transit stations. 
 
The term organized crime usually refers to large-scale and complex criminal activities 
carried out by tightly or loosely organized associations and aimed at the establishment, 
supply and exploitation of illegal markets at the expense of society. Such operations are WORKING PAPER 43 
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generally carried out with a ruthless disregard of the law, and often involve offences 
against  the  person,  including  threats,  intimidation  and  physical  violence  (United 
Nations, 1990:5) 
 
Unlawful  activities  of  organised  crime  include  smuggling;  fraud  and  theft;  drug 
trafficking; counterfeiting of documents, currency and commodities; financial crimes; 
illegal  immigration  and  human  beings  trafficking,  kidnapping  and  extortion.  Since 
terrorism cannot openly collect taxes, often it turns to criminal actions for funding their 
activities like the ones mentioned before (Europol, 2009: 6). Such common behaviour 
enforces the argument to analyse jointly both sources of insecurity. Terrorism or crime 
can be considered transnational when they involve more than one country through a 
variety of possible connections such as perpetrators or victims. 
 
What seems to mark out organised criminal activity from ordinary crime is the high 
level of entrepreneurial skill that is applied to its operations that often includes the 
suppression  of  rival  gangs  (Schelling,  1971).  Nonetheless,  a  clear-cut  distinction 
between organised and ordinary crime is often not easy to trace. 
Box 1. Definition of terrorism and organised crime
2 
 
Main products and services 
 
There is a plethora of policies and instruments to eradicate terrorism and organized 
crime.  Some  try  to  abate  them  addressing  their  root  causes
3  –being  they  economic, 
political or social– offering opportunities and incentives to these organizations and their 
members  to  change  preferences  and  abandon  illegal  activities.  For  example, 
communications strategies are used for challenging the ideologies (battle of ideas) that 
extremists  believe  justify  the  use  of  violence.  Since  state  failure,  disintegration  and 
internal  conflicts  in  foreign  countries  could  raise  threats  to  European  security, 
diplomacy combined with the adequate incentives and sanctions (e.g. against terrorist 




Yet these (soft) policies to forestall threats before they become critical are only effective 
in the long term and may not be able to defeat all sources of terrorism and organised 
crime.  Therefore  more  direct  measures  may  be  required,  which  demand  capabilities 
(NRC, 2002:27) that can be grouped in the following ones. 
 
· Intelligence  and  surveillance  is  an  essential  capability  since  these  organisations 
operate in a concealed way. They involve technologies to: (a) gather information of 
members,  assets  and  behaviours;  (b)  monitor  sites  and  areas;  (c)  detect  concealed 
weapons and operations’ plans, and (d) to maintain the profiles, databases and systems 
to exploit such information once collected. 
 
                                                 
2  The EU provides a definition of a terrorist act in the ‘Guidelines for a common approach to the fight 
against terrorism’ dated 26 of March 2003, partially declassified on 14 of February 2008. See also a 
wide discussion of both terms in Engerer (2008). 
3  For a comprehensive analysis of root causes of terrorism see Davis and Cragin (2009). 
4  See  COM(2003)  313  final  on  European  programmes  to  fight  poverty  and  inequality,  to  support 
democratisation and respect of human rights and to improve governance throughout the world. WORKING PAPER 43 
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· Prevention is aimed at disrupting their operational and logistic chain cutting off their 
access  to  money,  weapons,  knowledge,  technologies,  infrastructures
5,  and  other 
resources;  preventing  the  recruit  of  new  members,  foiling  their  attack  plans  (e.g. 




· Protection / denial is needed should detection and prevention fail. It means hardening 
the target so that destruction or disruption becomes more difficult such as reinforced 
building  structure,  blast-resistant  containers,  redundant  systems  and  so  on.  It  may 
include precautionary measures such as the deployment of manned guarding. 
 
· Interdiction or crisis management seeks to detect and forestall an imminent attack by 
identifying  and  neutralizing  perpetrators,  and  preventing  them  from  bringing  their 
violent  operation  to  fruition  such  as  the  deactivation  of  an  improvised  explosive 
device (IED). 
 
· Response and recovery also called consequence management means containing and 
limiting the damage level and the number of casualties in the aftermath of an attack by 
organizing  emergency  responses,  public  health  measures  and  restoring  critical 
functions increasing in such way resilience
7. 
 
· Attribution refers to the ability to identify the perpetrators of an action carried out and 
it is essential to select the adequate response. It includes forensic science and other 
investigative  and identification techniques to analyse terrorist and criminal means, 
track and apprehend suspects, and support the arrest and prosecution of individuals 
responsible of the illegal action. 
 
In  addition,  we  shall  consider  another  area  that  we  will  name  preparedness  than 
involves  all  the  planning,  organising  and  training  processes  needed  to  meet  said 
capabilities. 
 
These capabilities are mainly focused on raising the cost and reducing the benefits of 
terrorism  and  organised  crime  actions
8.  They  support  active  measures  to  abate  the 
source  of  threat,  aimed  at  stifling  the  operational  capabilities  of  terrorist  and  crime 
organisations,  as  well  as  protective  or  defensive  measures  aimed  at  strengthening 
potential targets, thereby increasing the difficulty in striking them with success (Enders 
and Sandler, 2006:85). As will be illustrated, the security industry mainly concentrates 
on providing goods and services for the second type of measures. 
 
                                                 
5  This may be composed of training camps, communication networks, safe houses or havens (even for 
financial assets). 
6  The detection and disruption of the flow of persons and illegal goods within terrorism and organised 
crime  networks  may  help  to  unveil  and  neutralise  these  groups.  Port,  airports,  and  stations  are 
excellent places to spot, in particular when they are collocated at borders, since these organisations are 
increasingly becoming trans-national (Europol, 2008, 2009). 
7  Resilience can be defined as the system’s ability to recover after failure. It is measured by the time 
until a backup system starts functioning, the time until the full capacity is restored and sustainable, 
and the time to clear all backlogs. 
8  Large penalties and fines for those committing such actions is a fundamental way to raise such cost 
(Becker, 1968). WORKING PAPER 43 
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This  survey  uses  a  broad  definition  of  the  term  industry  considering  all  the  agents 
involved  in  the  value  chain  of  security  goods  and  services.  It  encompass  industrial 
activities  related  to  research,  design,  development,  production,  assembly,  test, 
evaluation,  supply,  maintenance,  upgrading,  logistic  support,  human  services  and 
project  management.  The  provision  of  these  goods  entails  a  large  supply  chain  of 
subsystems and components, some of them proceeding from other economic sectors. 
That means, on the one hand, that a relevant part of the product value is generated 
outside what is considered here the security sector, and on the other hand that many 
suppliers to this industry operate also in other economic sectors. 
 
Organisations  in  charge  of  security  require  a  large  set  of  products  and  services  for 
sustaining their dairy operations as for example clothing, food, fuel, office equipment, 
computers, furniture, and motor cars; or services like catering, cleaning, construction, 
consultancy, legal advice, telecommunications, training and transport. This survey will 
not focus on these widely demanded goods and services, which do not show relevant 
differences when they are bought by security organisations, but in those which exhibit 
specific  features  for  underpinning  security  operations,  although  this  distinction,  in 




Even narrowing the scope of this industry, the difficulty to set clear boundaries still 
remains and is a source of controversy. This is the case of the industry related to the 
restoration and recovery of the situation to pre-event levels. This task involves long 
term  activities  that  do  not  differ  essentially  from  routine  activities  of  maintenance, 
repair, reconstruction or upgrade. Hence, a criterion is needed to set the scope, being a 
reasonable principle to consider only the industry related to the emergency activities 
performed in the aftermath of a security incident. 
 
Similar troubles appear when a distinction of products and services related to organised 
and ordinary crime is attempted. Since operating methods and countermeasures are alike 
–organised crime being perhaps more sophisticated and larger– a real distinction cannot 
be settled and so it seems reasonable to consider the industry that faces both types of 
illegal activities as unique. 
 
Often suppliers are specialised divisions of firms, whose business is not only focused on 
security, being frequently this market not the main source of revenues. In such cases, 
these  companies  shall  be  considered  part  of  the  security  market  as  long  as  they 
manufacture products and services used to cope with terrorism and organised crime. 
Companies  that  only  provide  some  subsystems  and  components  that  cannot  operate 
autonomously should be in principle considered outside this sector. Yet, in certain cases 
attention should be paid when said companies provide key specific components with 
few applications in other markets. 
 
Diseases and pandemics are other major life risks that are confronted with the support of 
the health industry. This industry is related to terrorism and organised crime since it 
provides essential support to avoid and restore any damage on health and life. Products 
and  services  provided  by  this  industry  do  not  markedly  differ  from  those  aimed  at 
protecting the population against injuries, illnesses or pandemics caused by hazard. This WORKING PAPER 43 
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industry
9 should be considered outside this sector. Notwithstanding the analysis of its 
capabilities to defeat attacks against public health, such as a chemical or biological one, 
is of interest from a security point of view. 
 
The industry related to natural disasters –such as floods, storms, droughts, earthquakes, 
forest  fires–  or  man-made  disasters  –such  as  technological  or  industrial  accidents–, 
usually known as the safety industry, addresses the goods and services to respond to 
hazards that cause damage without purposeful action. Whilst many goods and services 
for mitigating damages are also shared with those used in the case of a terrorist or 
criminal  action,  the  preventive  means  are  of  a  very  different  nature  as  for  example 
weather  forecasting  systems,  forest  fire  detection  systems,  real-time  water-level 
measurement in rivers and watersheds to pre-warn of flooding, safe design to avoid 
human operator mistakes and so on). 
 
The EU vision
10 and the Department of Homeland Security (Bush, 2002)
11 take an all-
hazard approach when security issues are at stake. This suggests that the analysis of the 
sector  in  order  to  be  comprehensive  should  address  all  kind  of  threats  and  risks. 
However,  the  differences  in  technologies,  products  and  services  –and  therefore 
industrial capabilities– and the variety of customers –in addition to law enforcement, 
health, civil protection and environmental protection agencies shall be considered– raise 
doubts about the convenience and appropriateness of such a broad approach. The study 
will  consequently  focus  on  a  narrower  field,  yet  the  reader  will  be  warned  when 
products and services neatly address both areas. 
 
The difficulty in distinguishing between internal security, mainly related to the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime, and external security, mainly related to defence 
activities, poses additional challenges in qualifying suppliers to both industrial sectors. 
In effect, these groups may be powerful enough to raise small armies, and their attacks 
can  take  a  form  similar  to  that  of  insurgency  and  guerrilla  using  weapons  such  as 
mortars, RPG guns, MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence System) or even CBRNE 
(Chemical,  Biological,  Radiological,  Nuclear  and  Explosive)
  devices.  Additionally, 
terrorists could also act as proxy of certain states or may have foreign training camps 
and  logistics  bases.  Countering  such  organisations  may  require  joint  actions  of  law 
enforcement  units  and  armed  forces
12  such  as  air  or  space  surveillance,  hostage 
recovery, maritime counter-terrorism, fight against piracy and smuggling in high seas, 
bomb disposal, renegade aircraft interception, and special operations for the persecution 
                                                 
9  A detailed analysis of this economic sector can be found in A.J. Curley Editor (2000). Handbook of 
Health Economics. 
10  See COM (2006) 786, Directive 2008/114/EC or the definition of security established in January 2005 
by  the  European  Committee  for  Standardisation  on  Protection  and  Security  of  the  Citizen  (CEN 
BT/WG  161).  The  definition  states:  ‘Security  is  the  condition  (perceived  or  confirmed)  of  an 
individual, a community, and organisation, a societal institution, a state, and their assets (such as 
goods, infrastructure), to be protected against danger or threats such as criminal activity, terrorism 
or other deliberate or hostile acts, disasters (natural and man-made)’. Dr. Alois J. Sieber (Institute 
for the Protection and Security of the Citizen - IPSC) presentation on Standards for Security and 
Protection of the Citizen in the Security Research Conference, Ankara, April 2008. 
11  The Department of Justice and the FBI play also a relevant role. 
12  The role of armed forces to combat terrorism may be considered exceptional in Europe. Land Army 
has been used by the British government to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland. France, faced with a 
continuing terrorist bombing campaign, deployed 37,000 military personnel and police to security 
functions, including 5,000 soldiers to patrol train stations, bus terminals, and airports in the terrorist 
bombing of the St. Michel train in Paris on July 25, 1995 (Jenkings, 1996). WORKING PAPER 43 
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of  terrorists  up  to  their  havens  in  host  countries.  Moreover,  high  risk  conditions 
(Olympic  Games,  World  Cups)  and  internal  security  incidents  with  far  reaching 
consequences generally demand the (spare) capabilities of armed forces when civilian 
capabilities become insufficient. Having said that, a rational criterion would recommend 
analysing the industry that does not supply what is traditionally  considered military 
equipment. 
 
Insurance  companies  play  a  relevant  role  in  the  security  field,  since  they  allow  the 
transfer  of  the  residual  risk  which  cannot  be  mitigated  with  other  types  of  security 
investment.  These  companies  facilitate  the  purchasing  of  insurance  against  potential 
damages, providing financial support for incident recovery. Based on the estimated risk 
and  consequences  of  undesired  events,  they  set  the  payable  amount  (premium)  for 
covering the economic losses of these events. They provide deductions to homeowners, 
businesses and other organisations when they have made investments in cost-effective 
loss-mitigation  measures.  Hence,  insurance  companies  may  have  a  considerable 
influence in setting security standards and as a consequence in the demand of security 
products and services
13. However, since these companies are not true solution providers 
in reducing or eliminating threats, they would be considered out of the scope of this 
survey. 
 
Closely related industries and markets 
 
The  capability  of  some  security  products  and  services  to  indistinctly  face  defence, 
natural and man-made disasters, safety and other social needs as well as the similarity of 
development  and  production  methods  explain  that  security  firms  usually  operate 
concurrently  in  these  markets,  because  they  provide  advantages  in  terms  of  a  more 
diversified customer base, synergies and economies of large production. This is the case 
of the following industries. 
 
·  The defence industry because it shares common needs in areas such as surveillance, 
communications and management systems, operational vehicles, or small arms to 
neutralise terrorist and criminals when they oppose resistance to law forces. 
 
·  Building monitoring and management industry because it usually integrates in their 
solution fire protection, access control, or intrusion detection in addition to heating, 
air conditioning and other building controls. 
 
·  Industrial automation and control industry since it shares related technologies based 
on sensors, communication devices and control systems. 
 
·  Scientific  instrumentation  industry,  such  as  X-ray,  computer  tomography, 
radiological  detection  devices  and  so  forth,  because  these  instruments  facilitate 
some inspection processes. 
 
·  The ICT industry because it provides hardware, software and communications for 
many security solutions. 
 
                                                 
13  According to Wharton (2005:155) the European insurance companies still play in this area a low role. WORKING PAPER 43 
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SURVEY APPROACH 
 
The  survey  has  been  based  mainly  on  available  information  related  to  the  security 
sector. The list of references at the end of the study reflects the main data sources used. 
A  considerable  part  of  the  survey  has  been  devoted  to  collect  and  analyse  such 
information.  The  sparse  and  fragmentary  nature  of  said  information  has  made  the 
appraisal of this economic sector more complex. Few complete studies on this market 
have been found, confirming the initial hypothesis of an area where knowledge gaps 
exist. 
 
Market studies performed by consultancy companies such as Frost & Sullivan, Inc., 
Gartner, Inc., International Data Corporation (IDC) or Ecorys have been quite useful, 
having in mind that open reports offering some numbers about the security sector are 
few. Information of the security market in Central and Eastern Europe is very scarce. 
Probably this is due to a less developed market vis à vis Western Europe. The EU 
Competition merger reports of security companies have been also a source of accurate 
insights on some market segments. During the study the author was able to assist to the 
Security Essen fair held between the 5
th and the 8
th of October 2010, where he had the 
opportunity to dialogue with some industrial representatives. 
 
The survey follows a descriptive approach complemented with the analysis of main 
patterns  and  features  identified.  The  traditional  Structure  –  Conduct  –  Performance 
method has guided this analytical process. Classical literature on industrial organisation 
such  as  Scherer  (1980),  Tirole  (1988)  and  Martin  (1993,  1994)  have  provided 
theoretical insights to discover and understand fundamental patterns of this industry. 
Some studies coming from the defence market (Hartley, 2007: chapter 33) have been 
also a good information source since large and complex security systems suppliers, in 
particular in the high-end government market, show similar patterns. The use of analogy 
and educated assessments has been made when information available was poor. 
 
The multiple dimensions of security make suppliers in this economic sector numerous 
and diverse. An exhaustive analysis of all industries involved would be, in addition to 
unfeasible, meaningless. It has been thought that it would have more sense to focus the 
survey in the more important and developed markets where the industry has been able 
to  work  out  cost-effective  solutions  to  security  needs  which  generate  considerable 
revenues  such  as  video-surveillance,  access  control,  intrusion  detection,  security 
services, transport- or ICT-security. Yet an effort has been made to mention and briefly 
describe the whole market especially for those products and services related to relevant 
threats, although their economic size could be considered small. The survey highlights 
also  emerging  markets  with  good  growth  prospects  where  products  are  in  the 
development stage and only available as prototypes or pilot projects. 
 
Concrete  examples  have  been  provided  about  products  and  services  and  industry 
suppliers  to  better  explain  some  market  features.  Their  names  are  given  only  as 
examples  of  industrial  capabilities  and  do  not  represent  any  positive  or  negative 
recommendation about them. 
 
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION 
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This  report  has  been  organised  in  nine  chapters.  An  introduction,  facts  about  the 
security  industry,  basic  market  conditions,  main  market  segments,  the  role  of 
government,  market  structure,  market  conduct,  market  performance,  summary  and 
conclusions.  A  list  of  acronyms  and  references  used  across  the  study  closes  the 
document. 
 
The introduction describes the goals of this survey and provides a definition of this 
economic  sector  in  order  to  fix  the  scope  of  the  research.  This  definition  helps  to 
identify  the  suppliers  and  the  main  products  and  services  provided  in  this  market. 
Boundaries with other markets and industries closely related with this economic sector 
are also discussed. Finally, a short explanation of the methodology used for doing the 
study is made. 
 
The next chapter provides some quantitative information about this economic sector. It 
includes  information  about  EU  and  Member  States  expenditures  including  R&D 
outlays, industrial revenues across market segments, country distribution, employment, 
market  trends,  imports  and  exports  and  markets  in  other  world  regions.  The  main 
problems  related  to  the  collection  and  accuracy  of  quantitative  information  are 
highlighted. Time series, when available, have been presented and commented. A short 
description  of  the  Member  States  industry  and  table  showing  the  main  European 
security firms is also given. 
 
The  chapter  of  basic  market  conditions  describes  those  exogenous  factors  from  the 
demand and the supply side with relevant influence on the market. Key aspects of the 
demand include main customers, demand drivers and restraints, geographic markets, 
price  elasticity  and  substitutes,  growth  rate  and  cyclicality,  and  marketing  and 
purchasing  methods.  The  relevant  question  of  a  European  security  market,  where 
national boundaries set barriers to the single market, is analysed in detail. The supply 
side  describes  key  aspects  such  as  the  supply  chain,  technology,  research  and 
development, product and services features, and the role of standards. 
 
The next chapter provides a detailed analysis of the main market segments. It highlights 
the different classes of products and services supplied in this market, emphasizing the 
specific conditions of demand and supply associated to them. For each of these classes, 
the  main  features,  technologies,  providers,  supply  chain,  customers,  regulatory 
conditions  and  market  trends  are  described.  Whereas  the  study  concentrates  on  the 
European  industry,  a  close  look  is  made  also  to  the  world  industry  due  to  the 
international character of the market. Products and services have been grouped around 
the following areas: preparedness, intelligence and surveillance, protection, interdiction, 
response and recovery, and forensics. 
 
The following chapter analyses the government role from four basic points of views. 
The first is the role of government as entrepreneur. The second is the role as supporter 
of the industry and as improver of its dynamic performance. The third is as a large 
purchaser of security solutions, and the fourth is as enacter of specific regulations with a 
relevant impact on the demand and quality of security goods and services. Main EU 
initiatives and regulations in this area also presented. 
 
The key topics that lay down the market structure are analysed in the next chapter. It 
addresses  questions  like  the  main  market  agents,  product  differentiation,  entry WORKING PAPER 43 
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conditions,  cost  structure,  industrial  concentration,  and  the  role  of  imports.  Entry 
conditions analyses questions like economies of scale, absolute cost advantages, sunken 
costs and R&D. The concentration analysis considers horizontal and vertical integration 
within the supply chain as well as conglomerates and joint ventures. This analysis is a 
previous step to study market conduct and assess market performance. 
 
The  market  conduct  chapter  analyses  the  behaviour  of  industry  to  achieve  its  goals 
focusing on those aspect that might have a negative impact on market performance. It 
analyses  questions  related  to  pricing  such  as  competition,  collusion,  exclusionary 
practices and vertical restraints. The strategies related to the product such as research, 
development  and  innovation;  marketing  and  advertising;  bundling  or  contract 
implementation practices are examined. Conduct regarding mergers and takeovers with 
influence on market structure is also assessed. A list of more important mergers in the 
sector is also presented. 
 
The market performance chapter analyses questions related to industrial performance. It 
analyses the three main aspects of market performance, namely allocative efficiency, 
productive efficiency, and dynamic efficiency or rate of technological progress. The 
analysis discusses in detail the impact of the industry structure and its conduct on such 
performance. The role of incentives in dynamic efficiency is discussed in more detail, 
since this is an essential question in this market. Government intervention to encourage 
such efficiency is also discussed. The life cycle of technology is presented as a method 
to  assess  the  evolution  of  this  industry  and  the  problems  it  faces  to  achieve  best 
performance. Some economic indicators are used to better assess the performance of 
this industry. 
 
The last chapter sums up the main findings of the survey. It describes the main market 
features, and it envisages future market trends such as areas of future growth, the role of 
the  defence  industry  in  this  market,  and  the  permanent  need  of  research  and 
development.  It  also  infers  some  conclusions.  In  particular,  it  assesses  the  different 
vision of security to each side of the Atlantic and its large impact on the industry as well 
as the complexity of the efficient allocation of resources to security. Some areas where 
there is a chance for improving market performance based on some policies are pointed 
out as could be the case of a more consolidated EU market, profiting for advances in 
other market sectors. Finally, a way ahead concerning future research on this economic 
area is suggested. WORKING PAPER 43 
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II. FACTS OF THE SECURITY INDUSTRY 
 
The terrorist attacks to the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington 
(2001), that was ensued by the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings, raised 
concerns  of  many  nations  about  their  security.  These  attacks  have  resulted  in  the 
creation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with an important budget 
to  address  security  issues  that  was  mimicked  with  expenditure  increases  of  EU 
institutions as well as Member States. Such expenditures have stimulated the demand of 
security goods and services, and the growth of this market. 
 
The  European  security  market  is  second  only  to  the  North  American  market.  Yet, 
getting numbers about the size of this market in terms of revenues or employment is not 
easy. The statistical classifications used by governments to record economic activity do 
not help to measure this activity. NACE version 2 reserves some codes for security 
related services
14, but the supply of many security good and services are included in 
broad category codes, where those  addressing  security  cannot be  easily  demerged
15. 
Therefore, the utility of official sources of information for estimating the size of this 
economic sector is limited. 
 
Estimates of industrial output and employment may be obtained collecting data from 
industry, but here problems also arise. First, the identification of all the firms operating 
in  the  market  is  required,  including  first  and  second  tier  suppliers  of  key  security 
equipment.  Identifying  the  suppliers  is  certainly  complex  having  in  mind  that  the 
number  of  companies  operating  in  the  market  is  rather  large.  Furthermore,  since 
companies operate simultaneously in many markets and countries, information about 
security revenues and exports are not always disclosed. Even if data were available, it is 
normally  considered  confidential  for  commercial  reasons  and  is  not  delivered  to 
researchers  on  this  topic.  Moreover,  some  market  figures  obtained  by  consultancy 
companies are often derived from estimates based upon interviews whose reliability is 
unknown and whose audience may not cover the complete sector. This explains that 
computed  values  from  distinct  sources  frequently  show  large  differences.  All  these 




                                                 
14  They are: code 80.10 for private security activities, 80.20 for security systems services activities and 
80.30 for investigation activities. Code 84.24 is used for Public Order and Safety and code 84.25 is 
used for Fire Services. 
15  This  includes  code  25.72  Manufacture  of  locks  and  hinges;  code  25.99  Manufacture  of  other 
fabricated metal products n.e.c. that includes safes,  strongboxes and armoured doors; code 26.30 
Manufacture  of  communication  equipment  that  includes  CCTV  cameras  and  fixed  and  mobile 
communication  systems  for  security;  code  26.51  Manufacture  of  instruments  and  appliances  for 
measuring, testing and navigation that includes equipment for surveillance and inspection; code 32.99 
Other  Manufacturing  n.e.c.  that  includes  safety  gloves  and  headgear;  code  33.20  Installation  of 
industrial machinery and equipment that includes the installation of security equipment; code 43.21 
electrical  installations  that  includes  burglar  alarm  systems;  code  47.59  Retail  sale  of  furniture, 
lightning equipment and other household equipment that includes electrical alarm systems; code 70.20 
Technical Testing and Analysis that includes operation of police laboratories, and code 74.90 Other 
professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c. that includes security consulting. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Since the State is one of the main investors in security relevant information can be 
obtained from budgetary information. Some Eurostat figures can be obtained of these 
expenditures as can be seen in table 1. 
 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Austria  779,1  839,3  837,2  922,3  912,6  922,8  945,1 
Belgium  715,6  834,0  873,1  760,5  794,5  804,6  821,8 
Denmark  531,6  549,1  581,6  625,6  674,8  698,3  744,6 
Finland  650,0  603,0  633,0  613,0  637,0  635,0  672,0 
France  4.362,0  4.973,0  5.447,0  5.775,0  5.956,0  5.952,0  6.178,0 
Germany  9.520,0  10.060,0  9.860,0  10.520,0  10.640,0  11.350,0  12.100,0 
Greece  189,0  195,0  222,0  263,0  267,0  288,0  406,0 
Ireland  510,4  579,5  598,7  635,9  696,0  872,2  1.023,5 
Italy  3.868,0  5.088,0  5.371,0  5.239,0  5.451,0  5.403,0  5.710,0 
Luxembourg  49,7  61,5  79,1  84,6  89,9  85,8  80,1 
Netherlands  2.657,0  3.169,0  3.336,0  3.490,0  3.507,0  3.951,0  4.281,0 
Portugal  384,5  348,3  412,4  390,9  432,4  429,4  449,4 
Spain  2.529,0  2.922,0  3.119,0  3.591,0  3.794,0  4.063,0  4.702,0 
Sweden  1.212,5  1.356,6  1.348,0  1.281,0  1.364,8  1.510,5  1.552,7 
United Kingdom  15.393,9  17.230,5  17.032,1  19.635,8  20.786,7  21.121,3  21.997,8 
EU-15  43.352,3  48.808,8  49.750,2  53.827,6  56.003,7  58.086,9  61.664,0 
Bulgaria  136,5  46,5  168,3  176,1  184,6  161,4  286,0 
Cyprus  29,0  33,4  36,0  35,7  34,4  39,2  44,1 
Czech Republic  365,4  500,1  480,2  525,8  527,3  626,6  674,4 
Estonia  62,9  75,4  79,3  66,6  88,1  106,7  131,0 
Hungary  277,0  410,9  346,0  349,9  361,2  349,4  361,8 
Latvia  45,6  43,5  44,8  54,3  112,9  172,3  221,8 
Lithuania  49,0  60,3  68,4  79,8  89,3  112,9  145,9 
Malta  14,5  13,5  15,2  13,9  13,1  12,6  12,4 
Poland  0,0  845,4  983,0  1.064,7  1.428,6  1.653,8  1.960,0 
Romania  0,0  279,3  389,6  382,5  670,8  686,6  469,4 
Slovakia  256,1  250,1  186,5  269,1  280,7  346,0  368,3 
Slovenia  114,4  119,5  126,9  132,9  126,3  150,0  179,6 
EU-12  1.350,4  2.677,9  2.924,2  3.151,3  3.917,3  4.417,5  4.854,7 
EU-27  44.702,7  51.486,7  52.674,4  56.978,9  59.921,0  62.504,4  66.518,7 
Growth rate    15,2%  2,3%  8,2%  5,2%  4,3%  6,4% 
Table 1. Government expenditures in Public order and safety (2001-2007) 
Source: Eurostat (series: General Government expenditure function, Classification of the functions 
of government: 3 Public Order and safety, National accounts indicators: P2 Intermediate 
consumption + P5 gross capital formation). Values in million €. 
 
Table 1 records public order and safety expenditures for European countries. This value 
corresponds to 0.5% of GDP of the EU-25 for 2007; 0.4 for intermediate consumption 
and only 0.1 for gross capital formation. It includes expenditures in police services, fire 
protection, law courts, and prisons. This value is 25% smaller than the defence sector. 
From the table, it can be seen that the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy are 
the four main consumers. 
 
The table shows a moderate growth rate similar to defence expenditures, with a peak 
between 2001 and 2002 that might be explained by the 9/11 attacks which raised the 
social  perception  of  insecurity.  However,  the  attacks  in  Madrid  (2004)  and  London 
(2005) did not reflect a leap in government expenditures. This may be due to the fact WORKING PAPER 43 
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that  the  increase  in  security  expenditures  was  reflected  in  the  budget  of  transport 
organisations  that  is  not  reflected  in  these  values.  For  example,  the  Madrid  Metro 








Total  R&D 
million € 
Austria  0.3  0.1  0.4  29.9 
Belgium  0.2  0.1  0.3   
Bulgaria  0.4  0.4  0.8   
Cyprus  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.0 
Czech Republic  0.4  0.1  0.5  1.5 
Denmark  0.3  0.1  0.4   
Estonia  0.5  0.7  1.2  0.0 
European Union (27 countries)   0.4  0.1  0.5   
Finland  0.4  0.0  0.4  4.0 
France  0.2  0.1  0.3   
Germany   0.4  0.1  0.5  300.0 
Greece  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.0 
Hungary  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.0 
Ireland  0.5  0.1  0.6  0.0 
Italy  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.0 
Latvia  0.6  0.0  0.6  0.0 
Lithuania  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.6 
Luxembourg  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Malta  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.0 
Netherlands  0.6  0.2  0.8   
Norway  0.3  0.0  0.3  0.4 
Poland  0.4  0.2  0.6  7.1 
Portugal  0.2  0.0  0.2  28.0 
Romania  0.2  0.1  0.3   
Slovakia  0.5  0.2  0.7   
Slovenia  0.3  0.1  0.4   
Spain  0.3  0.1  0.4  0.0 
Sweden  0.4  0.1  0.5   
United Kingdom  1.0  0.2  1.2  72.8 
Table 2. Government expenditures in Public order and safety 
Source: Eurostat gov_a_exp (COFOG) 
 
Table 2 shows for 2008 government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. As can be 
seen from the table, values significantly differ between Member States. This suggests 
differences  in  national  perceptions  of  insecurity  and  in  the  preferred  mix  of 
consumables, services and long term investments aimed at achieving security. 
 
The values shown could only be considered as an estimate of the overall demand size 
for  three  reasons.  First,  it  contains  information  related  with  the  supply  of  common 
products and services that are not specific for security purposes such as fuel. While 
gross capital formation reflects purchases of security equipment, yet the value is merged 
with  expenditures,  such  as  real  state  investments,  that  are  not  part  of  the  security 
market.  Second,  it  does  not  reflect  relevant  security  expenditures  of  other  State 
organisations such as environmental protection agencies, civil protection, or transport 
                                                 
16  http://www.belt.es/noticias/2005/marzo/30/metro.htm as 24/03/2010. WORKING PAPER 43 
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security. Third, it does not consider expenses of private agents such as companies and 
individuals. According to Ecorys (2009:31) report this value ranges between 67,74% 




The European Union is a relevant investor in security. This is because many security 
activities  have  a  true  European  dimension  and  are  led  and  supported  by  the  EU 
Commission. Several Directorate Generals and European agencies purchase goods and 
services related to security. DG Enterprise and Industry manages €1,400 million for 
security research during the period 2007–2013 (see below). DG Justice, Freedom and 
Security
17 allocates funds during the same period to programmes related to ‘security 
and safeguarding of liberties’ including critical infrastructures protection
18 as can be 
seen in table 3. 
 
  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  Total 
Prevention and fight against crime  58,0  67,0  91,0  107,0  133,0  142,0  147,0  745 
Prevention,  Preparedness  and 
Consequence  Management  of 
Terrorism  and  other  Security 
related risks 
12,7  15,2  17,7  20,3  23,0  23,4  25,1  137,4 
Table 3. DG JLS expenditures related to security and safeguarding of liberties in million €. 
Source: DG JLS web page (10/01/2010) 
 
The Civil Protection Financial Instrument is another source of funds. It has a reference 
amount of €189.8 million for the same period. The EU Health Programme 2008-2013 
supports actions on preparedness and response to CBRN threats to public health. These 
funds  finance  the  different  EU  Rapid  Alert  Systems  in  the  event  of  pandemics  or 
biological contamination. With a financial envelope of €2,062 million for the period 
2007-2013,  the  Instrument  for  Stability  includes  assistance  for  the  development  of 
effective  control  of  illicit  trafficking  in  CBRN  material  or  agents.  The  EU  Phare 
programme has financed during the period 2000 - 2006 some projects related to border 
protection  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  states.  For  the  period  2007-2013  the 
Community will finance €1,820 million through the EU External Border Fund of the 
Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Programme
19. Other DGs involved in 
security projects are Energy, Mobility and Transport, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, 
Information Society and Media, Environmental Protection, and Joint Research Centre 
with its Institute for Protection and Security of the Citizen. 
 
European agencies involved in security issues are Europol (€80 million budget in 2010), 
Eurojust (€30.6 million budget in 2010), the European Border Agency – FRONTEX 
(€83 million budget in 2009), the European Network and Information Security Agency - 
ENISA (€7.9 million budget in 2010), and the European Defence Agency – EDA (€31 
million  budget  in  2010)  also  involved  in  security  projects  as  for  example  Software 
defined  Radio  and  Maritime  Security.  It  is  planned  a  new  Agency  that  will  be 
operational in 2012 that will manage the Schengen Information System (SIS II), Visa 
                                                 
17  This Directorate has been split in two since July 1, 2010: DG Justice and DG Home Affairs. 
18  The European Programme on Critical Infrastructures Protection (EPCIP) was launched the 12
th of 
December 2006. COM(2006) 786 final. 
19  COM (2006) 733 final. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Information System (VIS), EURODAC and other large-scale IT systems in the area of 




Eurostat  gov_a_exp  database  have  been  accessed  to  identify  government  outlays  in 
security research, an important figure in this economic sector. The result is shown in 
Table 2. As can be seen not all nations provide data. With the exception of Germany 
and the United Kingdom, outlays are relatively small. The amount spent by the EU in 
security research is also a relevant value. Within the Preparatory Action on Security 
Research from the period 2004-2006 it was €45 million distributed between 39 projects. 
The expected amount that will be invested in the 7
th European Framework Research 
Programme is €1,400 million from the period 2007-2013, which represents 2.75% of the 
total research budget. As can be seen from the different calls, this activity is heavily 




Since market size is hard to measure from the demand side, we turn now to see if some 
data can be obtained for the supply side. For this purpose, we will use market studies 
performed by some specialised consultancy companies due to the lack of other data 
sources. Such information, however, as we have mentioned, is also subject to problems. 
The methodology used to estimate the numbers and a measure of its accuracy is not 
unveiled. Having in mind that information has been obtained based on interviews there 
is  a  chance  of  some  bias  due  to  estimates  based  on  simplified  reasoning  or  on 
commercially sensitive data. Furthermore, since documents are prepared for a target 
audience (e.g. investors) the risk of some bias slippage in the final figures cannot be 
fully discarded. 
 
Physical security market 
 
Data for the physical security market has been obtained from Frost & Sullivan (2008d). 
It  rates  the  European  security  market  in  2007  of  access  control,  video  surveillance, 
intrusion  detection  and  fire  detection  around  €14.5  billion.  The  market  was  valued 
considering product related services (supply, installation, maintenance) and value added 
services  (alarm  monitoring,  remote  system  management)
20.  The  United  Kingdom, 
Germany,  Iberia  and  France  represented  the  four  largest  markets  in  2007,  with  a 
contribution over 65% of the overall market. Growth rate was estimated around 6.9% 
for the period 2007-2013. 
 
The distribution of the revenues between customers can be seen in the following table
21. 
 
  %  Billion € 
Residential
22  17.6  2.55 
Commercial  35.5  5.15 
                                                 
20  This market was valued by Frost & Sullivan (2004:1-10) in €4.66 billion in 2002. Yet the value only 
accounts for the development and manufacturing of security equipment. It does not include revenues 
of distributors, security solution providers, retailers, system integrators and related business entities. 
21  Frost & Sullivan (2004:6-58) estimated that private enterprises spent in 2002 $7.5 billion on security 
equipment. 
22  Frost & Sullivan (2006) valued this market for 2005 with a lower value: €1.6 billion. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Industrial  14.6  2.12 
Government  16.9  2.45 
Banking and finance  8.4  1.22 
Transport  7.1  1.03 
Table 4. Distribution of the market between sectors 
 
The  distribution  of  the  revenues  between  products  and  services  can  be  seen  in  the 
following table: 
 
  %  Billion € 
Hardware / software  31.9  4.63 
Installation  29.7  4.31 
After sale / maintenance  20.1  2.91 
Value added services  18.3  2.65 
Table 5. Market distribution between products and services 
 
The  distribution  of  the  market  between  the  kinds  of  application  can  be  seen  in  the 
following table: 
 
  %  Billion €  Hardware  
Billion € 
Video surveillance
23  19.6  2.84  0.91 
Access control  14.0  2.03  0.65 
Intrusion detection  22.8  3.31  1.05 
Fire detection  43.5  6.31  2.01 
Table 6. Market distribution between the different applications 
 
The distribution between geographic regions is
24: 
 
  %  Billion € 
United Kingdom  17.12  2.48 
Germany  17.00  2.47 
Spain / Portugal  16.20  2.35 
France  14.70  2.13 
Italy  8.70  1.26 
Eastern Europe  9.70  1.41 
Scandinavia  7.20  1.04 
Benelux  6.20  0.90 
Alpine (Austria, Switzerland)  2.90  0.42 
Table 7. Distribution between geographic areas. 
 
These numbers only reflect the physical security market, but do not account the market 
segment of doors, mechanical locks and fences. To get numbers related to other security 
market segments we have analysed the Ecorys (2009) report whose figures can be seen 
in the next table. 
 
Technologies  EU (low estimate)  EU (high estimate) 
Screening and scanning  3.5  4.5 
Tracking and tracing  3.0  4.0 
CBRNE  1.0  2.0 
                                                 
23  The value of the hardware equipment was estimated by Frost & Sullivan (2007) in $1.42 billion. 
24  However, Frost & Sullivan (2005) rated total sales of security equipment in Germany in the range of 
€1 billion in 2001, and UK value in the range of €2.4 billion. Such differences raise concerns about 
data accuracy. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Biometrics  1.0  1.5 
IT & Secure Communication  6.0  7.0 
Physical security protection  10.0  15.0 
Protective clothing  1.5  2.5 
Total  26.0  36.5 
Table 8. Ecorys estimation of market revenues in billion € (2008). 
 
As can be seen the value for physical security is of the same order of magnitude that the 
one provided by Frost & Sullivan. Yet IDC (2009) provides a higher number for the 
ICT market (see below). These values are decomposed in the following areas. 
 
Sector  EU (low estimate)  EU (high estimate)  Global market 
Aviation security  1.5  2.5  5.2 
Maritime security  1.5  2.5  6.7 
Border security  4.5  5.5  9.9 
Critical infrastructures  2.5  3.5  12.6 
Counter-intelligence  4.5  5.0  19.4 
Physical security*  10.0  15.0  39.2 
Protective clothing  1.5  2.5  10.0 
Total  26.0  36.5  103.1 
* It includes CCTV, access control equipment, intrusion and detection systems, etc. 
Public expenditures estimated between €15.5 to €21.5 billion. 
Table 9. Ecorys estimation of market revenues in billion € (2008). 
 
Manned guarding services 
 
Market value of manned guarding services has been collected from Frost & Sullivan 
report (2008b). Total size of the market is €24.5 billion. CoEES (2009) also provides 
some  numbers  that  are  slightly  different,  but  of  the  same  order  of  magnitude.  The 
Eurostat sbs_na_1a_se_r2) table, however, provides a higher value €34.5 billion. A 
detailed table per member state is provided in chapter III.  
 
Network and information security 
 
IDC (2009) estimated the value of the EU Network and Information Security (NIS) 
market in 2007 in €10.7 billion of which 4.8 corresponds to software products, 4.7 to 
services and only 1.13 to hardware. More details of this market are provided in chapter 
III. 
 
Summing up numbers 
 
Aggregating these numbers, the revenues of the security market in Europe could be in 
the  range  of  €59  billion
25.  This  number  does  not  include  market  revenues  of  areas 
closely related to security like the RFID market, or the electronic payment market. The 
value represents the 0,48% of the total GDP of the European Union in 2007, a value that 
can be considered low when compared with other economical sectors as for example. 
€1,115 billion in transport in the EU in 2005 according to Eurostat (2009) or €670 
billion of the ICT market according to EITO (2007). 
 
                                                 
25  Senger (2006) provides a rough estimate of the European market for the year 2004 around €100 
billion including the computer security and the equipment and services market. WORKING PAPER 43 
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EMPLOYMENT 
 
Private security services are the main source of employment in the security market. 
Frost & Sullivan estimates this figure in 1,240,000 employees for 2007. Eurostat table 
sbs_na_1a_se_r2 provides a quite close estimate 1,112,903 for 2008. Measuring the 
remaining labour force is not easy. For the equipment market, the survey has found only 
a very outdated value in Frost & Sullivan (2004) that estimated this number in 54,500. 
Subtracting revenues of security services from total revenues and comparing it with 
revenues  and employees of the defence industry, a linear estimation could be made 
where working people would give a value in the range of 300,000. Nonetheless, this 
estimates lacks of any empirical ground. 
 
EXPORTS / IMPORTS 
 
Reliable information about export and import has not been feasible. Very obsolete data 
was found in Frost & Sullivan (2004) about export of security equipment regarding 
CCTV, intrusion detection systems, and access control systems. It amounted to €1.31 
billion in 2002 of which 0.19 corresponds to export outside the EU and the remaining 
amount to intra-community sales. The value represents only the 0.04 percent share of 
the total European Union exports in 2002. Imports represented €1.79 billion of which 
0.58 corresponded to imports outside the EU sharing probably the USA the lion share. 
As can be seen, the trade balance was negative for the whole European Union in that 
year. These values, however are rather old, and only reflect part of the security market. 
 
From the different reports analysed Russia, South America (especially Brazil), Middle 
East  (Arabia  Saudi
26,  UAE),  India  and  Far  East  (China
27,  Singapore)  are  the  main 
importing countries. Middle East and Asia seem to be markets with a growing demand, 
a consequence of the shift of fundamental terrorism to these regions due to large support 
populations and lower security controls than USA and Europe (Enders and Sandler, 
2006:201). The private demand of security in South America could be influenced by a 
higher perception of insecurity due to high crime rates, large differences in wealth, and 
the weakness of state law enforcement organisations. These threats combined with low 
domestic industrial capabilities offer business opportunities to the European industry. 
Main exporting firms are large EU companies like the ones mentioned at the end of this 
chapter. The competitive edge of the industry is mainly based on non-price factors. 
MARKET SIZE TREND 
 
Prospects of market evolution are not easy to forecast. As has been shown public and 
private expenditures have overall a positive trend slightly higher than inflation. Yet, 
these values do not collect private investment. Unfortunately, the information is too 
aggregated to identify growth variations in the different market segments. Furthermore, 
time-series information of past growth is a feeble indicator of market trends. 
 
                                                 
26  For example, Saudi Arabia awarded a contract to EADS Defence and Security as prime contractor for 
a full national border surveillance programme valued in €1.6 billion (Defence News, 1 July 2009). 
27  China is a complex market with price controls, high tariffs rates, restrictions on investment from 
abroad and absence of stringent property rights. This creates an adverse business environment for 
foreign companies. According to Ecorys (2009:26), China has used reverse engineering to develop 
products and enter the security market. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Information  can  be  attained  from  market  studies.  These  studies  make  interviews  to 
stakeholders to know their expectations in sales and purchasing plans. Such values may 
be aggregated to get a better estimate of market trends. For example, Frost & Sullivan 
(2005) estimated a compounded annual growth rate above 10% in 2005 a value too high 
compared with the ones recorded in table 1. A more recent report of Frost & Sullivan 
(2008d) for physical security reduces this value to 6.9% till 2013. Having in mind that 
these reports are mainly focused at investment organisations some biases may exist in 
the  information  provided.  Yet,  the  majority  of  reports  consulted  (Frost  &  Sullivan, 
Gartner, Ecorys and IDC) show beyond question a positive trend, at least until 2008. 
This could point out a trend in Europe to invest in security above general growth. 
 
The recent economic downturn that began in 2008 will negatively impact on the market. 
Yet little information is available for assessment. A downturn implies the decline in the 
construction sector, closures of banks and commerce and so on, that will shrink the 
demand.  It  also  means  tighter  budgets  that  will  stifle  large  investments  in  new 
equipment and the life enlargement of deployed systems and a delay in their renovation. 
While continued technological improvements and sustained security concerns (e.g. the 
loss of jobs of a downturn may increase burglaries leading end users to install alarms for 
basic level of protection) may insulate the market to some extent to this fall in demand, 
it probably will not be immune. 
 




A look at USA spending in security is necessary being its market the largest in the 
world and its industry the leader. The main difference that can be observed is the large 
federal budget, in addition to States and cities expenditures, whose yearly value can be 
seen  in  the  next  table.  This  quantity  has  no  comparison  with  EU  Commission 
expenditures that are more modest. Budget includes expenditures in natural and man-
made disasters and the fight against terrorism rather than organised crime. The peak that 
is  observed  in  2006  was  mainly  due  to  the  Katrina  hurricane.  Customs  and  Border 
protection,  Coast  Guard,  Emergency  Management  Agency,  Transport  Security  and 
Immigration and Customs enforcement are the beneficiaries of nearly the 79 % of the 
budget. However, these numbers reflect total budget, not the amount spent in purchases 
to industry as we have shown previously for EU member states. 
 
2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
15.0  17.6  32.0  26.6  38.7  69.1  39.2  40.6  49.2 
Table 10. Homeland Security Budget in billion $. 
Source: The budget for fiscal year 2010, historical tables. Outlays by Agency 
 
The U.S. DHS (2009:17) reserves 2% of the budget to Science and Technology. That 
means that nearly $1 billion is allocated to research  and development. This amount 
could be in practice larger having in mind that some supplies often involve a certain 
amount of development. Nearly one half of the budget goes to CBRN countermeasures 
(James, 2004:33). Yet, the majority of federal homeland security R&D remains outside 
the DHS (ibid.: 34). The Department of Justice also invests relevant quantities in R&D 
as the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) which invest $0.233 billion according to the 
2007 annual report. 
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The  value  of  USA  private  expenditures  is  not  accurately  known.  O’Hanlon  et  al. 
(2003:xii) estimated total expenditures about $100 billion of which $35 is federal share, 
which  means  that  Federal  States,  cities  and  private  organisations  spent  around  $65 
billion.  Civitas  Group  (2006)  estimated  this  value  at  around  43.3%  of  government 
expenditures. Hobijn (2002) and Hobijn and Sager (2007) estimated private spending 
for the USA based upon protective services labour cost and electronic security capital 
cost in a higher value at 83.43%. 
 
The market in other world regions 
 
Some values of the security market in other world regions can be seen in the following 
table. 
 
Country  Revenues in billion € 
EU  26.0 
USA  42.0 
China  13.5 
Japan  3.8 
Israel  2.7 
Russia
28  1.1 
Rest of the world  13.9 
Total  103.0 
Table 11. Security market size in world regions. 
Source: Ecorys (2009) 
 
Other values have been found during the research. Civitas estimated world revenues for 
the year 2006 in the range of $55 billion, where USA share was only $31 billion. This 
amount is considerable smaller that the quantity estimated by Ecorys. EPOSS (2009) 
report estimate the safety and security equipment world market around €25 billion, of 
which 5 billion relates to electronic devices. The market has an expected growth rate of 
7%. The report states that the European market is more than one third of world market 
in this domain (approximately €10 billion). Again, such large differences invite to be 
wary about the accuracy of these quantitative estimates. 
 
MEMBER STATES INDUSTRY 
 
Security companies in Europe show notably differences in size. There are a few number 
large companies with a European, and often international, dimension capable to provide 
products and services across countries. They are followed by medium size companies 
able to operate at national level ensued by a large number of small companies that often 
are only able to operate at regional or local level. Smaller companies mainly focus in 
providing security goods and services to the lowest market segment, i.e. residential and 
private companies market. These companies mainly distribute, install or integrate small 
to medium scale security systems, or provide manned guarding services. 
 
The largest companies have a good market share in some sectors, but Frost & Sullivan 
(2004:3-1) reports that companies holding a share higher than 20% are unusual. Hence 
the  concentration  pattern  is  of  oligopolies  where  a  few  companies  jointly  have  the 
largest market share. In its report, Frost & Sullivan estimates that there were more than 
                                                 
28  The U.S. Commercial Service report written by Elizaveta Ninyaeva (31/01/2008) estimates total size 
in $6.8 billion of which $1.7 was equipment. WORKING PAPER 43 
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150  security  systems  manufacturers  who  have  presence  in  Europe  (100  in  physical 
security and 50 in RFID). It also estimated that the number of distributors and installers 
was very high, in the range of 2,500, most of them of very small size. 
 
Differences in the industry between member states can also be appreciated. It is more 
developed, as could be expected, in the most industrialised member states where a rich 
network of companies provides a solid ground for organising the supply chain. More 
relevant countries are United Kingdom, France and Germany followed by Italy, Sweden 
and Spain. Italy has a large number of small security companies (ibid.: 8-17). Other 
countries,  in  particular  Eastern  Europe,  have  a  smaller  security  industry  with  few 
domestic  production  capabilities.  For  this  reason,  they  have  to  recur  to  imports  for 




In  the  following  table,  it  can  be  seen  the  main  suppliers  of  security  products  and 
services  across  the  European  Union,  being  some  of  them  true  world  leaders  which 
operate in the international market. As can be seen, many suppliers belong to large and 
diversified holding groups. Revenues and employees working in the security market 
have been given. However, such information is not always available. In such a case, 
total holding values have been provided. These companies are often prime-contractors 
in the provision of large security solutions, due to their system integration capability. 
They hold a relevant share in the market segments where they operate. 
 
Company  Main activity  Country of 
origin 
Rev.  Empl. 
Assa Abloy AB
b  Access control systems, doors and locks. 
Companies belonging to the group 
include HID Global, Securitron and 
Keso. 
Sweden  €3,177  32,723 
Axis Comm. AB




Consultancy, design, deployment, 
maintenance and monitoring, CCTV, 
sensors, alarms, system integration 





Nationwide Security, Critical 
infrastructures security, major events 
security, ICT security 
Europe  €5,400  28,000 
CISCO
b  Communications security, networked 
CCTV 
USA  €28,446  66,129 
G4S
b  Solution design capabilities in security 
systems. Manned guarding services. 
United 
Kingdom 
€6,372  561,876 
GE Security  Wide security product portfolio  USA  $1,800  3,150 
Giesecke and 
Devrient 
Banknote production and processing, 
smartcard-based solutions, software and 
services for electronic payment, Security 
documents and identification systems 
GE  $1,700  10,000 
Gemalto NV
b  Identity and security cards  Netherlands  €1,659  10,000 
Gunnebo AB
a  Bank Security & Cash Handling, Secure 
Storage, Entrance Control and Services 
Sweden  €640  6,000 
Honeywell
b  Intrusion, video surveillance, access 
control, integrated solutions. 





Business continuity and resilience 
services, system integration, computer 
security services. 
USA  74,555  398,455 WORKING PAPER 43 
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Ingersoll-Rand
b  Electronic and biometric access control 
systems.  





X-Ray screening systems and Metal 
Detectors. 




Consultancy, design, deployment, 
maintenance and monitoring. 




b  CCTV systems  Japan  €71,977  305,828 
Prosegur





Identification, detection and biometrics   France  €904  5,600 
Securitas Group






Building automation, fire safety and 
security. 
Germany  €7,007  42,575 
Smiths Detection  Explosives, chemical and biological 
detectors; weapons and contraband 
detection. 
USA / UK  €2,300  639 
Sony




Security solutions for supervision and 
control of critical infrastructures, Id 
documents, computer security.  
France  €2,977  19,827 
Tyco Fire and 
Security / ADT
d 
Video-surveillance, RFID, electronic 
access control, intrusion detection, 
electronic article surveillance. 





CCTV, access control, intruder, systems, 
fire detection and extinction. Brands: 
Chubb, Kidde, Onity, Lenel. 
USA  $6,500  43,000 
a: company web page at 12/01/2010. 
b: the 2009 EU industrial R&D investment Scoreboard. 
c: Annual report 2009 page 132 
d: Data provided through direct contact with the company. 
Table 12. Main companies in the security sector. Revenues in millions 
 
RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has presented some relevant numbers and information about the security 
industry.  No  authoritative  source  or  institution  has  been  found  which  provides 
expenditures  on  security,  as  this  term  is  understood  in  this  survey.  We  have  used 
different approaches to obtain the best estimate of this market. First, we have analysed 
government expenditures and second we have tried to estimate some economic values 
based upon information supplied by the proper industry. Based on available information 
total expenditures in security would be in the range of €59 billion of which nearly one 
half would correspond to security services. 
 
While  some  insight  has  been  achieved,  it  can  be  said  that,  unfortunately,  numbers 
obtained should be seen as broad indicators or rough estimations of economic activity 
rather than exact measures; especially having in mind that revenue information has been 
collected based on interviews and unknown methodology. Therefore, numbers shall be 
used and valued cautiously. 
 
Overall, data collected is too patchy to provide a stable ground onto which advanced 
economic analysis of the sector could be performed in order to better characterise and WORKING PAPER 43 
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assess  the  market.  Availability  of  data  and  quantitative  information  remains  an 
outstanding issue that certainly will require further research. Solving practical problems 
to get accurate and reliable information about the market will demand, nonetheless, a 
non-negligible effort whose costs would certainly need some kind of sponsoring. WORKING PAPER 43 
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III. BASIC MARKET CONDITIONS 
 
Basic market conditions can be seen as exogenous characteristics or features with a 
substantial influence on the structure, conduct and performance of an economic sector. 
A meaningful understanding of these conditions is a first step to improve the knowledge 
about the security industry. 
 
Hence, the aim of the current chapter is to examine in detail these conditions from both 
the demand and the supply side. From the demand size we analyse with some detail the 
main customers, demand drivers and restraints, geographic markets, price elasticity and 
substitutes, growth rate and cyclicality, and marketing and purchasing methods. The 
important  question  of  a  single  European  security  market  and  the  barriers  for  its 
consolidation is addressed in detail. From the supply side key aspects such as the supply 
chain, technology, research and development, product and services features, and the role 




Main types of customers 
 
Unlike defence, the achievement of security often calls for some kind of collaboration 
between public and private agents. Whereas private companies and individuals are able 
to protect themselves to some extent applying different measures; they still need the 
support  of  public  bodies  to  effectively  fight  against  terrorism  and  organised  crime. 
Police  forces  and  the  judicial  system  are  essential  instruments  to  enforce  law  and 
prosecute members of these groups, whereas civil protection agencies are crucial to 
provide emergency services and a first response in case of a security incident with wide 
and severe consequences on society. 
 
Governmental organisations and agencies are the main customer in the security market, 
ensued by large organisations, usually in charge of critical infrastructures
29. Companies 
are the third major buyer of security.  Individuals is the smallest market segment in 
revenues, although the largest in number of customers. 
 
Government / Public sector 
 
The government, being the principal and ultimate security provider to society, requires 
relevant  capabilities  in  surveillance,  intelligence,  prevention,  protection,  interdiction, 
response and recovery, and attribution to combat terrorism and organised crime. Such 
relevant role makes the government the purchasing leader of security goods and services 
in  terms  of  volume,  innovation,  projects  scale  and  prominence.  Governments  are 
sophisticated buyers that usually demand high-end products and services, with a large 
industrial impact, to demonstrate effective security solutions. 
                                                 
29  The  European  Council  Directive  2008/114/EC  on  the  identification  and  designation  of  European 
critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection defines a critical 
infrastructure as: An asset, system or part thereof located in Member States, which is essential for the 
maintenance  of  vital  societal  functions,  health,  safety,  security,  economic  or  social  well-being  of 
people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State 
as a result of the failure to maintain those functions. WORKING PAPER 43 
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These capabilities are distributed across different public organisations and agencies like 
police forces, forensics and crime investigation units, customs and border protection, 
prison management, emergency or civilian protection. These organisations and agencies 
have different responsibilities and operational scope (European, national, regional or 
local level). Most of them have their own budget and have autonomy to decide on what 
products  and  services  buy.  This  means  that  acquisition  in  the  public  sector  is  not 
centralized and thereby the different needs and purchasing capabilities of these agencies 




Private companies and organisations are the second major consumer of security. The 
protection of their business becomes an integral part of their strategy in order to avoid 
the economic losses that a security incident may create. Security investment is the result 
of  business  continuity  and  security  plans  that  address  measures  to  defeat  potential 
threats and vulnerabilities. Many corporations have a security department and a Security 
Officer in charge of managing security issues. 
 
Operators and managers of critical infrastructures
30 largely invest in security because 
the  disruption  of  services  they  provide  can  potentially  have,  in  addition  to  internal 
losses, far-reaching and long-lasting consequences due to the dependency that society 
and other infrastructures have on them. Infrastructures deemed critical are transportation 
(road,  rail,  air,  inland,  ocean  and  shore  sea  shipping  and  ports),  health,  energy 
(electricity, oil, gas), water, information and communication, finance, food, chemical 
(e.g.  refineries).  The  production  of  dangerous  goods,  the  defence  industry  and 
agriculture may also share to some extent this critical nature. 
 
Transportation is a paradigmatic example of critical infrastructure since it handles the 
movement of large volumes of people, goods and services. It is international in scope 
and intertwined in economic and social activities. For instance, a few seaports handle a 
major share of the goods moved in international trade, and commuter and rapid rail 
transit  systems  are  the  circulatory  systems  of  urban  environments,  critical  to  the 
functioning of towns and cities (NRC, 2002:211). 
 
Being transport a major target of terrorism, organisations and companies involved in 
this activity are large security investors. The most developed area is air transportation 
where the identity of the traveller and the inspection of his belongings inspection are 
routinely performed. These controls are complemented with surveillance of main areas 
of the airport, protection of the perimeter protection against intrusion, and access control 
for the working personnel. Rail and road transport also benefit from security measures, 
however the open nature of these systems and the large mass movement they often 
support limit certain kind of controls since, being too strict, they will cause intolerable 
delays (above 15-30 minutes). 
 
                                                 
30  These infrastructures are indistinctly owned by state agencies, private companies and often managed 
through some form of public / private partnership. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Banks and financial institutions invest largely in security to protect the high value assets 
they custody against theft. Retail stores also invest in security for the same reason
31. 
Private organisations with a large number of users and customers like shopping malls, 
cruise ships, resorts, amusement parks, or sport arenas are also large investors to avoid 
any security incident. 
 
Individual and residential market 
 
Individuals  buy  security  to  protect  themselves  and  their  main  assets,  fundamentally 
against ordinary crime and theft. Since household is the main asset and the place where 
people live, this market is many times known as residential market. According to Frost 
& Sullivan (2006) estimates there were 163.7 households in the EU in 2005 of which 
5.5% were equipped with some kind of security equipment. This low value suggests that 
security does not hold a high priority in the individual’s life and that current measures –
based mainly on fences, doors and locks– do satisfy security needs of the majority of 
citizens, been seen more advanced measures as a kind of luxury expenditure. 
 
Demand drivers and restraints 
 
The sense of security is a fundamental desire of the human being. This is the ultimate 
reason of the demand of goods and services, since they are able to reduce or remove the 
chance of suffering damage on what one values most such as life and property. 
 
A naïve approach would suggest that security expenditures are closely correlated with 
the statistics of terrorism and organised crime. Yet, statistical information of the EU and 
government expenditures and crime does not show prima facie a good correlation as can 
be  seen  in  the  next  figure.  Furthermore,  the  sparser  nature  of  terrorist  actions  still 
correlates worse. This simple explanation, consequently, must be discarded and other 





















Figure 2. Security expenditures and number of crime in the EU. 
                                                 
31  Frost & Sullivan (2004:6-56) estimated around 4.14 million retail stores in the EU (Eurostat number 
for 2007 was only 2.81 million, however information of relevant countries like France or Italy was not 
available). WORKING PAPER 43 
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Source: Eurostat. 
 
From  an  economic  viewpoint,  the  decision  to  implement  security  and  preparedness 
measures should be driven by whether the benefits of added investment outweigh the 
costs of doing so. Additional resources should be allocated until the marginal benefits 
(i.e. reductions in expected losses of an attack) no longer exceed the marginal costs of 
improving security measures. Putting this rather simple principle into practice, however, 
is not straightforward, making it hard to estimate optimal levels of protective measures, 
or ordering them by priority. This is owed to the complexity of measuring the cost of 
terrorism and organised crime in quantitative, accurate and objective terms, and the 
benefits of security and preparedness measures in reducing such cost. Benefits and costs 
depend on many variables, whose real value and influence is unknown and traditional 
cost-benefit analysis is rendered nearly impossible (Jackson et al., 2007b:38). Here, we 
analyse in detail these foreseen difficulties grouped around the following areas. 
 
a)  Risk perception, loss expectations and risk aversion, 
 
b)  Investment required to gain a feeling of confidence or peace of mind, 
 
c)  User acceptance. 
 
Risk perception, loss expectations and risk aversion 
 
Risk perception, loss expectations and risk aversion lay down the expected utility of a 
security investment. The frequency and the type of incidents occurred in the past, and 
the damage on possible targets may serve to assess risk and the undesired consequences. 
These values can be combined to measure the likelihood-weighted losses of a potential 
security  incident  and  compare  it  with  the  cost  of  implementing  a  security  measure. 
Finally  risk  aversion  will  determine  the  customer  willingness  to  overinvest 
(underinvest) in security being he or she adverse (prone) to risk. 
 
This quantitative measure is however troublesome. On the one hand risk assessment 
requires information regarding the likeliness of such events as for example predilection 
of  terrorism  on  a  certain  target.  This  assessment  is  not  feasible  when  statistical 
information about terrorism and organised crime behaviour is unavailable or it is not 
disclosed  by  intelligence  and  law  enforcement  agencies  for  security  reasons
32. 
Nevertheless, in a context where group behaviour changes according to past experience 
and evolving circumstances, historical data might be misleading for assessing risk. 
 
The difficulties to assess risk scientifically –and its reduction due to a new solution– are 
highlighted in OECD (2003b:15). Models, such as game theory, may be used to palliate 
                                                 
32  Private organisations may be also reluctant to share with the government their proprietary knowledge 
about their vulnerabilities and preparedness level, as well as to report security breaches for fear of 
negative market reaction. This is because they may be exposed to firm liability, drop in share value, 
and loss of customer trust and competitiveness. Chalk (2008:7) for example reports that one half of 
piracy  attacks  are  unreported  due  to  the  losses  associated  to  the  incident  reporting.  Data  breach 
notification acts exist in some USA states regarding the loss of personal data. The European Union 
has develop a proposal of Directive on this issue (see the common position 16497/1/08 adopted by the 
Council on 16 February 2009). The directive relies on ‘naming and shaming’ to encourage firms to 
improve protection of personal data. This levels up the playing field and prevents the competent being 
penalised for taking protection seriously (Anderson et al., 2007:26). WORKING PAPER 43 
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some  weaknesses,  in  particular  when  the  empirical  frequency  distribution  for  very 
uncommon  events  cannot  be  identified  and  the  real  performance  of  the  new 
countermeasure is unknown. A large variety of disciplines and areas of expertise needs 
to be combined to develop valid threat scenarios and to understand causal relations and 
the phenomenon under analysis in order to unfold a workable model. Anyhow, models 
have  to  simplify  reality  assuming  linear  relationships  or  standardised  behavioural 
patterns of human beings and are not immune to a certain degree of subjectivity. These 
limitations may make these models inappropriate to explain, reproduce or predict with 
accuracy and reliability real world conditions and complex phenomena. 
 
The  evaluation  of  potential  damages  is  hard  to  estimates.  It  needs  to  assess  the 
likelihood that the terrorist or criminal action succeeds as well as the likelihood that the 
damage propagates (second order effects) due to interdependencies of the target with 
other assets
33. Cross-effects of different security measures to reduce risk and damages 
are also hard to ascertain. Moreover, the quantification of losses such as property and 
assets, restoration costs, or loss of revenues may be relatively easy; but non-monetary 
values such as business reputation, personal suffering, items losses of purely personal 
value (e.g. the symbolic value of a national monument), or family stability are harder to 
evaluate.  Finally,  long-term  effects  of  protracted  events,  such  as  changes  in 
consumption and investment spending on different sectors (e.g. tourism) due to risk 
aversion, are often neglected due to their computational complexity. 
 
The cost of new measures raises also problems. The total cost of ownership needs to 
consider (research and) development as well as system operation and maintenance costs. 
These  values  will  have  some  degree  of  uncertainty  until  implemented.  Cost  shall 
include not only the financial and material costs but also other more intangible such as 
any reduction in privacy and civil liberties, inconvenience, or time spent by the public 
due to security measures. 
 
Risk assessment and its reduction due to a new investment is made therefore within an 
environment of bounded rationality  (Simon, 1978) based on cognitive biases due to 
unavailable  or  wrong  information  about  perceived  levels  of  threat,  imperfect 
information  on  the  effectiveness  of  security  measures,  inability  to  make  complex 
calculations under uncertainty demanded by strict rational choice, simplified models 
subject to scientific controversy, where interest and attitudes of those involved in the 
decision –such as elected official, experts, the public and firms– may differ, and where 
psychological factors such as culture, age, character may play a significant role. In such 
environment there is no objective measure of risk and different views of risk, involving 
different  technical  considerations,  may  be  pertinent  and  legitimate.  In  such  a  case, 
maximizing the expected utility or net pay off is extremely complex for policy makers 
for two reasons. First, because data collection and utility computation is costly, and 
second because there may exist more than one and often competitive objectives, whose 
indifference curves to make trade-offs, are hard to determine. This may be particularly 
true in decisions for safeguarding against low probability events characterised by large 
losses, as many security events are, where probability and losses based on statistical 
analysis will have a low degree of confidence. 
 
                                                 
33  For example, many benefits of ICT systems applied to security derive mainly from the capability to 
speed  up  response.  Developing  models  on  how  faster  response  can  reduce  eventual  costs  is  a 
substantial challenging task. WORKING PAPER 43 
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A decision process driven by bounded rationality is based on heuristics, whereby only a 
tiny part of the space of potential solutions is analysed –since alternatives have to be 
searched for at a cost–, and simplified reasoning, whereby rules of thumb and rough 
estimations are used to rank solutions. Such process will settle for solutions that appear 
to be good enough whether or not truly the best. Bounded rationality may give room to 
decisions  where  intuition,  emotion  (fear  and  moral  panics),  pre-established  beliefs, 
constituencies concerns, the behaviour of other actors, or debatable slanted reports may 
play their role. This explains, for example, that after a terrorist attack overinvestment is 
quite frequent due to a higher risk perception, in particular when the means of attack are 
novel  or  the  location  is  unprecedented,  while  just  the  opposite  occurs  after  a  large 
period without incidents. This pitfall is caused by the use of the ‘availability’ heuristics 
whereby a very recent event is taken as a signal that similar events are likely to happen 
soon,  a  method  that  leads  to  systematic  and  serious  biases  on  probability  estimates 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). 
 
Risk aversion may accentuate the desire to invest in security well above the expected 
loss. This may influence, for example, Public Authorities that may  feel the need to 
retain the confidence of their constituencies, especially in election years, investing in 
rather visible security measures even if they are not too effective
34. In the same vein, 
many executives likely prefer to invest rather than exposing themselves to the risk of 
being sued for negligence should be the firm target of an attack. 
 
Behaviour influence in risk perception 
 
The behaviour of terrorism and organised crime influences the kind of threat and so the 
demand of security solutions. This behaviour varies between groups due to differences 
in goals, strategies and capabilities. For example, Islamic terrorism is more prone to 
cause indiscriminate mass casualties (Europol, 2009). This behaviour changes over time 
according to changes in the political and economic climate and the capabilities of these 
groups based on their human and financial capital. 
 
A fundamental advantage of these groups is the small risk they confront due to the 
freedom with which they can select the time, place and method of their attacks; the 
small  quantity  of  resources  and  the  economic  cost  that  their  actions  demand,  the 
openness and accessibility of many high pay-off targets, and the easiness to conceal 
their  planned  actions.  This  behaviour,  perceived  from  the  outside  as  unpredictable, 
makes  the  achievement  of  a  wide  protection  very  difficult,  since  safeguarding  each 
potential target is unaffordable. 
 
The decision of a terrorist group to attack is influenced by many factors. Davis (2009) 
enumerates the following ones as the more important: 
 
·  The perceived benefits, which also include the increase of popular support such 
as attacks provoking government repression
35. The acceptability of perceived 
                                                 
34  As  Schelling  (1963)  shows,  in  a  game-theoretic  framework,  an  efficient  strategy  may  be  to 
demonstrate power toward perpetrators, because expectations about the behaviour of the opponent 
may be more relevant than the worthiness of the implemented measures. 
35  Historically  when  groups  have  committed  (or  have  been  perceived  as  committing)  particularly 
atrocious attacks, there have been backslashes in sympathy and presumably in material support as 
well. WORKING PAPER 43 
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risks  to  achieve  operational  success  such  as  weakness  of  defences,  group 
capability, and group effectiveness versus counterterrorism measures. 
·  The acceptability of resources required such as money, technology, people, or 
time. 
·  Enough situational awareness achieved through intelligence
36, surveillance and 
reconnaissance,  as  well  as  technical  knowledge  and  communications 
capabilities. 
Attacks  are  chosen  from  a  combination  of  target  attractiveness,  feasibility, 
effectiveness  and  cost,  and  therefore,  they  are  hardly  random,  though  due  to 
asymmetric information they are perceived so. For example, suicide tactics are used 
primarily  against  well  protected  targets  whose  probability  of  success  using  a 
conventional  method  is  low  and  that  of  apprehension  is  high.  Such  evidence  of 
rationality  means  that  we  can  expect  terrorists  to  be  clever  and  to  make  good 
operational choices that exploit target weaknesses. More positively, however, it means 
that with good intelligence and analysis, we can expect to understand their calculations 
and how to affect them with the adequate incentives. 
 
As a conclusion, it can be said that since terrorists are sensible to operational cost-
benefits considerations. Hence, this information should be used to assess the risk of 
potential attacks and to devise countermeasures that increase their costs and bind their 
benefits. 
Box 2. Factors influencing terrorist decisions and behaviour 
 
The limited availability of resources of these groups and the constraints imposed by law 
enforcement  and  other  well-funded  security  measures,  in  particular  the  need  to  go 
undetected,  place  anyhow  significant  burden  on  these  groups  and  abridge  their 
operational  capability.  This  explains  that  they  apply  a  very  conservative  or  very 
practical  strategy,  grounded  on  widely  diffused,  well  proven  and  inexpensive 
technologies in comparison with those that States can afford
37. Offensive capabilities 
are often limited to a small range of tactics and technologies, mainly based on arson 
(e.g. Molotov cocktails), bombings (based on rudimentary home-made explosives that 
can be readily assembled using ingredients that may be found elsewhere) and firearms. 
Yet, the sheer destruction these groups cause using such means and tactics creates a 
media  sensation  that  is  highly  effective  in  transmitting  their  message  to  the  public. 
Bigger risks are only accepted for high pay off targets where sophisticated equipment is 
indispensable to succeed. This also explains that in spite of the  growing interest of 
terrorism in advanced weapons including CBRN, gathering the resources and means to 
acquire (or manufacture), deploy and use these weapons with success is outside the 
capacity of the majority of these groups
38. 
                                                 
36  Personnel with privileged access to critical infrastructures, particularly control systems, may serve as 
terrorist  surrogates  by  providing  information  on  vulnerabilities,  operating  characteristics,  and 
protective measures. 
37  Yet available technologies are used quite effectively. For example, the internet, satellite phones, and 
other advances in communication permit the coordination of operations and the execution of attacks at 
widely dispersed places. This facilitates their activities and according to Enders and Sandler (2006:41) 
has helped to increase the transnational number of terrorist incidents. Europol (2009) reports that 
several organisations run their own websites on servers located outside the EU –whose owners and 
webmasters cannot be identified easily– to recruit new members, promote radicalization and raise 
funds. 
38  Although  accurate  surface-to-air  missiles  are  widely  available  and  have  been  in  some  terrorists’ 
arsenals  for  years,  they  have  not  been  used  against  commercial  aircraft  outside  conflict  zones. WORKING PAPER 43 
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One  of  the  main  problems  in  evaluating  the  utility  of  security  measures  against 
terrorism and organised crime is that these organisations do not passively react to them. 
On the contrary, they try to undermine those using different methods. For example, they 
may shift their attacks to more vulnerable targets; change their tactics and operating 
methods; use available technology in quite innovative ways, or use new technologies to 
overcome current protective measures such as for example the use of non-metallic guns, 
non-nitrogen-based  explosives  or  flammable  liquid  explosives  to  disable  current 
controls.  In  the  same  vein,  illegal  border  traffic  in  the  south  of  Europe  has  proved 
flexible, innovative and capable of learning, despite substantial efforts at control. 
 
The potential efforts of terrorism and organised crime to degrade the effectiveness of 
defensive systems mean that they must be addressed in planning to ensure that efforts to 
protect  society  are  effective.  Expending  resources  for  systems  that  can  be  easily 
neutralized in a sense does the terrorist’ work for them by diverting those resources 
away from better use (Jackson et al., 2007:132). However, some systems can continue 
to  pose  problems  for  these  organizations  even  after  they  know  how  to  evade  or 
neutralize them. Those problems are a price the group must continue to pay over time-in 
the effort needed to counter the technology, the increased planning burden it creates, 
new or different weapons that must be procured, or resources that must be expended to 
protect the group from its effects (Jackson et al., 2007:132). 
 
If the utility of the security solution significantly falls, as a consequence of the new 
behaviour, to the point of becoming obsolete, it will trigger a new cycle of measures and 
the demand of new equipment in a recurrent process that resembles an arms race. The 
contest of measures and countermeasures between the State and these groups may press 
the research and development of new security equipment with higher performance and 
rise expenditures and product prices, however not always with a clear outcome in terms 
of increased security. R&D will contribute to unit cost escalation, whose steepness will 
depend on the innovation capability of terrorism and organised crime that probably is 
lower  than  defence  arm  races  due  to  their  resource  constraints  and  other  reasons 
commented in Box 3. 
 
The capability of terrorist groups to use technology to leverage the magnitude of their 
attack is also a relevant question when deciding the resources that societies should 
commit to curb their activities. Jackson (2001) analyses this problem and has found 
many restraints on terrorist groups to use adequately technology to achieve their goals. 
He has also found an overestimate of the actual threat posed by the terrorist adoption of 
some weapons due to their complexity. He cites for example the unfulfilled prediction 
made in the 1980s and 90s that the use of grenade launchers would greatly increase. 
The ability to adapt a technology for unique local requirements seems to demand a 
much deeper understanding than that required to just use the technique or product. One 
example  he  gives  is  the  fabrication  of  homemade  mortars  by  the  PIRA.  Although 
                                                                                                                                               
Terrorist, so far as we know, have not attacked agriculture and have not attempted to seize or sabotage 
nuclear reactors (Jenkins, 2006). To date, most terrorist groups have used the internet to facilitate their 
own operations rather than to disrupt the operations of a target audience (Enders and Sandler, 2006: 
257).  The  White  House  (2003:viii)  National  Strategy  to  Secure  Cyberspace  recognises  that  the 
required technical sophistication to carry out such an attack is high—and partially explains the lack 
of a debilitating attack to date. Chalk (2008:19) also explains the low level of maritime terrorism due 
to its technological complexity. Yet, strategically, these groups will be interested in declaring more 
capabilities than available with the aim to raise the threat level and fear. WORKING PAPER 43 
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straightforward in principle, the mortars constructed by the group experts had generally 
proven inaccurate and caused many operational accidents. 
 
While  bomb-making  manuals  are  readily  available  on  the  internet,  those  same 
characteristics mean that the knowledge delivered has likely not been validated and 
could  simply  be  wrong.  Additional  tacit  knowledge  has  to  be  gained  through 
experimentation  than  can  be  dangerous  and  expensive  such  as  deaths  caused  by 
homemade explosives. Moreover, the pressure of law enforcement may prevent the 
adoption of a new technology or deprive the time necessary to adopt it. 
 
Group  leadership  and  structure  may  also  have  a  negative  influence  on  technology 
acquisition. If discussion of problems and solutions is viewed as dissent or criticism to 
the leader for choosing the technology, no such questioning will occur and the group 
will lose the chance to optimize its use. And if a movement chooses to organise itself 
using a cell or leaderless-resistance model –where small independent groups operate in 
varying degrees of ignorance about the plans and intentions of other group members– 
technology adoption by the entire movement will be essentially impossible (as may be 
the case of Al Qaeda in relation to CBRN weapons). 
 
The availability of financial and human resources may hinder the capabilities of these 
groups  to  profit  from  certain  technologies.  Because  of  the  illicit  nature  of  their 
activities, extremist groups cannot take advantage of the labour mobility which exists 
among  commercial  firms.  In  the  absence  of  confounding  factors,  the  larger  an 
organisation, the more likely its members are to posses the appropriate explicit and 
tacit knowledge base to efficiently absorb new technology and the more likely it is that 
the organisation can afford to devote some of its members to technology acquisition 
activities. 
 
Finally, the short live of most terrorist groups partially explains why most operations 
use relatively simple technologies and ‘non-innovative’ tactics. 
Box 3. Terrorism capabilities, technology and innovation 
 
Embedded and dual use security solutions 
 
Security solutions, rather than defence equipment tend to have more than one use. They 
are many times integrated in the design of wider solutions which incorporate specific 
features to underpin security measures. The inherent difficult of measuring objectively 
the utility of security solutions to counter rare events explains that some investment are 
more  palatable  for  decision  makers  when  they  are  meshed  in  solutions  aimed  at 
achieving wider and more peremptory goals. This multipurpose nature helps to justify 
the investment. 
 
Investment required to gain a feeling of confidence 
 
The utility of a security solution depends on the vulnerability reduction in terms of a 
less likely event and fewer consequences. Utility should be measured in terms of net 
value, i.e. after discounting the cost of the investment to trade off between performance 
and cost. In theory, the selection process shall choose the solution whose net value is 
higher. However, the availability of financial resources often limits the set of available 
choices.  That  means  that,  keeping  other  things  equal,  stakeholders  with  bigger WORKING PAPER 43 
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economic  resources  will  tend  to  invest  more  in  security  provided  they  are  more 
effective. And, in macroeconomic terms, it means that nations with a large GDP will be 
more prone to invest in security. 
 
User acceptance and ethical issues 
 
The utility also depends on the acceptance of security solutions which may downshift 
their demand, slowing down or reversing the deployment of these solutions. When the 
security solution is perceived as a degradation of the quality of life, as for example the 
time spent in airport controls, an adverse social, political or psychological response may 
be triggered. This negative response may unfold when the disutility surpasses utility as 
may be the case when disutility is clearly observable, whereas the potential damages of 
a security shortfall are harder to envisage. Disutility may be also perceived very high 
when fundamental rights
39 such as privacy or the search of social cohesion may be 
jeopardised by some solutions, especially when they are not subject in sufficient ways 
to political and judicial scrutiny. 
 
Several  security  solutions  raise  concerns  about  their  potential  impact  on  privacy 
expectations of citizens. Apprehensions, in general, are based on fear of misuse or abuse 
–i.e. that these solutions are used for purposes  other than that for which they were 
intended– and whether the loss of privacy is really required to attain the security goal. 
For example, there is a fear that governments use the new and powerful surveillance and 
facial biometric technologies to track people
40. Employees may fear that management 
will be tempted to monitor their performance using CCTV cameras or access control 
systems. Also at issue is whether people will be arbitrarily monitored based on their 
race  or  ethnic  origin  or  whether  security  staff  may  be  tempted  to  indulge  in  video 
voyeurism by, for example, focusing on young, attractive females. A similar case is 
related to systems used to detect weapons hidden under clothes that show the image of a 
person nearly naked when millimetre waves or backscatter X-ray scanners are used, 
something found too intrusive and invasive by many citizens
41. 
 
Concerns also appear when some technologies may reveal health information. This is 
the case of biometric retinal scans that can identify changes in the retina due to vascular 
dysfunctions caused by diseases such as AIDS, diabetes or high blood pressure. There 
are also concerns that, in the future, facial recognition may be used to detect expressions 
and thus emotional conditions. The lack of friendliness of some security systems may 
also induce a negative response. For example, retina scanning requires close proximity 
with the reading device. People may resist biometric devices because of hygiene issues 
                                                 
39  See the EU charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
40  In January 2001 a face recognition system was installed in the Superbowl in Tampa (Florida) in an 
attempt to identify ‘wanted’ individuals entering the stadium. (NTSC, 2006:73). 
41  Some  prototypes  of  these  systems  have  been  tested  in  airports  in  the  USA  and  Europe.  The 
department for Transport and BAA trialled this kind of system on the Heathrow express train line and 
Paddington railway station in London in early 2006. According to GAO-10-484-T report, TSA plans 
to deploy 1,800 systems by 2014. To protect passenger privacy and ensure anonymity, strict private 
safeguards are built into the scanning procedure. The officer who assists the passenger does not see 
the image that the equipment produces, and the officer who views the image is remotely located in a 
secure resolution room and does not see the passenger. Blurring is also added to protect privacy and 
images are deleted from the system after the person is cleared. On the European view on this issued, 
see  the  European  Parliament  resolution  of  23  October  2008  on  the  impact  of  aviation  security 
measures and body scanners on human rights, privacy, personal dignity and data protection. WORKING PAPER 43 
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such as Japanese citizens
42. And other people may find fingerprint scanning distasteful 
due to its criminal connotations. 
 
The European data protection Directive 95/46/EC sets out strict principles that have to 
be  observed  in  the  design  and  operation  of  security  systems  that  manage  personal 
information. This is the case of systems that store biometric information, video images, 
or e-mail
43 since this information is considered personal data. Principles to observe are 
transparency, legitimate purpose, and proportionality. This implies fair data collection 
(e.g.  right  to  be  informed),  minimised  data  collection,  storage  and  processing;  and 




The demand of widely accepted or regulated security solutions 
 
When security measures are widely acknowledged by society as tacit social norms or 
regulations  acceptable  for  the  level  of  risk,  then  the  demand  of  security  goods  and 
services related to these measures becomes more subject to the overall trend of society 
evolution. This is the case of transport where a more mobile and interconnected society 
is raising the number of passengers (see figure below) and merchandise across the world 
increasing the opportunities of clandestine immigration
45, commerce, theft and the free 
movement  of  terrorists  and  criminals.  The  creation  or  the  expansion  of  airports, 
seaports, mass transport hubs and border checkpoints to support this growing traffic 
demand security  goods and services to verify legitimate travel and trade, and avoid 
merchandise loss. 
 
Figure 3. Air passenger in Europe 
 
In the same way, the demand is correlated with the growth of certain businesses such as 
bank offices, retail stores, office buildings, enterprises or manufacturing units where the 
goods and services related to security and safety are considered an inseparable part of 
the business. The rate of renewal of certain assets like cars, personal computers, or 
                                                 
42  More details can be found in GAO (2002) report. 
43  E-mail is correspondence and is covered by the right to confidentiality of communication laid down in 
the European Convention of Human Rights. 
44  The article 29 of the Directive sets up a Data Protection Working Party as an independent advisory 
body on data protection and privacy. Its mission is laid down in article 30. 
45  This is a consequence of population ageing of most advanced European countries that is creating 
shortages of specific skills combined with the growing population of developing countries and the 
expectations to earn wages in excess of those in their country of origin. This scenario will probably 
persist throughout the next decades. WORKING PAPER 43 
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households  better  explains  the  demand  increase  of  car  antitheft  systems,  software 
security packages, and home alarm systems. The growing momentum of e-commerce, e-
banking services and other on-line services due to the development of the internet and 
the information society is also pushing expenditures in computer security to shatter the 
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Figure 4. Number of European households with connection to the internet. 
 
Security and other societal needs 
 
Investment  in  security  is  driven  by  its  perceived  utility  in  comparison  with  other 
personal  or  societal  needs.  That  means  that  in  periods  with  low  rate  of  security 
incidents, perceived as a less risky environment, or periods where income decreases, 
preferences may turn to other welfare competing needs considered more important such 
as healthcare or education. 
 
The trade-off between security and efficiency 
 
Security  investment  is  associated  with  an  efficiency  loss  since  it  is  often  seen  as  a 
misallocation  of  resources  which  has  to  be  financed  as  an  overhead  internal  cost. 
Security investment are often seen as unproductive since it, like pollution abatement and 
environmental protection, generates an intangible output (often hardly discernible from 
null effect) that is not considered part of private or public accounts. 
 
Security measures are also perceived as a source of disutility since they are expensive to 
apply and usually diminish performance, create inconveniences and cut out customer 
satisfaction. This is because security entails monitoring and enforcing services such as 
inspections  and  controls.  The  paradigm  is  transport  security  where  solutions  reduce 
passengers or cargo throughput due to inspection delays. Other example could be the 
preservation of large dataset of  e-mails or phone calls for investigative purposes  as 
required by the EU data retention Directive 2006/24/EC
46. 
                                                 
46  This directive obliges operators to keep data relating to mobile phone, fixed telephone, internet access, 
email and telephony regarding a communication’s termination data (source and destination) and its 
date, time and duration –but not its content– for at least six months but not longer than two years. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Security investments, whereas reducing fragility and local disruptions that could lead to 
widespread and catastrophic failures, work also against productive efficiency in terms of 
lean production systems, resource concentration to increase economies  of size, ‘just 
enough, just in time’ deliveries to shrink inventories, and infrastructures coupling to 
leverage benefits from scale and interconnectedness
47. This is because security requires 
robustness (system ability to tolerate failures) and resilience that is achievable through 
different means such  as system hardening; redundant assets
48 and  compartmentation 
(geographic backup sites, back-up lines or routes) and spare capabilities like spare parts 
and emergency teams able to provide enough resources to quickly respond and avoid 
any supply congestion in case of an emergency or security incident
49. Consequently, 
security will stifle the competitive advantage of the industry and impact on their profit 
due  to  higher  cost  per  unit  sold  or  loss  of  customer  base  when  such  measures  are 
perceived more as a burden than a benefit. As security measures raise operation and 
transaction costs, they usually have an adverse impact on trade and economy
50. Their 
efficiency and opportunity may be questioned when security incidents are extremely 
unusual, using the social norm that it is hard to justify an expenditure that has not paid 
off (Krantz and Kunreuther, 2007). 
 
The  decision  to  invest  in  security  by  the  private  sector  will  consequently  take  into 
account these positive and negative effects. The assessment will be grounded on a cost-
benefit analysis, whose benefits will be measured by the avoidance of losses related to 
damages to production and distribution facilities, harm to workers, loss of business, loss 
of reputation, legal liabilities and indemnification claims. 
 
Private versus public benefits of security investments 
 
But the social costs could go further and include the harm or loss of life of individuals, 
damage to the environment, and negative effects on other business dependent on the 
targeted industry (e.g. Internet Service Providers). When private benefits of security are 
significantly smaller than social benefits, private firms may have insufficient incentive 
to meet social objectives and companies will not invest adequately in security, thus 
decreasing social welfare due to an improper allocation of resources. This trend may be 
easily reinforced against a background of very competitive and cost sensitive markets 
such as transportation, energy or telecommunications where companies are unable to 
pass such costs on to consumers without experiencing a significant loss in market share. 
 
                                                 
47  For example, integrated supply chains that feed components and other materials to users just before 
they are required and just in the right amounts in order to keep low inventory costs. As Huang and 
Whalley (2006) demonstrate border control delays trigger an inventory raising response. 
48  While such investments do increase security, they do not result in large revenues to the security 
market as is defined in this study. 
49  For example ambulances, beds in hospitals or vaccines stockpiles. Yet, the large costs associated with 
this spare capability explain to some extent the complementary role of armed forces or international 
cooperation in large emergencies. 
50  This may not be the case when customers perceive the transaction as too risky. In such a case security 
measures may be valued positively by the customer and companies will be interested in investing 
more.  This  is  the  reason  of  the  considerable  investment  in  computer  security  of  e-commerce 
companies due to the considerable savings and earnings achieved moving on-line these services as 
well as their assumption of liability for on-line fraud (Anderson and Moore, 2008). In this case, non-
dependable  payment  systems  in  e-commerce  that  may  result  in  identity  fraud  may  reduce  more 
benefits in terms of lost gains from trade associated with transactions foregone than the stolen amount. WORKING PAPER 43 
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When market fails to induce agents to properly invest in security up the desired level, 
then society needs to agree on policy tools to  encourage  agents to  adopt protective 
measures (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003). They may involve self-regulation to forms of 
co-regulation  and  government  intervention.  Self-regulation  uses  codes  of  conduct 
whose main incentive is prestige and reputation. They are often developed by industrial 
associations (e.g. IATA) and may allow that an agent does not make business with other 
agent if the latter has not subscribed the code. Regulation includes mandatory measures 
which are linked to fines and penalties for those failing to implement such measures. 
They are often accompanied of imposition of taxes on certain services or products to 
finance named measures, or fiscal incentives for those that implement such measures. 
The enforcement of regulations requires some kind of inspection system. Third parties 
may assist governments in this inspection as for example insurance companies who will 
reduce the policy premium if measures are properly implemented. 
 
A liability system may also be used to enforce security if companies are found negligent 
of not providing a secure environment for operations and shall compensate employees, 
customers or third parties of the damages undergone by a security incident. Although 
such system has attractive theoretical properties, it faces practical problems due to high 
transactions  costs,  because  determining  the  responsibility  of  the  company  and  the 
amount of damage can be very costly and extremely time-consuming (Kunreuther and 
Heal, 2003). 
 
The role of externalities in security demand 
 
Security investments create positive and negative externalities that may influence the 
demand  of  market  agents.  An  example  of  positive  externality  is  the  government 
investment in law enforcement that may reduce the general capabilities of terrorism and 
organised crime and raise the perceived feeling of security of citizens, lowering their 
willingness to invest in private security (Orszag and Stiglitz, 2002)
51. 
 
Positive externalities may cause underinvestments of the private sector in security. This 
may raise concerns when it provides services that are essential to the functioning of 
society. These services can be considered to some extent as a public good, and hence 
private  losses  of  a  security  incident  will  be  likely  smaller  than  social  losses  as  for 
example some power outages have shown in the past (e.g. Italy 28/09/2003)
52. Hence, 
some remedies as the ones described in the previous section may be needed to achieve 
the desired investment level. 
 
Negative externalities appear when investments in the protection of specific assets may 
deflect attacks to softer targets, thus raising the insecurity of these potential targets. For 
instance,  if  a  government  responds  by  tightening  security  at  official  sites  –such  as 
embassies and government buildings– civilian targets will become relatively less secure 
and attractive (Enders and Sandler, 2006:83). Being security high on a country, terrorist 
attacks may be performed against individuals or corporate offices located abroad; and 
cyber-attacks can be launched against ISP providers with a lax security policy. Another 
                                                 
51  The provision of government of ex post assistance (after hardship) also reduces parties’ incentives to 
appropriately  manage  risk  (before  hardship  occurs)  ex  ante.  This  behaviour  is  known  as  the 
Samaritan’s dilemma. 
52  The externalities caused by the lack of home computers protection, which are increasingly loaded with 
malware aimed at harming other computers, is another example (Anderson et al., 2007:19). WORKING PAPER 43 
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example  is  the  selection  of  airports  with  limited  screening  capabilities  (lack  of 
inspection equipment or expert personnel) or, being capabilities adequate, the attack can 
be  deflected  to  metropolitan  train  networks  such  as  Madrid  or  London  bombings. 
Europol (2009) reports that in the last years Basque terrorist groups mainly carried out 
attacks against soft business such as bank offices and government targets such as local 
administration or police offices. As a conclusion it can be said that investments that 
divert rather than deter terrorism and crime may be excessive from the social point of 
view because private investors will only care about their own protection rather than 
overall deterrence. Furthermore, if those who suffer the negative externality are unable 
to pay for their own security, then some sort of social exclusion may unfold. 
 
Interdependency and cooperation 
 
Many security measures are more effective when they are jointly applied by all the 
members of a community, association or coalition. This is because the overall security 
may be compromised as members do not apply measures and create security gaps while 
they free ride over the benefits of measures implemented by the remaining members. If 
there is no assurance that measures will be implemented by all members, a disincentive 
to invest in security is created (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003). 
 
Coordination  is  therefore  needed  to  agree  on  such  measures.  However,  achieving 
agreements takes time since, as often occurs, preferences and available resources to 
implement such measures differ across members. In such a case, the agreement may 
delay –or even paralyse when it fails– the implementation of the desired measure. Such 
interdependency is a potential source of inertia in the market demand. 
 
Agreements may be between private agents, public and private  agents, EU member 
states or international. For example, the Schengen agreement for suppression of internal 
borders within the EU is an agreement between member states. International agreements 
are  required  for  protecting  activities  with  transnational  dimension  as  is  the  case  of 
transport or telecommunications. They are promoted by international organisations such 
as ICAO or IMO. They state common or harmonised practices, information exchange 
standards or equipment performance. 
 
When some members find the security level insufficient, they may launch unilateral 
actions. This is the case of some USA and European initiatives described in chapter V. 
The main risk of such actions is that they may discriminate nations that have difficulties 
in implementing measures. For example (Chalk, 2008:41) reports that the fulfilment of 
the  ISPS  code  precludes  the  vast  majority  of  littoral  countries.  Aids,  although,  are 
sometimes given to implement the desired measures as is the case of the US DOE’s 
Megaports Initiative. 
 
The role of technology 
 
While the demand curve can be considered fixed in the short-term, it changes over time 
as technological advances are able to offer more attractive products and services as for 
example higher scanning and inspection rates, lower false positives and negatives rates, 
higher  reliability,  savings  on  operating  personnel,  and  fewer  inconveniences.  Such 
displacement  of  the  demand  curve,  when  quantum  leaps  in  performance  or  sharp WORKING PAPER 43 
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reduction of price are achieved, can considerably stimulate the demand, in a similar way 
as the personal computer or the mobile phone attained in the past. 
 
The role of government 
 
Government plays a relevant role on demand since, being the ultimate responsible of the 
security of the citizens, it settles the national security policy. Such policy will determine 
goals and missions and the available budget, which in turn will settle to a large extent 
the demand of security products, in terms of product features, performance and quantity. 
Such policy is largely influenced by the societal perception of risk, but because this 
perception usually differs between social groups, it has to be agreed at political level. 
 
National policy also will influence the non-government demand when incentives for 
citizens and organisations to invest in security are not enough. Governments may enact 
laws and regulations that force such investments in order to attain the social benefits 
that the market is unable to assure. The role of government is discussed in more detail in 
chapter V. 
 
The demand of the individual / residential market 
 
The individual demand of security focuses mainly in household protection against theft. 
Inexpensive  mechanical  locks  –and  sometimes  armoured  doors  and  safe  boxes–  are 
used for this purpose
53. Phones and videophones are usually employed to control access 
to individual residence. More advanced solutions include the installation of intrusion 
detectors connected to an alarm system that may trigger a visual or audible alarm and 
send an automatic warning by phone lines, data lines or mobile net to a central alarm 
system  operated  by  a  security  services  company.  The  changing  EU  housing  pattern 
towards  single  and  double  person  housing  units  is  likely  to  lead  to  an  increase  in 
demand for home alarm systems. The other important asset is the vehicle. It is protected 
using door and ignition locks and keys and may include an intrusion sensor. Its low cost 
makes  that,  today,  nearly  every  medium  range  vehicle  is  equipped  with  it.  These 
systems  are  directly  installed  by  the  car  manufacturer.  The  last  relevant  household 
element  to  protect  is  the  home  computer.  It  requires  software  security  packages  to 
safeguard the equipment from attacks through the internet. 
 
The demand of these products is fundamentally driven by the income, assets value and 
the feeling of insecurity of the householder which is basically influenced by the crime 
rate. Products tend to be standardized because threats are similar in nature and scope 
and customers are very sensible to price. Customers are not too literate on security 
issues and usually receive assessment on what to buy from a local agent or seller. 
 
Home insurance plays a role in the residential market demand. Householders tend to 
install a basic alarm system to get a deduction from the insurance company. Insurance 
often is tied to the awarding of a mortgage that is usually needed when the house is 
bought.  This  explains  that  customers  do  not  have  a  large  interest  in  sophisticated 
products or technologies or the replacement of an old system. This reasoning is also 
applicable to small businesses which insure against theft (Frost & Sullivan, 2008a). 
Specific demand drivers of companies 
                                                 
53  The protection of money, jewels, and other relevant assets by bank offices that can provide a safer 
storage service can be an alternative option. WORKING PAPER 43 
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The security demand of companies is driven by the need to protect business and avoid 
the economic losses caused by a security incident, which may result in employees or 
customer  damages,  assets  losses,  or  business  disruption.  Major  threats  include 
workplace violence, theft, or terrorism. The risk of large companies becoming a target 
of  terrorism  may  be  higher  as  long  as  States  are  increasingly  protection  their 
infrastructures  and  iconic  buildings  make  them  a  difficult  target  to  hit  (see  U.S. 
Department of State, 2004: appendix G). 
 
The  demand  of  companies  focuses  mainly  in  surveillance  systems,  access  control 
systems,  fire  detection  and  extinguishing  systems,  anti-theft  systems  in  finance  and 
retail, and computer security. Small companies usually opt for high-volume, low cost 
security packages and services, while large companies have more room for solutions 
tailored  to  their  needs.  Investments  apart  from  material  and  equipment  also  include 
security  services  to  operate  and  maintain  the  security  system  as  well  as  guarding 
services. 
 
Overall large companies tend to be more effective in developing security solutions than 
medium  and  small  business
54.  Large  companies  usually  have  a  better  knowledge 
regarding threats and potential solutions than small companies which may find more 
costly to shop the best value for money product. Since security solutions tend to exhibit 
economies of scale –i.e. decreasing cost of security per unit protected– the former may 





The  security  market,  following  the  general  trend  of  other  industrial  sectors,  can  be 
considered  today  largely  globalized.  The  majority  of  security  services  and  products 
including  their  subsystems  and  components  are  sold  worldwide  with  few  trade 
constraints. Controls only apply to certain types of equipment able to cause physical 
harm  such  as  small  arms
55,56  Globalisation  affects  the  whole  supply  chain  where 
comparative advantages in customer knowledge, system integration, advanced products 
and technologies and low cost manufacturing allies to provide a system with the best 
value for money. 
 
This  global  character  of  the  market  is  reflected  in  the  existence  of  large  security 
suppliers  with  a  European  or  international  dimension.  This  is  the  case  of  U.S. 
companies  like  General  Electric,  Tyco  or  Rapiscan;  EU  companies  like  Securitas, 
Siemens, Bosch, Smith Detection, or Sagem Morpho; or Japanese companies like NEC, 
Panasonic  or  Sony.  Companies  from  Korea,  Taiwan  or  China  also  sell  electronic 
components related to security in the international market. Foreign direct investment 
rather  than  awarding  production  licenses  seems  to  be  the  preferred  way  of  these 
                                                 
54  IDC (2009:40) reports this fact in the computer security market, but the argument seems to be valid 
for other kind of security measures. Being the case, it means that mandatory security regulations may 
be relatively more costly to implement by small companies and organisations (e.g. a small airport) this 
creating an uneven playing field. 
55  According  to  Ecorys  (2009:180),  export  of  chemical  detection  devices  is  blocked  by  customer 
authorities to countries, when they are included in the list that prohibits export of dangerous materials. 
56  The recent Directive 2009/43/EC on intra-community sales is aimed at reducing such controls within 
the European Union. WORKING PAPER 43 
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companies  to  increase  revenues.  These  companies  have  frequently,  apart  from 
marketing  and  post-sale  services,  production  facilities  in  foreign  countries  and  even 
research facilities such as Bruker Daltonics facilities in Bremen and Leipzig . These 
large companies operate in the stock market and their shares can be bought by foreign 
investors. 
 
Notwithstanding, geographic proximity between buyers and sellers often provide key 
advantages  for  selling  products  and  services.  Local  distributors,  suppliers  and  value 
added  resellers  usually  have  a  better  knowledge  of  the  market  and  culture  of  their 
customers  and  provide  more  efficiently  services  like  design,  installation,  training, 
operation,  maintenance,  or  repair  in  terms  of  rapidness  and  cost.  This  explains  the 
presence of large number of small size local suppliers and distributors and the territorial 
spread of security companies along the EU Member States. 
 
Is the European security market fragmented? 
 
One question that is often raised is that the European security market is fragmented and 
unstructured
57 in the sense that markets are national, a level playing field is lacking due 
to  differences  in  national  security  policies  and  regulations
58,  and  the  demand  is  too 
fragmented  due  to  the  large  diversity  of  customers  in  some  areas  such  as  personal 
protective equipment (PPE). This question is important since departures from the single 
market may weaken competition, and impede the achievement of economies of large 
production and consequently it may negatively impact on market performance
59. 
 
The analysis performed along this study shows that many security companies have a 
true European dimension as they operate in different Member States. Therefore, at first 
glance, it seems that artificial barriers, such as specific national regulations or standards 
that may impede companies to sell products and services in other Member States are not 
insurmountable (see EU merger 3688) although they could have a more relevant impact 
in small and medium size companies. Evidence of a large internal trade of security 
products have been found in Frost & Sullivan (2004: 9-7) where it can be seen that 
intra-community  sales  amounts  28,11%  of  total  sales.  Openness  of  the  market  to 
imports seem also relevant having in mind that for the same period 12,66% of purchases 
were made outside the EU. 
 
Still, fragmentation may appear in the field of public procurement, when large systems 
are acquired and member states want that their industry plays a key role in the supply 
since the system is considered strategic from the security or the industrial point of view. 
While  this  preference  is  hard  to  unveil
60,  some  evidence  of  this  practice  may  be 
observed  for  example  in  the  purchase  of  emergency  communications  systems.  Such 
contract awarding suggests that, apart from a preference on national suppliers regarding 
the provision of systems considered essential for national security, the improvement of 
                                                 
57  See ESRIF (2009) or EOS (2009). 
58  Market  competition  across  industry  may  be  distorted  when  mandatory  requirements  to  invest  in 
security differ between member states. 
59  As opposed to the defence market, the appeal to article 346 (ex 296) TFEU in order to avoid common 
market rules (including State aids) can be considered problematic, even if it is interpreted in a wide 
way  to  protect  national  security  interest,  since  it  is  restricted  to  a  list  of  products  that  are 
fundamentally related to defence rather than security. 
60  The  broad  recommendation  of  many  market  studies  to  find  a  local  partner,  when  bidding  for 
government contracts or large infrastructures operators, may indirectly confirm this hypothesis. WORKING PAPER 43 
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industrial  capabilities  and  employment  have  priority  over  best  value  for  money 
solutions. Public procurement rules may be used to shape the demand and design the 
market  with  requirements  and  awarding  criteria  where  national  suppliers  enjoy 
important advantages. Notwithstanding the case may not be general. Countries like the 
United Kingdom show more flexibility having awarded important security contracts to 
foreign companies like  Sagem  for iris recognition, Northrop Grumman for  IDENT1 
programme  for  replacing  the  National  Automatic  Fingerprint  Identification  System 
(NAFIS), or Raytheon for its e-Borders programme. Offsets agreements where some 
kind of compensation to national industry is provided within a government programme 
has not been identified, although foreign companies are usually sensible to government 
desires and integrate national partners in their proposal. 
 
Another kind of fragmentation appears because purchasing is usually less concentrated 
(more orders but fewer units) than defence due to the large number of ministries, state 
agencies and public and private organisations and companies in charge of providing 
security  to  society.  This  fragmentation  is  to  some  extent  inevitable  and  cannot  be 
overcome easily due to the decentralize nature of purchases and the freedom of these 
organisations to buy their preferred goods and services. 
 
Fragmentation may also appear in the area of research when programmes are funded 
nationally. Such fragmentation impact the market in two ways. On the one hand, aids 
granted may unnecessarily duplicate efforts when research projects are uncoordinated. 
On the other hand, member states may overfinance these programmes because they do 
not account for the negative externalities (i.e. market stealing) on the industry of other 
member states. If aids differ across states, they will distort market competition in the 
EU. 
 
As a conclusion, it can be said that fragmentation of the security market due to national 
barriers seems to be lower than expected, whereas fragmentation caused by customers is 
an inherent feature of this market. However, more studies and quantitative analysis in 
the field of public procurement, R&D financing, and national regulations are needed to 
determine accurately any unnecessary fragmentation with negative impact on market 
efficiency. 
 
Price elasticity and substitutes 
 
Price elasticity reflects how customers will enter or leave the market as the price of 
goods and services changes and as a consequence the quantity demanded changes. It is 
measured  as a ratio between  changes in demand and changes in price. An inelastic 
demand means that consumers will pay almost any price for the product, whereas a very 
elastic demand means that consumers will pay a very narrow range of prices for the 
product. An inelastic demand means that a producer can raise prices and still increase 
profits since demand will not decrease too. 
 
Being security a very valuable asset, it may be expected that price elasticity will be in 
general low, probably similar to the defence equipment where trade-off between product 
cost and performance usually favours the second. Operational requirements may reduce 
elasticity as long as high (but costly) product performance
61 is considered essential to 
                                                 
61  Measuring equipment performance, nonetheless, has its own intricacies. For example the efficiency of 
a sensor depends on a low number of false positives and negatives. This parameter can be often WORKING PAPER 43 
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achieve  security,  as  for  example  quick  screening  systems  to  avoid  large  queues  in 
overcrowded  airports.  Other  non-price  preferences  such  as  reliability,  quality,  brand 
identity and the availability of complementary products and services (e.g. operation and 
maintenance support) may have a large influence on demand making it more inelastic to 
price. 
 
Sensitivity to price differs between market agents, mainly due to the available budget 
for security. Individual investors may be more sensible to price than companies since 
these investments are tightly restricted by their income. Small companies more sensible 
than large companies since the latter enjoy large revenues. Large companies are more 
sensible  than  critical  infrastructures  operators  and  the  latter  more  sensible  than 
governments
62. This fact may explain that certain security products developed for high-
end markets do find a hard path to percolate into low end markets. In sum early adopters 
of new and more sophisticated technologies and services are represented, apart from 
government, by large companies (e.g. banks, industries, airports) with higher purchasing 
power and longer experience in product acquisition or services outsourcing. Overall, 
these companies will upgrade their system more quickly than small companies that will 
be more inclined to exhaust the life span of their system. 
 
Price elasticity of a product is also related to the presence of substitutes. If substitutes 
are few or imperfect –i.e. they exhibit differences- then demand will be more inelastic
63. 
On the contrary, inelasticity will be smaller if products are very similar in performance 
such as some standardized electronic sensors used in the security field (e.g. handheld 
metal  detectors).  Whereas  substitutes  are  common  for  some  security  products  (e.g. 
cameras) they can be very few for some very specialised or complex security equipment 
(e.g. large portal truck scanners). Furthermore, if there are relevant costs associated with 
the change of product, buyers will have extra difficulties to switch once the product has 
been bought. 
 
Many security solutions are integrated developments based on user’s demand. In these 
cases, solutions offered by suppliers tend to be a more imperfect substitutes of each 
other  and  therefore  with  a  smaller  cross-elasticity.  Besides,  once  started  the 
development, the switching cost of changing the supplier will increase, since even if 
other product or system has advantages in terms of price or performance, the cost of 
dismantling the old system, redesigning it, and retraining the operators may be too high 
and will require additional financing whilst the risk and the uncertainty associated with 
the new solution will only disappear after entering into service. Such switching costs 
grow proportionally to the size and complexity of the system. Since the investment will 
                                                                                                                                               
adjusted; however improving one  will  worsen the other.  In addition,  sensor performance  may be 
closely related with operator skills and inspection time, where a smaller inspection time may result in 
larger false negatives. All these features challenge the purchaser capability of selecting the best price / 
quality product. 
62  Within critical infrastructures operators differences can also be appreciated. Airport authorities tend to 
spend more funds in security than seaport or border authorities, due to the larger revenues generated 
by air transport in addition to the higher threat level of airports as target of terrorism (it is estimated 
that security expenditures of airports range between 15 and 20%). Even within the administration 
price elasticity may differ. Local police of small cities, apart from higher budgetary restrictions, may 
be more reluctant to buy expensive security equipment if they regard themselves as an unlikely target 
of terrorism. 
63  For  example  manned  guarding  may  show  a  higher  deterrence  capability  that  electronic  guarding 
equipment. WORKING PAPER 43 
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have  a  long  life  and  the  maintenance  of  the  system  including  upgrades  are  usually 
provided by the same supplier the relationship between supplier and customer tends to 
be long-lasting subject to conditions of bilateral monopoly. The paradigmatic case is 
large government security programmes such as an Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System (AFIS). This low level of substitution assures business continuity and is an 
attractor for the industry. 
 
Manned guarding services, an activity generally outsourced by many organisations, is 
an example of service that is easy to substitute, since it does not usually involve large 
cost for the customer allowing him or her to easily change of company, if he or she is 
dissatisfied with the service provided. This explains the higher price elasticity of these 
services. Only when the provision of security services is bundled to a system provided 
also by the services company, the change must be more difficult. 
 
Market size and growth rate 
 
The size and the evolution of the demand is a relevant parameter to analyse in every 
economic sector. A large market size combined with a good growth rate is an attractor, 
while a small market with a shrinking demand discourages entry of new companies. 
 
As has been shown in  chapter  II, the size of the security market in Europe can be 
considered modest in relation to the GDP when we compare it with other economic 
sectors such as the ICT market (tenfold higher). This may explain that large companies 
do not work exclusively for this market. Data of chapter II shows also that public and 
private expenditures have moderately grown in the last years with a value above the 
inflation  rate  of  the  European  Union.  Growth  trends,  however,  differ  across  market 
segments. 
 
However, the current economic crisis in Europe may raise attention to more pressing 
needs and result in a short-term freezing or falling demand. Industry showing fears of 
demand fall have been identified in some reports whereas others do record such fall
64. 
 
Stability of the demand 
 
A market with a stable or moderately growing demand is more attractive than a market 
with  fluctuating  or  random  demand,  since  companies  will  experience  changes  in 
expected  incomes  that  will  require  costly  adaptations  of  the  development  and 
production capabilities. 
 
As we have seen demand of security is mainly related to risk perception. This value is 
mainly driven as we have seen by the number and severity of security incidents. New 
incidents may raise the need of enhanced security. On the contrary, a decrease in the 
number of incidents may favour complacency and the demand may stagnate or fall. This 
may  easily  occur  when  other  more  pressing  societal  needs  largely  surpass  security 
needs. 
                                                 
64  See for example Frost & Sullivan reports in 2009 ‘The Physical Security Market in Asia Pacific. 
Surviving the Economic Downturn’ and  ‘Biometrics Market. Surviving the Global Recession’.  A 
press note of the Spanish association APROSER dated 8/6/2010 reports a demand fall of 6% when 
compared with 2008 revenues. However, according to Gartner, the computer security market will 
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Unexpected incidents usually trigger the demand of new measures, which may call for 
the  development  of  new  system  and  the  agreement  of  new  regulations.  The  latter 
activities  may  take  time  and  slows  down  demand  growth.  On  the  contrary,  agreed 
regulations on the provision of security may dampen a demand fall. The demand of 
some services like operation and maintenance (or renewal) may be more subject to the 
stock of the security equipment installed base rather than changes on risk perception. 
 
Variations in government demand, as we have seen in chapter II, tend to be slow. This 
is  mainly  due  to  the  inertia  of  the  budgetary  process.  Whereas  pressures  of 
constituencies may influence budget size, this process tends to be slow and quantities 
change only slightly from year to year. However, government demand in certain market 
segments  is  mainly  driven  by  large  acquisition  programmes  which  show  a  cyclical 
behaviour combining periods of great feasts with periods of great famine. 
 
Marketing and purchasing methods 
 
The individual customer purchases security products and services to local brokers or 
dealers. They play a relevant role in the design and installation of the security solution 
based upon user needs and standard off the shelf security products (e.g. a alarm unit 
with different sensors). The assessment and the after-sale service they provide is key to 
enhance the attractiveness of a rather standard and mature product whose differences 
with competitors are small. The supply of alarm systems is usually tied with the supply 
of remote monitoring and maintenance services. 
 
On the contrary, the Public Administration purchases security goods and services as a 
consequence  of  programmes  that  usually  follow  a  planning,  programming  and 
budgeting process derived form national policies. The acquisition is made using the 
rigid (and cumbersome) public procurement regulation in order to assure transparency, 
accountability and equal treatment to all parties
65. Transactions tend to be infrequent, 
large in value and duration. Bidders tend also to be few, often reduced to reputable 
firms. The preparation of request for proposals, where the list of requirements and the 
awarding  criteria  are  set,  is  a  complex  and  resource  intensive  task.  Not  less  is  the 
formulation of tenders by the industry and the selection of the best proposal. The whole 
contracting process may easily surpass a year and the supply contract may take years for 
large systems. Development and production contracts include elaborated formulas to lay 
down prices, procedures to audit costs, and other clauses to prevent monopolistic rents. 
The transaction cost
66 is a large part of the total cost due to complexity of the whole 
process. The Administration often reserve rights in the selection of subcontrators and 
key suppliers. 
 
While  acquisition  may  be  based  upon  products  available  in  the  market,  it  is  not 
uncommon that it may entail considerable product development integration products to 
fit user needs. Even feasibility studies and a R&D phase may be required. In such case, 
government involvement tends to be high. For more complex systems, the government, 
                                                 
65  It  follows  the  Public  Procurement  Directive  2004/17/EC.  The  new  Directive  2009/81/EC  on  the 
coordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service 
contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security offers a more 
flexible environment for security provision. 
66  This cost embraces the costs of planning, bargaining, modifying, monitoring and enforcing a contract. WORKING PAPER 43 
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suppliers, regulators and professional bodies tend to work together with users ex-ante to 
negotiate the design, methods of production and post-delivery innovations (Hobday, 
1998). 
The  purchasing  method  of  companies  lies  in-between.  They  tend  to  have  a  deeper 
knowledge of their security needs than individuals, be more sophisticated, and use open 
tenders instead of direct contracting. However, differences may appear between small 
business and large companies. In the first case the process may be simpler, while in the 
second the process is closer to public procurement procedures. Anyhow transparency in 
the  awarding  process  does  not  go  as  far  as  public  procurement  being  enclosed  the 
process by confidentiality. Purchasing usually involves representatives of the different 
departments in the organization: financial, general management, security,  IT, human 
resources, purchasing, architects or independent consultants. The negotiation process 
takes  time  due  to  the  higher  complexity  of  system  requirements,  considerations  of 
system operation and maintenance, or the desired service level. The contracting and 





The supply chain 
 
The  supply  chain  of  security  equipment  can  be  considered  large  even  for  single 
equipment. Equipments are usually composed of different parts and technologies that 
require specialised and unique capabilities for its design and production that are hardly 
achievable by a single firm. Industry usually finds advantages outsourcing or buying 
(instead of manufacturing) parts of the equipment that are cheaper or have better quality 
when outsourced. This reason explains the deverticalizacion of many industries and the 
increasing number of companies involved in the supply chain. This chain is especially 
large in complex security solutions such as a border protection system composed by a 
large number of systems, subsystems and components. An indicator of the large size of 
the supply chain may be found in the list of technologies identified in the European 
Union PASR programme STACCATO having in mind that companies only master a 
few ones. As it occurs in other economic sectors today this chain easily crosses borders 
in the search of higher performance or lower prices to improve the competitiveness of 
the final product or service
67. Component vendors may come as far as Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan or China. 
 
Therefore,  a  key  factor  of  success  in  this  market  is  the  proper  management  and 
coordination of this supply chain to integrate key technologies and maximise product 
value at affordable cost. This explains the relevant role of companies specialised in 
system engineering and system integration; the formation of supply clusters, strategic 
alliances and long term supply agreements; the acquisition of upstream companies who 
own  key  technologies  by  integrators  and  solution  providers;  and  the  interest  of 
companies in developing open  (instead of proprietary) standards interfaces to  easily 
integrate security components into the final product. 
 
                                                 
67  For example, Smiths Detection is sourcing cabinets for their explosive detection system to Eastern 
Europe and EADS electronic boards to the Estonian company Elcoteq (ECORYS, 2009:114 and 228). 
Cogent, Inc. is producing their biometrics readers in China (interview with Cogent representative in 
Essen Messe 5/10/2010). WORKING PAPER 43 
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Technology 
 
Technology plays a relevant role in nearly all the security market segments. While the 
ability to clearly understand customer needs and goals as well as the individual pieces 
of the problem and their interdependencies is required to translate them into system 
requirements and service specifications, it is equally important to choose the adequate 
technologies and define the path of progress to satisfy the (sometimes stringent) product 
features. This may include not only the exploitation of available technologies, but also 
the  development  of  new  (sometimes  disruptive)  technologies  based  on  brand  new 
scientific and technological advances. The lack of mature technologies, in supporting 
product performance or cheap manufacturing methods, is often the reason that hampers 
the development of markets and the diffusion of new products. This is for example the 
case  of  face  recognition  methods  in  biometry,  RFID  in  transport  security,  or  the 
combination of two or more sensors or screening technologies to compensate for each 
other’s weaknesses in drawing attention on potential threats. 
 
Electronics
68 and information and communication technologies play a quite relevant 
role since they are embedded in many security equipments providing the main added 
value and key capabilities unattainable without them. Different algorithms, processes 
and  user  interfaces  are  able  to  underpin  security  measures  such  as  the  detection  of 
anomalies  that  may  warn  of  a  threat  or  the  identification  of  perpetrators  based  on 
information retrieval, analysis and fusion from large databases. Computers code and 
man hours of software development for security systems show a clear growing trend. 
 
Information technologies are also essential to increase the efficiency of the life-cycle 
processes of a security system from the design to development, manufacturing, test and 
maintenance  since  all  of  them  use  knowledge  and  information  as  for  example 
concurrent  engineering  and  lean  manufacturing.  They  facilitate  the  generation, 
processing and distribution of the large amount of information that is needed today to 
manage the supply chain
69. 
 
Technology enables both product and process innovation which provides competitive 
advantages in terms of enhanced performance or lower manufacturing or operating cost. 
However, mastering technology involves a significant effort in which uncertainty in the 
final outcome (and the potential profits) can be considerably high. This may restraint 
the  investments  in  new  technology  and  innovation  and  be  a  source  of  poor  market 
performance. This is a question than will be analysed in more detail in next chapters. 
 
The role of research and development 
                                                 
68  The electronics industry is largely driven by semiconductors. The supply chain of the semiconductor 
industry is composed of chip design, mask generation, wafer fabrication (foundries), packaging and 
test. This chain is today largely globalized bringing significant price reductions due to economies of 
scale,  competitive  labour  rates  and  large  consumer  demand  (ICAF,  2006).  Semiconductors  are 
allowing affordable solutions in many fields such as home protection systems or low-cost personal 
smart  secure  portable  objects  (trusted  personal  devices).  The  combination  in  the  early  90s  of 
cryptography and smart cards into Subscriber Identity Modules (SIM) contributed to the wide success 
of GSM standard for mobile communications, but also to automatic digital identification and security, 
payTV,  e-commerce,  e-banking,  e-health,  or  e-governmental  and  institutional  (EPOSS,  2009). 
Integrated circuits are also essential for microsize and low-power RFID tags. 
69  On  the  contribution  of  information  technologies  on  firm’s  performance  see  for  example  OECD 
(2004:85) ‘Understanding economic growth’. WORKING PAPER 43 
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The relevance of technology implies that research and development play a key role in 
this market. This  activity  encompasses different levels of effort.  It may involve the 
adoption  of  an  existing  technology,  the  adaptation  of  a  technology  to  a  particular 
solution, additional developments to fully integrate the technology in the final solution, 
applied  research  to  shape  a  technology  to  an  specific  security  issue,  or  basic  or 
fundamental research when the current technology performs unsatisfactorily and key 
scientific advances (e.g. material sciences) are needed to achieve a new capability
70. 
Long lead-times characterise the latter activity and periods between 2 and 10 years are 
not uncommon (DSB, 2004). University departments often collaborate with industry in 
this activity. 
 
The security industry largely innovates grounded on technological advances developed 
in other economic sectors including defence
71. The dual nature of many intermediate 
and final products used in security favours the absorption of these advances; and the 
large amount of R&D investments in civilian markets assures a good chance to profit of 
available and inexpensive scientific and technical opportunities. A good example is the 
PMR market for emergency communications, which has profited of the advances of 
cellular commercial market (Ecorys, 2009:218). More uncommon is basic and applied 
research  for  unfolding  new,  otherwise  not  available,  technologies  without  which 
product performance would not be improved as could be the case of pulsed fast neutron 
analysis for cargo inspection equipment.  
 
Research  and  development  requires  extensive  test  and  evaluation  as  well  as  field 
experimentation to assess equipment performance and operational utility. In addition to 
high-skilled personnel, R&D requires specialised equipment for design, development 
and test, and in some cases the support of State laboratories as for example the testing of 
chemical weapons detectors. The whole activity consumes hence a large quantity of 
resources and is one of the main cost drivers of the industry
72. 
 
While technology push explains to a certain extent the development of new solutions, 
demand pull is also a key driver of market progress. The changing tactics and means of 
terrorism and organised crime, as  we have seen, devaluates over time the utility of 
available  products  and  services.  This  stimulates  the  investment  in  research  and 
development and product improvement to preserve (and raise) current capabilities. 
 
Security products features 
 
Security products range from very small and isolated standard off-the-shelf equipment 
for individual use such as a handheld metal detector to large integrated systems as a 
border surveillance system. In the first case, standardised production methods are used 
for delivering ready to use products. In the second, the large and complex system is 
designed  and  build  based  on  user’s  demands.  This  involves  the  development  and 
integration  of  building  blocks  that  are  manufactured  or  provided  by  specialised 
                                                 
70   A more detailed description of these activities can be found in DOD (2009). 
71  For example X-ray from scientific instrumentation mainly applied to health care and non-destructive 
quality inspection; computer networks from the telecommunications industry, ATM magnetic cards 
for access control, or simulation software. 
72  According to Freeman (1986:175), it is more that 50% in the field of electronics, a sector closely 
related to the security market. WORKING PAPER 43 
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suppliers. These hardware or software blocks are usually standardised commercial off-
the-shelf  components,  yet  in  some  cases  they  are  fabricated  under  specification 
requiring some design changes or even a complete development. For example, an access 
control system is composed of card-readers, doors, a centralized computer system and 
the management software. The system design focuses in the adaptation of the solution 
to the specific environmental conditions as for example the architecture of the building 
for intrusion protection or the development of specific functionalities. The delivery of a 
security solution often involves a phase of installation, deployment, testing and tuning 
with  a  non  marginal  impact  on  final  cost.  Other  times  solutions  require  a  mobile 
platform (land, sea, air or space) that has to be conveniently adapted to the specific 
security  mission  such  as  survey  and  patrol  of  specific  areas,  support  of  special 
operations, or first response in the aftermath of a security incident. 
 
The  technical  architecture  of  a  security  system  is  usually  composed  of  sensors, 
communication channels able to transmit information, central units that collects and 
process data and a user interface that presents relevant information to the operator about 
the environment which may compromise security helping to increase awareness and to 
respond  properly.  Such  kind  of  products  accounts  for  the  fundamental  role  that 
electronic, information and communication technologies in this market. As a result it 
may be expected that some industrial features appear also in the security industry such 
as the relevance of economies of scale, scope and learning, the need of large capital 
investments for supporting R&D and sophisticated machinery for efficient production. 
 
Some security measures need the support of large scale space infrastructures which are 
currently  unfolded  on  the  European  level  such  as  the  Global  Navigation  Satellite 
System Galileo
73 for precise location and the Global Monitoring for Environment and 
Security  (GMES  /  Kopernikus)  for  earth  observation.  They  constitute  a  strong  and 
reliable backbone  for implementing a variety  of security  applications. Such markets 





Security  products  are  characterised  by  a  relatively  long  life.  Advanced  sensors  and 
video systems typically have a life expectancy of 5 to 7 years. Access control and alarm 
systems can expect to last for 10 to 20  years (TCRP 86, Vol. 4). Emergency PMR 
systems can extend over a 20 year period. This creates a lock-in effect that may tie the 
customer to a specific technology or standard for a long time, since the investment will 
be only replaced after it is fully depreciated. 
 
Durability of security products is subject anyhow to its adequacy to counter threats and 
its degree of technical obsolescence. While it may be very slow in some cases, it may be 
rather quick in others. For example, new threats as the rapid and constant development 
of  new  computer  malware,  explains  the  constant  delivery  of  new  equipment  and 
products  releases  and  patches  for  updating  computer  protective  software.  And  the 
                                                 
73  The system is expected to be fully operational in 2013 (European Parliament, ‘Getting Galileo into 
orbit 2013’. Reference 20080414BGK26528). 
74  See  for  example  Ecorys  (2009).  Competitiveness  of  the  EU  Aerospace  Industry  with  focus  on: 
Aeronautics  Industry.  Within  the  Framework  Contract  of  Sectoral  Competitiveness  Studies 
ENTR/06/054.  Final  Report.  Client:  European  Commission,  Directorate-General  Enterprise  and 
Industry. WORKING PAPER 43 
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extraordinary  pace  of  change  in  electronics  (Moore’s  Law),  information  and 
communications  technologies  ensures  that  many  parts  and  components  of  security 
systems become rapidly obsolete and may undergo lower performance and spare parts 
shortages, forcing the system update due to the increasing maintenance costs. When the 
durability of the product is too short the market orients to the provision of a permanent 




Many  security  products  show  a  clear  dual  nature,  i.e.  they  have  a  multipurpose 
functionality. That means that the product will benefit of a higher utility and demand, 
and hence its development will be more easily financed. For instance, investment in fire 
protection systems and incident management systems are useful not only against natural 
or  unintentional  man-made  disasters  but  also  against  terrorism.  Personal  emergency 
response  systems  can  be  integrated  with  home  alarm  security  systems.  Border 
management systems may deter terrorism and organised crime, but also speed up the 
flow of legitimate commerce and people. Air and sea traffic management system may 
avoid aircraft or vessel collision, but also identify renegade aircrafts and smuggling 
ships.  Systems  to  track  information  about  merchandise  may  help  to  curb  cargo 
smuggling and theft, but also to avoid cargo mishandling and to shorten port or customs 
clearance  time.  CCTV  in  mass  transportation  may  also  reduce  acts  of  vandalism  in 
public places. Access cards may be used to restrict the access to a building, but also to 
verify the presence of a person, or measure employee time and attendance. Matching of 
airline passengers with their bags may reduce incidents of lost luggage, but also avoid 
the surreptitious introduction of bombs into aircrafts. Research on mitigating the blast 
effects caused by explosives can be useful in protecting structures from earthquakes and 
other natural disasters. Investments in rapid diagnoses, better vaccines and therapies to 
struggle against emerging infectious diseases may help to counter bioterrorism threats. 
Filters to protect buildings against CBR attacks will improve indoor air quality and 
prevent respiratory infections, asthma and allergies among occupants. Water testing to 
detect chemical or biological agents will also improve overall water quality. UAV can 
be used to patrol borders, but also to survey forest fires, perform search and rescue 
missions, or locate illegal fishing activities. High-resolution satellite images of targeted 
geographies can be used for environmental monitoring and damage assessment; but also 




Security products characterise also by a high price / weight relation. The low impact of 
transportation cost on the final price facilitates a more international security markets and 
supply chains. 
 
Security services features 
 
The security market not only provides equipment, but also a wide range of services to 
satisfy  this  social  need.  These  services  are  driven  by  a  subscription  based  business 
model and they ensure a continuous flow of revenues and a stable demand to many 
security companies. 
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The most relevant service is manned guarding services in terms of revenues, employees 
and  firms.  Suppliers  of  equipment  also  provide  complementary  services  such  as 
installation, training, operation (remote monitoring), maintenance and repair services, as 
well as system upgrades. 
 
Consultancy is another essential service. It is necessary to analyse threats and develop 
adequate contingency plans that may involve market and feasibility studies to identify 
and select the best option. 
 
The role of standards 
 
Standards  perform  a  range  of  useful  functions  in  the  economy.  They  provide  for 
compatibility between products and systems. They serve to enhance quality. They may 
efficiently  reduce  variety  and,  more  generally,  they  promote  understanding  and 
diffusion of technology by providing information. Taken together these functions, they 
promote the spread of new technology, a process that economists increasingly see as 
prone to market failure, since market power and imperfect information may both figure 
in  making  a  given  diffusion  path  (or  indeed  the  lack  of  one)  sub-optimal.  The 
development of standards provides a means by which those failures can be corrected or 
at least ameliorated. It is reasonable to hypothesise that institutions, which ameliorate 
those failures, may have an important and quantitatively significant effect on the long 
run economic growth. Public standardization agencies may add two important qualities 
to the standards they promote, namely openness and credibility, which can be essential 
to the standard success (Temple, 2005:3). 
 
An important point however is that the creation of standards is itself subject to market 
failure, and there are strong presumption that, unaided, markets will underprovide for 
standards. This last point is probably well understood: the development of standards 
involves fixed costs, and the gains may not be appropriable by the individual firm which 
develops one. Together, these give standards properties akin to a public good (Temple, 
2005). Such failure explains that governments usually promote its development. 
 
Standards are particularly important as means of assuring interoperability, a key feature 
of many security solutions that are based on information networks whose elements are 
developed  by  different  suppliers.  They  also  level  the  playing  field  decreasing 
information asymmetries between market agents. An open standard –whether given to 
the market or under some form of general public licence or cooperatively developed– 
can  enhance  competition  (by  lowering  entry  barriers)  and  stimulate  innovation  (by 
providing  guidelines  to  developers  of  complementary  products).  The  adoption  of  a 
common  standard  can  enormously  stimulate  market  growth,  as  GSM  in  mobile 
telephony has shown. On the contrary, lack of standards or standards not commonly 
accepted hamper market growth  especially in markets where network  effects  are so 
relevant (Katz and Shapiro, 1994) as is the case of the security market. 
 
Benefits from adoption depend upon network effects. These effects are complementary 
relationships  in  value  creation  among  adopters  of  common  standards.  For  example, 
operating on a common standard allows communications with more users. This is a 
direct network effect or network externality, if the adoption per se confers a benefit to 
others. Indirect effects are the result of widespread adoption that allows producers to 
achieve scale more easily (Stango, 2004). If no countervailing factors serve to bound the WORKING PAPER 43 
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increasing return effects, the process eventually will lock-in a single standard (more 
than one prevailing standard will be less efficient) while others disappear (David and 
Greenstein,  1990).  Hence,  companies  that  do  not  follow  common  or  interoperable 
standards  will  be  disfavoured.  However,  a  standard  to  succeed  needs  to  surpass  a 
threshold  number  of  adopters  to  assure  enough  large  network  gains
75.  In  such 
environment, early adopters will confront higher costs, but will have more chances of 
winning the standardisation race. 
 
Standards  are  also  important  to  enhance  minimum  quality.  There  may  well  be 
demonstrable gains in situations of information asymmetry, where buyers are unable to 
distinguish between high and low qualities –at least in advance of the purchase without 
incurring in large test and evaluation costs. If, as is likely, high quality producers face 
higher costs that low quality producers, they might find it hard to survive in such market 
conditions, giving us a case of Gresham’s Law in which the bad drives out the good. In 
such cases, minimum quality standards may help in mitigating the operation of the Law, 
helping consumers to distinguish different qualities (Temple, 2005:13). A certification 
authority  will  be  more  efficient,  since  it  will  reduce  the  transaction  cost  because 
customers would not need to test the equipment or service
76. 
 
Since much innovation involves the deliberate development of variety on the part of 
firms, it might be thought that variety reduction standards may constrain innovation. 
While this may well be the case in some instances, there may be many others where 
variety is of little benefit to customers and achieving economies of scale may be more 
important (Temple, 2005:14). 
 
Cards  ISO 7810 Physical characteristics 
ISO 7811 Recording technique 
ISO 7813 Financial transaction cards 
ISO 7816 Electronic identification cards with contacts (smart cards) 
ISO/IEC 14443 Proximity cards 
ISO/IEC 15693 Vicinity cards 
Identification based on 
biometrics  
ICAO 9303 – ISO / IEC 7501 Machine Readable Travel Document 
ISO 19784 Biometric application programming interface 
ISO 19794 Biometric data interchange formats 
ISO 19795 Biometric performance testing and reporting 
ISO 24700 BioAPI conformance Testing 
ISO 24713 Biometric profiles for interoperability and data interchange 
XML Common Biometric Format (XCBF) – OASIS. 
Protection  and 
Security of the citizen 
CEN BT / WG 161 replaced by CEN/TC 391 Societal security 
CEN/TC 384 Airport and aviation security services 
RFID  ISO 14223 15434 14443 15459 15693 15961 15962 17363 19762 
ISO 18000 RFID for item management 
ISO 18033 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Encryption 
algorithms -- Part 3: Block ciphers 
ISO/IEC 18092 Near Field Communication - Interface and Protocol 
ISO 18185 Freight Containers Electronic seals 
ISO 18186 Freight Containers RFID tags 
ISO 24729 RFID for item management. Implementation guidelines 
                                                 
75  Markets  subject  to  network  economies  always  confront  with  a  large  inertia  in  the  initial  phase. 
Because there are few users, few products and applications are developed. User do not have incentives 
to join until there are enough products and applications, but products and application’s developers do 
not want to invest until there is a large base of customers. 
76  This is for example the case of explosive detection systems where probability of detection, probability 
of false alarm and system throughput has to exceed certain threshold values. WORKING PAPER 43 
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ISO 24730 Information technology - Real-time locating systems (RTLS) 
ETSI recommendations EN 300 220, EN 302 208 and EN ERC 70-3 
ETSI TR 102 436 449 562 and 649-1 
IATA RP 1740. RFID for luggage 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) global standards 
Information 
technologies 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Information technology - Security techniques - Code 
of practice for information security management 
ISO / IEC 27000 family of information security management standards. 
ISO / IEC 18028 IT network security. 
ISO / IEC 18043 Selection, deployment and operations of intrusion 
detection systems 
ISO / IEC 19770 Software Asset Management. 
RFC 2246 (Secure Socket Layer – SSL, Transport Layer Security - TLS). 
RFC 4301 and RFC 4309 (IPsec). 
Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). 
Digital  certificates 
standards 
ITU-T X.509. 
CCTV  Video image compression: H.263, H.264 (MPEG-4 part 10), MPEG-4 / 
ISO / IEC 14496. 
Audio compression: G.726. 
LAN / MAN / WAN  TCP / IP protocol. Connection of a security equipment to an IT network. 
Freight container  ISO 6346 coding, identification and marking of intermodal containers. 
ISO 9897 (CEDEX) electronic interchange relating to freight containers. 
ISO/PAS 17712:2003 Freight containers -- Mechanical seals 
Passenger  Name 
Record 
IATA standard. 
Land  Mobile  Radio 
communication  for 
Professional  /  Private 
Mobile Radio (PMR). 
ETSI Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA)
77. 
EADS TETRAPOL 
APCO P25 (ANSI TIA/EIA-102) United States 
iDEN 
EDACS 
Intruder alarm systems  EN 50130 (2004) 
EN 50131 (2004) 
Video surveillance  EN 50132 Alarm systems. CCTV surveillance systems for use in security 
applications. 
Financial security  Basel II agreement on International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards. 
PCI DSS. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards. 
Security of the supply 
chain 
CEN/TC 379 Supply Chain Security 
ISO  28000  requirements  for  a  security  management  system  to  ensure 
safety in the supply chain. 
Trace  Explosive 
Detectors 
ASTM E 2520-07 Standard Practice for Verifying Minimum Performance 
of Trace Explosives Detectors (International / US) 
ASTM  F  2069.  Standard Practice  for  Evaluation  of  Explosives  Vapour 
Detectors (International / US) 
Radionuclide 
Detection Equipment 
Nuclear Security Series 1, IAEA, 2006. 
IEC 62244 / 62327 / 62401 Radiation protection instrumentation 
ISO 22188 monitoring for inadvertent movement and illicit trafficking of 
radioactive material. 
Personal  Protective 
Equipment 
EN 469 Requirements for fire-fighters' protective clothing. 
EN 659 Protective gloves for fire fighter. 
EN 15614 Protective clothing for firefighters. Laboratory test methods and 
performance requirements for wildland clothing 
ISO 11613 Protective clothing for firefighters -- Laboratory test methods 
and performance requirements 
ISO 15538 Protective clothing for firefighters -- Laboratory test methods 
                                                 
77  ETSI is working on new communications emergency standards such as EMTEL (www.emtel.etsi.org) 
and MESA (www.projectmesa.org) in addition to TETRA. WORKING PAPER 43 
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and  performance  requirements  for  protective  clothing  with  a  reflective 
outer surface. 
Fire Detection  EN 54 Fire detection and fire alarm systems. 
Building  Automation 
and Control Networks 
ISO 16484-5 BACnet 
ISO 15745-4 Modbus 
OPC (Open Connectivity) 
Road Ambulances  CEN. 1789 Medical Vehicles and their equipment (2007). 
Table 13. Some standards applicable to security goods and services
78. 
 
Standards may either hinder or enable innovation according to the business situation. 
Too  early  a  standard  may  effectively  shut  out  promising  and  ultimately  superior 
technologies when technology is immature, forestalling in such a way price and quality 
competition.  Too  late  and  the  costs  of  transition  to  the  standard  may  be  too  high 
impeding diffusion of technology and the development of new or superior goods and 
services.  Innovation  and  standards  play  usually  a  complementary  role  –both  are 
necessary  for  innovation  to  succeed.  Anticipatory  standard-writing  interacts  closely 
with the innovation process helping to raise a common perception of the problems to be 
solved. The product development process of companies operating in markets in which 
network  externalities  are  significant  is  closely  related  to  this  kind  of  anticipatory 
standards as the telecommunication industry (David and Greenstein, 1990). 
 
Standards, however, are not laid down without cost and it takes a very long time due to 
the  variety  of  parties  that  the  standard  setting  body  needs  to  consult  and  bring  to 
consensus. Standards show path dependence in that the historical sequence of choices 
made, or the path taken in the adoption process, have a strong influence in the final 
outcome.  Compromises  have  to  be  reached  between  all  market  participants  that  are 
invariably  done  at  the  cost  of  the  performance  of  technology.  Vested  interests  and 
strategic behaviour to protect proprietary from rival technologies (in the form of know-
how, design and production assets) may cause delay and impede consensus. However, 
in  many  cases  it  is  the  agreement  and  coordination  that  a  standard  achieves  that  is 
important –the precise characteristics of the standards and whether it is actually the best 
standard– are far less important. The role of a standardisation body or public agency to 
solve potential adopters’ uncertainty when they can delay committing to a standard and 
to  coordinate  the  process  –favouring  openness,  inclusiveness,  transparency  and 
coherence– may be essential to settle on a standard that is efficient from the societal 
point  of  view.  Such  role  can  avoid  two  potential  inefficiencies:  excess  inertia  –i.e. 
becoming locked-in an old inferior standard (reverse decision too costly due to long life 
expectancy of the product) – or excess momentum –i.e. too quick adoption based on 
uncertain  assessment.  Standardization  bodies,  however,  may  be  captured  by  better 
informed industrial players, amplifying the anticompetitive effect of proprietary non-
optimal standards
79. Standards voluntarily agreed by industry (standardisation consortia) 
may take longer to spring up and may mask collusion (IPTS, 2005:82). 
 
Standards also call for independent certification organisations that apply comprehensive 
testing protocols for warranting that developed products comply with them. This may 
                                                 
78  Security products with electronic components have to fulfil related European Union standards such as 
Electro-magnetic compatibility (Directive 89/336/EC), low-voltage (Directive 93/23/EEC) or Radio 
and  Telecommunications  Terminal  Equipment  (Directive  95/5/EC)  as  well  as  health  and  safety 
standards (Directive 72/23/EC and 98/37/EC). 
79  When proprietary IP rights are incorporated into public body standards they shall be subject to fair, 
reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  (FRAND)  licensing  commitments  as  has  been  the  ISO  18185 
standard for electronic cargo seals (e-Seals) based on Savi technology. WORKING PAPER 43 
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result  in  a  costly  burden  for  companies  (when  industry  has  to  finances  these 




Governments play also a role sponsoring de facto standards when they launch new large 
security projects that will create a large installed base of a certain product compelling 
subsequent  public  and  private  buyers  to  adopt  the  same  standard.  For  example, 
Machine-Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) are driving global standard settings for 
biometrics on ID cards to match those being applied for in passports (Frost & Sullivan, 
2005:3-7). Two main risks may unfold here. The first is that governments select an 
inadequate standard and lock the market in an inferior standard before the needs of most 
users have been clarified and addressed by product designers. The second is that in 
choosing a proprietary standard they may facilitate a dominant position. 
 
As  a  conclusion,  it  can  be  said  that  standards  are  often  a  prerequisite  for  a  good 
performing market. Standards developed by European (CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI) 
and international bodies are required in a market where network effects are relevant and 
suppliers and solutions easily cross national borders. Their importance is recurrently 
stated in the ESRIF (2009:198) and EOS (2009) documents. ESRIF suggests a kind of 
European  Security  Label  that  certifies  that  equipment  fulfils  standards,  and  EOS 
suggests  European  Reference  Solutions  to  guide  industry.  The  development  of 
certification  schemes  for  ICT  security  products,  processes  and  services  is  also 
recommended  by  IDC  (2009:10).  The  lack  of  common  standards  and  certification 
bodies for security in Europe, a task being today a responsibility of member states, 
could be a relevant weakness that would need some kind of public action
81. Ecorys 
(2009:24) attributes this shortcoming to the authorities’ desire to retain control over 
technology  in  order  to  protect  domestic  industry  or  avoid  dependence  on  external 
technology supply, but it may well be due to a weak perception of advantages of a 
European approach. 
 
ETSI has been particularly active in the development of ICT standards in areas like 
mobile  communications,  lawful  interception,  electronic  signatures,  next  generation 
networks, algorithms, emergency telecommunications, smart cards and RFID (Brookson 
and  Zemerle,  2006).  CEN  regularly  organises  workshops  on  security  issues.  This 
activity is also being promoted in the European Research Framework Programme such 
as SECONDD on container interface; CREATIF on testing and certification facilities 
for CBRNE equipment; the Forum for Public Safety Communication Europe (PSCE) on 
facilitating  consensus  building  in  the  area  of  public  safety  communication  and 
information  management  systems;  STABORSEC,  on  standards  for  border  security 
enhancement.  Projects  related  to  public  safety  communications  include  OASIS 
(www.oasis-fp6.org),  CHORIST  (www.chorist.eu),  DeHiGate  (www.celtic-
dehigate.org), LIAISON (liaison.newapplication.it). As opposed to product standards, 
                                                 
80  For example in UK the Home Office Scientific Development Branch tests most scanning equipment 
in UK airports. Other example is the National Biometric Security Project Enterprise in the USA. 
Euralarm,  a  trade  organisation  representing  manufacturers  and  installers  of  fire  and  security 
equipment aims also to play a leading role in certifying security products (See Euralarm Newsletter 
June 2009). 
81  COM (2007) 651 recognises also gaps in certification, testing and trialling schemes for explosive 
detection systems. WORKING PAPER 43 
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security services standards have not been found, this suggesting that there could be a 
wide room for improvement in this area. 
RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has analysed the conditions and specific features which shape the security 
market and gives it its own idiosyncrasy. Such analysis is required to understand the 
importance of these exogenous variables that will influence on the structure, conduct 
and  performance  of  this  economic  sector.  Governments,  companies  and  individuals 
have different needs and therefore its demand largely differ. Main demand drivers and 
restraints have been also analysed. Risk perception, loss expectations, risk aversion, 
investment required, and user acceptance basically determine the demand. Yet, bounded 
rationality,  externalities,  interdependencies  and  regulations  have  often  not  a  minor 
influence on market demand. Geographic markets of security are largely globalized. 
However, national or local market conditions may give advantages to some domestic 
industries.  Since  procurement  in  this market  is  not  centralized  the  customer  base  is 
larger  in  the  public  administration  market  as  opposed  to  the  defence  market.  Price 
elasticity of security products is not large due to its essential need and sometimes the 
lack of substitutes. Yet price elasticity of the different customers differs being lower in 
government and larger in companies and individuals. Market size in terms of revenues 
or employment can be considered small in comparison with other sectors like transport 
or ICT. Demand in macroeconomic terms tends to be stable and growing till 2008, but 
the actual economic crisis will have a negative impact on the market still unknown. 
Purchasing methods varies along customers. Public procurement and ruled procedures 
dominate  the  high-end  market  of  government  and  large  companies,  whereas  small 
companies and individuals tend to use less bureaucratic and formal purchasing methods. 
 
The supply chain of security often involves many companies, especially for large and 
complex systems since many different technologies has to be integrated for achieving a 
product  and  companies  only  master  a  few  ones.  This  chain  is  today  largely 
internationalized. Technology plays a relevant role in the security equipment market, 
because it is essential to achieve products with better performance and cheaper cost. 
This implies that research, development and innovation, in one way or another, are key 
elements for market success; a question that will be analysed in more detail in chapter 
VII. Product duration is generally large creating a cyclical demand that is dampened 
with product upgrades and maintenance services. In other cases, duration is rather short 
(e.g. software) and updates needs to be contracted as a service. Standards play also a 
fundamental role as a means to achieve interoperability and assure minimum quality of 
products.  The  development  of  standard  is  subject  to  market  failures  and  strategic 
behaviour. This suggests an active role of governments to implement some remedies. WORKING PAPER 43 
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IV. MAIN MARKET SEGMENTS 
 
This chapter analyses the main segments into which the security market can be divided. 
Security demands a large variety of products and services of very different nature where 
it is hard to find coherence neither from the demand nor the offer side. Therefore, it is 
useful to decompose this economic sector in different segments or areas in order to 
understand  them  better  and  identify  their  regularities.  In  such  segments,  we  will 
examine  in  more  detail  specific  features  like  the  main  products  and  services, 
technologies, main suppliers, the supply chain, main customers, regulatory conditions 
and  trends.  The  analysis  follows  the  main  capabilities  defined  in  chapter  I  to  curb 
terrorism  and  organised  crime;  namely  preparedness,  intelligence  and  surveillance, 




Preparedness  addresses  all  the  tasks  related  to  planning,  equipping,  training,  and 
rehearsing to have the means and the level of readiness required to forestall, avoid or 
undergo  security  incidents.  Two  relevant  markets  have  been  identified  in  this  area: 
consultancy  and  training.  Government,  critical  infrastructure  operators  and  large 
companies are the main customers of these products and services. Economic figures 
about this market have not been obtained, but revenues would probably be rather small 
compared with other market segments
82. Yet, this market segment provides key services 




Preparedness requires know-how for making prospects about and analysing threats and 
vulnerabilities, assessing risk, developing contingency and resilience plans, designing 
methods  and  procedures  for  managing  threats  and  security  incidents,  assessing  the 
effectiveness of investments and resource allocations, performing feasibility studies of 
solutions to deal with insecurity, or managing the implementation of selected solutions. 
This analysis requires a great understanding of the complex nature of socio-technical 
systems related to (in)security to devise appropriate solutions.
83 
 
These knowledge intensive and highly skilled activities are often outsourced to small 
independent consultancy companies, specialised units of large consultancy companies, 
or small business units of prime contractors. 
 
Training and rehearsal 
 
Preparedness requires training and rehearsal of security personnel, first responders and 
decision  makers,  to  prevent  security  incidents  and  being  unfeasible  curtail  their 
consequences. Such training has to be coupled with programmes to test those skills and 
ensure that personnel remain vigilant even if no incidents have occurred for some time. 
This training may also be needed to educate people by means of campaigns to improve 
                                                 
82  The British Security Industry Association (BSIA) estimated this valued in £8 million in 2006 that 
equates to 0,18% of market revenues. 
83  This knowledge area seems underdeveloped according to Pullinger (2006:5). WORKING PAPER 43 
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their observation capability of anomalies that may foreshadow a security risk, and their 
ability to adequately respond to a security incident. 
 
Training or consultancy firms, sometimes  able  to develop training software, are the 
main market suppliers. Training for operating security equipment is usually provided by 
its supplier, but also by private security services companies like G4S Aviation Training 
Services. Training of own personnel is usually made internally by manned guarding 
services companies. 
 
Modelling and simulation using computers and software able to artificially simulate the 
incident scenario may reduce long-term training cost while providing a more realistic 
environment. These systems allow staff to rehearse response and emergency procedures 
and gain experience in better planning and decision making under crisis conditions. 
They can be used for example to simulate the spread of a chemical agent after an attack 
or  model  human  behaviour  under  stress.  These  means  are  supplied  principally  by 
companies with a good knowledge of security issues and the capability to unfold the 
appropriate  software.  Companies  involved  in  military  simulation  enjoy  competitive 
advantage due to the similarity of technologies. Products in this market are tailor-made 
and  they  do  not  show  a  clear  dominant  design  which  suggests  a  market  under 
development with product in prototype stage. 
 
INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE 
 
One of the ways of preventing terrorism and crime is through early warning of their 
hostile actions. The early detection of anomalies and security breaches as well as human 
intelligence  play  a  central  role  in  thwarting  attacks  before  damage  can  be  done. 
Equipment that may improve this awareness is of very different nature. It may been 
grouped in the following areas. 
 
·  Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 
·  Intrusion detection and perimeter protection 
·  Border protection 
·  Identification and access control 
·  Goods and merchandise 
·  Intelligence systems 
·  CBRN detection equipment 
·  Other awareness products 
 
Close Circuit Television 
 
Close Circuit Television (CCTV) uses cameras that collect and transmit images that can 
be  observed  remotely  in  a  monitoring  centre.  CCTV  is  probably  the  most  popular 
surveillance sensor. It is very effective since it allows a centralized surveillance thus 
reducing the amount of personnel needed for monitoring. It is well suited for perimeter 
and interior protection against intrusion
84; access control authorisation; the protection of 
public  places  like  transport  facilities;  the  surveillance  of  sports  places  to  prevent 
hooliganism and soccer violence; or the protection against theft in department stores, 
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shops
85, banks, casinos, hotels and residential areas. CCTV has a deterrence capability 
against illicit activities because recorded images can be used as evidence in a trial
86. 
 
A  CCTV  system  is  composed  of  cameras,  switching  systems,  monitors  and  video 
recorders. Cameras are composed of image sensor, optic, housing and other hardware to 
endure harsh conditions such as a box or dome, a wiper or washer, and a heater or 
cooler. They can be fixed or have a pan-tilt-zoom mechanism. They usually operate in 
the visual spectrum, but there are also infrared cameras able to see under poor visual 
conditions. The selection of the appropriate camera for the operating environment (e.g. 
enough definition to satisfy criminal justice requirements) is critical to attain a good 
performance.  Cameras  are  today  a  relatively  inexpensive  commodity  due  to 
technological progress, economies of large production, and strong competition. Night 
vision cameras are more expensive since their market is comparatively small. The cost 
of the monitoring and recording system may surpass one half of the total cost of the 
CCTV system. Many components and technologies used in CCTV are used in other 
civilian applications, such as entertainment or film making, and largely benefit from 
advances in these areas. 
 
CCTV technology has substantially changed in the last decade from analogue cameras, 
video tape recorders and cathode ray tubes to digital cameras, LCD flat panel monitors, 
and  digital  recorders  able  to  store  images  on  a  disk.  The  new  cameras  are  able  to 
automatically  focus  and  adapt  lenses  to  the  amount  of  ambient  light.  They  can  be 
remotely operated and transmit images over a local, metropolitan or wide area network 
–whether public or private– using the TCP / IP protocol. Captured images can be stored 
in Digital Video Recorders (DVR) or Network Video Recorders (NVR). Most advanced 
systems based on computers include a complete Video Management System (VMS) 
able to manage and present images to the operator. The digital transition has increased 
image  quality;  has  simplified  the  installation  (cabling)  process,  and  has  added 
capabilities  to  switch,  compress,  encrypt,  store  and  quickly  retrieve  images  using 
several  criteria  such  as  time,  date,  camera  or  location.  In  sum,  more  flexibility  for 
exploiting captured images. 
 
The advantages of the digital systems are crowding out the market of analogue systems, 
but  at  a  slow  pace  since  customers  are  fairly  satisfied  with  the  (large)  investment 
already made (Frost & Sullivan, 2005:7-3). Frost & Sullivan (2008e:57) expects that 
digital system will have a larger market share than analogue systems in 2013. Major 
drawbacks of digital cameras are lack of standards and the transitioning of installers and 
users into the new and more sophisticated technology (Frost & Sullivan, 2005:7-1). As a 
way to extend the life of the installed base of analogue cameras, some customers are 
moving to hybrid systems where the analogue signal is digitised before being stored in a 
recorder or a video server (Frost & Sullivan, 2006a:5-10). 
 
CCTV has limitations for the effective detection of suspicious and anomalous behaviour 
that  warns  of  an  illicit  action.  Since  watching  camera  screens  is  both  boring  and 
                                                 
85  CCTV is quite useful in  small retail shops  where the owner or  manager  has to operate the cash 
machine as well as keep a watch on customers. It was initially installed in shops selling luxury items, 
but today, it is enough cheap to be widely diffused. 
86  For example quantitative measures have shown that video surveillance can reduce acts of vandalism 
by 70-80% (Senger, 2006:35). However, according to other studies (Hempel and Töpfer, 2002) its 
impact on crime and violence seems to be inconclusive. WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  61 
mesmerizing, the attention of most individuals degenerates to well below acceptable 
levels  after  20  minutes  of  viewing.  This  restriction  has  stimulated  the  research  in 
methods to help the operator in identifying anomalies and in reducing its workload
87. 
Methods may range from simply motion detection to complex scene analysis, based on 
the processing of the video signal for recognising and tracking objects such as people 
and vehicles and monitor behaviour such as spot loitering (Munday et al., 2006:11). 
Advanced applications include the detection of unattended luggage that may contain 
explosives;  the  recognition  of  persons  using  biometric  analysis;  the  search  of 
individuals within a crowd, or the association and correlation of discontinuous video 
tracking  sequences.  These  technologies  often  require  images  of  good  quality.  They 
seem still immature and subject to research. Yet, some companies are offering products 
to the market (e.g. USA Objectvideo company). 
 
The CCTV market is a very competitive market with a large variety of products where 
customers may select those that better adapt to their needs and budget. According to 
Frost  &  Sullivan  (2005:7-5),  the  European  market  is  heavily  saturated  with  a  low 
demand and a high number of companies
88. This point is reflected by falling prices and 
revenue  erosion.  The  report  estimates  that  10  companies  dominate  the  65%  of  the 
market. These companies are present across Europe and have their own subsidiaries or 
share partnerships with dealers or installers. Panasonic is the leader, followed by Bosch 
Security Systems that expanded its activities in this market segment with the purchase 
in January 2003 of Phillips Communication, Security and Imaging (CSI) –the cameras 
arm of Royal Philips Electronics NV– as well as the company Vision Communication 
and Security AG (VCS) in July 2004, a company with good competences in video-over-
IP  solutions  and  network  based  surveillance  products.  The  rest  of  the  market  is 
dominated  by  specialists  such  as  Sony,  Victor  Company  of  Japan  and  companies 
offering complete solutions as Tyco, Siemens BT, and Honeywell with the acquired 
brands Ademco and Ultrak. 
 
The  market  of  IP  cameras  is  led  by  the  Swedish  company  Axis-Communication 
followed by the German company Mobotix. These cameras have triggered movements 
in the sector. Companies like Sony and Panasonic are pushing hard with a range of new 
IPV6 cameras and GE acquired Swiss-based VisioWave in 2005 to extend its portfolio. 
These  cameras  have  also  attracted  companies  coming  from  the  information  and 
communications technologies field. For example, Cisco has teamed up with Sony to 
produce IP-based solutions based on its networking capabilities. International Business 
Machines (IBM) is also providing consultancy and deployment services to enterprise 
level customers (Frost & Sullivan, 2005a:2-34). Other companies like HP or Accenture 
offer  also  expertise  at  system  integration  level  for  IP  video  surveillance  (Frost  & 
Sullivan, 2009:37). Defence companies, like SAGEM or Thales, are the main suppliers 
of infrared cameras (Ecorys, 2010). 
 
The  screen  market  is  also  very  competitive  and  is  driven  mainly  by  the  large  non 
security demand. Main suppliers are located in the Asia Pacific region. They include 
well-known companies like Panasonic, LG Philips, Samsung or Sony. 
 
                                                 
87  See for example, the 7
th European Research Framework Program ADABTS. 
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Distributors and system integrators play also a relevant role in this market segment 
since  CCTV  systems  are  frequently  a  part  of  a  security  system.  Examples  of  these 
companies are ADI-Gardiner, Thales and Group 4 Securicor, Securitas and ADT. 
 
The CCTV customer base is quite large. Individuals, small commerce, banks, industry, 
infrastructure operators and government are the main purchasers of these systems. 
 
The  deployment  of  video  surveillance  in  public  places  is  regulated  by  EU  data 
protection directive and national acts as such system may affect privacy rights. Such 
laws are not uniform and differ between Member States reflecting national preferences 
on  what  is  considered  an  intrusion  in  personal  freedom.  For  example  UK  is  more 
permissive,  while  Germany  is  more  restrictive.  This  different  vision  impacts  in  the 
CCTV demand and the installed base across the EU Member States. For example, in the 
United Kingdom there is one camera per 14 British citizens as opposed to one camera 
for 300 in Switzerland (Gras, 2004). 
 
Intrusion detection and perimeter protection 
 
Sensors are used to warn security staff of potential breaches helping to investigate and 
contain an intrusion. Its core operating principle is establishing and / or monitoring a 
norm and detecting or signalling a change in the norm, above or below, or with a preset 
threshold. The selection of the most appropriate sensor within the large variety available 
on the market is influenced by the nature and tempo of activity in and around the site or 
facility  to  protect,  the  physical  configuration  of  the  facility,  the  surrounding 
environment,  along  with  the  fluctuations  and  variations  in  the  weather.  Key 
performance parameters of a sensor are probability of detection, false alarm rate, and 
vulnerability to defeat. Arrays of networked sensors can be used to cross-check the 
validity of signals captured by  others thus increasing reliability  at the expense of a 
higher final cost. 
 
Intrusion can be detected based on effective and inexpensive technologies. Sensors are 
able to detect broken window glasses through acoustic or inertial shock; opened doors 
through  magnetic  switches;  chopping,  sawing,  drilling,  ramming  of  roofs  and  walls 
through the detection of unusual vibrations or sounds; movement inside a hallway / 
room  through  simple  radars  based  upon  acoustic,  micro-  or  infrared  waves;  or  the 
presence of human being through the detection of heat measuring infrared radiation or 
pressure on the floor. Electronic barriers can be created by means of the emission and 
detection of a set of thin photoelectric beams. Unusual movement on exterior fences can 
be  detected  using  sensors  based  on  electromechanical,  piezoelectrical,  electrical  or 
electrostatic field principles. In-ground fibre optic, ported coax buried line, balanced 
buried  pressure  line  sensors  or  buried  geophones  are  covert  devices  for  detecting 
intrusion in places where landscaping or aesthetics are important
89. 
 
Home  and  small  business  alarm  systems  demand  very  simple  sensors  such  as  zone 
sensors, window break sensors, magnetic door lock, and a smoke detector. Though such 
a system can be bypassed by a trained professional, it is a credible deterrent from petty 
criminals trying to infiltrate but without prior knowledge of the system. Solutions for 
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high-end customers use more varied sensors and requires some engineering and design 
to tailor sensors to the specific security needs as can be fence intrusion detectors. 
 
Wireless sensors are becoming quite popular since they can be installed quickly and 
cheaply without drilling walls for routing wires. Their main drawbacks are that they are 
more expensive, consume more energy, have less life if battery powered, and are less 
reliable since they may be more subject to interferences than wired ones. 
 
Sensors are an essential element of nearly all security systems based on surveillance. 
Their integration in an alarm monitoring system able to warn and display the alarm 
location is a major design issue in the development of a new security system. Once the 
alarm is reported in the monitoring centre appropriate measures can be taken such as 
sending a patrol to assess the threat and respond accordingly. The monitoring centre is 
based on computer systems and software that collect, store and present alarms. Its size 
ranges from small microprocessors with embedded software to large computer systems 
depending on the complexity of the asset to protect. 
 
Sensors  are  usually  available  as  commercial  off-the-shelf  (COTS)  products  with 
standard  interfaces  (e.g.  IP  protocol)  being  easily  integrated  into  a  wide  range  of 
security  systems.  Their  production  is  today  largely  commoditised,  especially  for 
technology mature sensors. It cost tends to be outweighed in the final system price by 
other items such as system engineering and design, installation, system test and tuning. 
 
They  are  sold  worldwide  by  a  large  number  of  companies  like  Honeywell,  GE, 
Siemens, Bosch, Cooper, or Tyco. Top 10 companies hold 50 per cent of the market 
(Frost & Sullivan, 2008a:78). Competition, technological progress and the shifting of 
manufacturing to Far East countries with low labour cost explain the falling prices for 
many sensors. They are mainly sold through distributors, value added resellers, system 
integrators and installers. Sometimes easy to install home or small business alarm kits 
are directly sold by manufacturers to end customers through ‘Do It Yourself’ stores or 




Controls at border checkpoints and the surveillance of unregulated frontiers are good 
methods to restrict the freedom of movement of terrorism and organised crime as well 
as illegal immigration. Controls focus in quickly verifying the validity of credentials, 
authenticate the owner, and check that she or he has no pending claim from justice, as 
well as the inspection of personal belongings to verify that they do not contain any 
illegal material. The equipment to support these processes will be analysed in the next 
section. Here we will address the protection of unregulated borders against illegal entry 
that is becoming more vulnerable as control over regulated air, sea and land borders 
tightens. This suggests that demand of border protection equipment will keep growing 
in the near future
90. 
 
The protection of the large perimeter of borders requires a different approach, since the 
sizeable physical space that must be protected makes the permanent surveillance along 
the  perimeter  too  expensive  and  inefficient;  especially  having  in  mind  that  natural 
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obstacles –such as rivers, mountains, or seas– limit the illegal entry of persons and 
goods.  Effective  solutions  consequently  have  always  to  accept  some  degree  of 
permeability. They  are  based on stationary systems composed of a network of long 
range remotely operated all-weather sensors (such as radar, visual or infrared cameras) 
able to cover the perimeter to protect and complemented with patrolling units. Sensors 
provide initial targeting information to patrol units that use it to locate and apprehend 
intruders such as immigrants attempting to reach a landing beach with a small boat. 
 
Patrolling  can  be  made  using  land  and  sea  vehicles  endowed  with  the  appropriate 
surveillance  equipment.  However,  the  wider  coverage  of  sensors  from  air  gives 
advantage to platforms such as helicopters and fixed wing aircrafts on certain missions, 
despite of being a more expensive surveillance method. 
 
Products sold in this market are composed of surveillance equipment (fixed or mobile) –
based on electromagnetic screening or optronics–, and command centres able to plan 
and  coordinate  the  collection,  analysis,  fusion,  correlation,  and  dissemination 
information involved in border protection. The close relationship with the equipment 
provided by the defence industry makes that equipment suppliers come mainly from this 
economic sector. The whole system is supplied by a single prime contractor or system 
integrator  such  as  EADS,  Thales  or  BAE  Systems  with  the  support  of  defence 
electronics industry for the supply of the surveillance equipment. Government is the 
single purchaser of this kind of systems. 
 
Vehicles  are  provided  by  the  automotive,  maritime  or  aerospace  industry.  These 
vehicles  require  the  tailoring  and  the  integration  of  specific  equipment  for  radio 
communications and surveillance. Land vehicles are basically all-terrain cars mainly 
supplied by the automotive industry. Coastal patrols boats are less complex vehicles 
than military surface ships since they do not need a sophisticated weapon system and 
other advanced features. Europe has a large shipyard industry able to provide these 
ships,  yet  this  industry  is  characterised  by  small  firms,  excess  capacity  and  lack  of 
collaborative  programmes  (Ecorys,  2010:243).  The  industry  is  subject  to  strong 
competition  from  Asian  countries  like  Korea  or  China.  Europe  has  also  a  well 
developed  aerospace  industry  able  to  supply  fixed  or  rotary  wing  aircrafts  as  for 
example  BAE,  Dassault,  or  Aerospatiale  as  well  as  their  main  components.  This 
industry characterises by high levels of R&D investments, where high cost and high risk 
programmes experience long development and pay-back cycles and a high value output, 
which is manufactured in low volumes (Jackson, 2004). 
 
Unmanned air vehicles  (UAV)
91 fitted with video-cameras and imaging  radars offer 
potential advantages since they do not need pilots. Its development is mainly driven by 
military  needs,  but  civilian  applications  such  as  border  protection  are  becoming  a 
potential  market  for  these  vehicles.  Yet  the  consolidation  of  the  civilian  market 
confronts with relevant problems not easy to solve such as a life cycle cost that needs to 
be smaller than manned aircrafts, improved  reliability (currently they  have a higher 
number of accidents that manned vehicles), the updating of civil air space regulation to 
integrate them with ATM systems
92, adequate airworthiness regulation that allow their 
                                                 
91  Instrumented Zeppelin and aerostatic balloons are other alternatives subject also to research. Another 
area of intense research is unmanned land vehicles. 
92  This task is being performed by EUROCAE WG-73. The EDA is also contributing and the Steering 
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insurance  (EC/785/2004  regulation)  and  the  allocation  of  enough  bandwidth  in  the 
overcrowded radiofrequency spectrum for the payload data-links (EU, 2007). Therefore, 
the unmanned aircraft market, although being very promising, is probably still years 
ahead. The market is led by  USA  and  Israel companies, who in certain cases have 
partnered with European companies for joint developments. Main European companies 
working  in  this  field  are  Sagem,  EADS,  Dassault  Aviation,  EMT,  Meteor,  Alenia 




Maritime surveillance is required to safeguard sea borders, but it is also needed for 
becoming aware of activities at sea impacting  on: maritime safety  and security, the 
maritime environment, fisheries, trade and economic interests of the European Union as 
well as general law enforcement and defence. Such varied goals make that diverse users 
and operators are involved in this activity such as port and ship owners / operators, port 
authorities, customs officials and the coast guard. 
 
The nature of threats in the maritime domain frequently encompasses a trans-national 
and a trans-sectoral approach. This explains the active role of different European Union 
agencies such as EMSA, CFCA, FRONTEX or EDA in supporting the development of 
maritime  surveillance  systems  at  European  and  Member  States  level.  As  has  been 
mentioned in chapter III, a key aspect for success in these developments are agreements 
on  standards,  interconnections,  non-technical  processes  and  procedures  that  enable 
information sharing on the basis of established access rights. 
 
Surveillance is mainly performed through the monitoring of vessel traffic based on an 
automatic identification system (AIS), a ship borne VHF radio that broadcasts to similar 
transponders  and  shore-based  facilities  information  regarding  the  ship’s  identity, 
position, heading, speed and destination allowing the tracking of these vessels when 
they are operating in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports. The system requires for 
operating a satellite tracking equipment named Ship Security Alert System (SSAS). The 
AIS system is mandatory in all vessels involved in international voyaging with gross 
tonnage above 300 tons and all passenger ships according to the 2002 International Ship 
and Port facility Security (ISPS) code. Its main purpose is to avoid vessel collision, but 
it can be used as well to survey sea lanes. Non-cooperative vessel detection requires 
radar equipment and other sensors to locate and identify them. 
 
As of January 1, 2009, according to the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS), all passengers ships, high-speed craft, mobile offshore drilling units 
and cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards regulated by IMO must be tracked 
with a Long-Range Identification and Tracking System (LRIT). According to SOLAS 
regulation, the contracting governments must implement national LRIT data centres, to 
which ships will report their position four times a day. Such data is transmitted through 
a satellite link. Such system is to some extent complementary to AIS. Both may help to 
track vessels worldwide. 
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Ecorys (2009) estimates the revenues of both equipment markets in the range between 
€10-20  million  for  AIS  and  €55-80  million  for  LRIT.  The  world  market  of  these 
equipments  is  led  by  US  and  European  companies.  The  EU  has  financed  research 
projects in this area like Marnis
93. Thrane & Thrane (DK) is one of the leading players. 
The market for Mobile Satellite Services, required for communicating LRIT data, is 
mainly dominated by Inmarsat (UK), however new players have entered the market like 
Iridium (USA), Global Star (USA), Thuraya (UAE) and Orbcomm (USA). 
 
A maritime surveillance system requires in addition sensors, communications, air/sea 
patrol  vehicles  and  command  centres.  These  large  systems  are  mainly  supplied  by 
integrators such as Thales, Konsberg, EADS, or BAE Systems . This area is subject also 
to  research  like  for  example  the  EU  projects  Autonomous  Maritime  Surveillance 





The  detection  of  border  intrusion  across  air  is  usually  managed  by  defence  forces. 
However,  the  detection  and  management  of  renegade  aircrafts  alerts  is  an  area  that 
requires civil-military cooperation across the European Union as is the case of NATO 
and  Eurocontrol.  An  information  dissemination  system  that  collects  and  distributes 
information between the main stakeholders involved in the response may help to better 
manage an air incident such as hijacking. Information will proceed from the air defence 
infrastructure, the air traffic control infrastructure, standard transponders installed on the 
aircraft  as  well  as  other  data  sources.  This  is  a  market  where  only  technology 
demonstrators have been developed like the European Regional Renegade Information 
Dissemination System (ERRIDS). 
 
Identity and access control management systems 
 
Personal identification is a key aspect of security. It allows to recognise a person and 
verify  its  right  to  perform  a  certain  activity  such  as  crossing  a  border;  accessing  a 
building  or  facility;  accessing  a  computer  system,  mobile  phone  or  PDA;  make  an 
economic transaction (e.g. credit card payment), or receiving services.  Identification 
also allows to check whether a person is being sued by justice. Effective identification 
systems can improve security raising the burden associated to terrorism and criminal 
activities. 
 
The  identification  is  based  upon:  (a)  something  one  has  such  as  documents,  cards, 
tokens whose ownership demonstrates the identity; (b) something one knows such as a 
pass-code;  or  (c)  something  one  is  based  on  the  comparison  of  personal  biometric 
features. These methods can be combined to increase the reliability of the identification 
process. 
 
Identity  theft  is  a  main  risk  in  security  because  it  may  wrongly  identify  a  person 
allowing  him  unauthorised  and  potential  harmful  actions.  There  are  different  theft 
methods.  Cards  and  tokens  may  be  counterfeited  though  watermarks,  ultraviolet 
fluorescence,  microtext,  microdots,  holograms  and  other  techniques  may  hinder  the 
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process
94. Passwords can be stolen. Personal biometric features are more difficult to 
steal, although an improper enrolment process may allow it. 
 
For analysis purposes, this area can be divided in three different market segments: 
 
·  Mechanical lock, entryphones and key pads 
·  Card systems 
·  Biometric systems 
 
Mechanical locks, entryphones and key pads 
 
Mechanical locks and bolts are the simpler access method. They need a key or token to 
permit the access. They are at the low end of the access control market, yet they are the 
most common access method. Audio and video entry-phones are also low cost solutions 
to authorise access in the residential market. Identification and authorisation is made 
personally  by  the  operator  through  the  phone  line,  which  may  include  also  a  video 
image. 
 
Another access method is through a key pad (usually alphanumeric) with processing 
electronics  designed  to  activate  an  electric  strike  when  some  keys  are  pressed  in  a 
predetermined order, either sequentially or simultaneously. Sophisticated keypads can 
log each time a pass-code is entered to record both successful and unsuccessful access 
attempts, and a duress function where a person being threatened can activate a silent 
alarm to summon assistance. 
 
These technologies are mature, simple and relatively inexpensive. They are appropriate 
to solve unsophisticated needs such as a single door access for any kind of customer. 
There is a large list of companies that produce this equipment. Assa Abloy followed by 
Simons and Voss are two large players in the European market. Distributors, retailers 
and installers provide them to the end customer. Frost & Sullivan (2008) estimated the 




Access based on personal credentials requires that a surveyor compares data stored in 
the  credential  (normally  a  facial  image  but  also  a  fingerprint)  to  identify  and 
authenticate  the  person.  Afterwards  the  consultation  to  an  authorisation  list  will 
determine  if  such  a  person  has  access  rights.  Information  and  communication 
technologies can help to automate the process and reduce resources and time spent for 
in this process. 
 
The simpler system use cards to store a code that identifies the owner
95. The user passes 
the card on a reader which transfers the data to a computer which authorises the access 
                                                 
94  Powerful personal computers, scanners, photo editing software, and printers now allows terrorist and 
criminal groups to produce authentic-looking forged documents and identity photos almost anywhere. 
Most documents and images produced in this fashion will usually not withstand a detailed forensic 
analysis, but they may be good enough to withstand cursory inspection by an undertrained or hurried 
clerk, security guard, or police officer (Don et al., 2007). 
95  These cards, however, do not necessarily verify a person. They only confirm that the owner has a 
valid card. This creates vulnerability when the card is used by unauthorized persons because the card WORKING PAPER 43 
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after consulting a database. The time and the control point is usually logged for auditing 
purposes. These systems range from a single gate to a networked solution covering a 
whole building or a group of buildings. 
Complementary hardware of access control systems is the door lock or barrier that is 
unlocked when access is authorised. There are many kinds of barriers. They can range 
from  such  conspicuous  physical  structures  as  revolving  doors  to  all  but  transparent 
optical turnstiles with higher throughput able to warn of unauthorised attempts to pass. 
 
There are many methods to store information about the card owner that are readable by 
a computer. While bar codes can be used, the most common method is a magnetic strip, 
which is widely used in the finance sector in the form of credit and debit cards. These 
cards are a very mature technology in the edge of obsolescence due to their limitations 
in  data  storage  and  processing.  They  are  being  substituted  by  more  sophisticated 
solutions being the most common those known as smart cards that contain on a chip a 
small microprocessor with a memory. Such cards are more flexible to changing needs, 
their data can be encrypted and they are less prone to fraud. They can store biometric 
information such as face and fingerprint, and a digital signature that enables the signing 
of electronic documents and financial transactions. 
 
Smart cards are replacing magnetic strip cards in the financial sector for ATM and POS 
terminals. They use a world standard named EMV promoted by the industry which has 
allowed the change to a more secure payment system. In the EU region merchants are 
now liable, as from 1 January 2005, from any fraud that results from transactions on 
systems  that  are  not  EMV  capable.  This  standard,  however,  does  not  implement 
biometric identification. 
 
Proximity  cards  are  based  on  radiofrequency  (RFID)  technology.  The  card  reader 
constantly transmits a low-level fixed RF-signal that provides energy to the card. When 
the card is held at a certain distance from the reader, the RF signal is picked up by the 
card’s embedded antenna and absorbed by a small coil inside the card that powers the 
card’s  microchip.  Once  powered  the  card  is  able  to  exchange  information  with  the 
reader. The main advantage is that being contactless the owner is not required to ‘do 
anything’  to  gain  access.  Smart  and  proximity  cards  and  their  readers  are  more 
expensive than magnetic strip cards, however their advantages largely surpass the cost 
difference. In some cases, for keeping compatibility with various systems, a card uses 
more that one of the abovementioned methods. 
 
According to Frost & Sullivan (2008) the manufacturers of the different elements of an 
access control systems such as cards, readers, doorlocks and barriers supply them to 
distributors  (55-60%),  installers  (25-30%)  and  valued  added  resellers  /  system 
integrators  (15-20%).  Top  market  companies  are  Honeywell,  Siemens,  Interflex 
(Ingersoll-Rand), Gunnebo, Kaba, Assa Abloy and Bewator. Other relevant companies 
are Bosch, GE and Gemalto. According to Ecorys (2009:194) main vendors of smart 
cards are Gemalto, Sagem Orga, RSA and Oberthur. Giesecke and Devrient is another 
supplier. Infineon Technologies AG is a supplier of chip cards and security IC. 
 
The desire of integrated solutions where a single card can be used for physical and 
logical access control, card readers can be connected to the  IT infrastructure of the 
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company  and  integrated  with  the  physical  security  system  and  other  building 
management systems has opened the market to IT distributors and building technologies 
companies.  The  largest  value  of  the  system  remains  in  the  design,  integration,  and 
software development capabilities to make a ‘turnkey’ system based on readers, cards 
and other commoditised system components. 
 
Access control systems are of widespread use when security needs are above average 
and  manual  methods  are  inefficient.  The  customers  with  such  needs  are  many  and 
include banks and financial services, hotels, industry, manufacturing, commercial retail 




A biometric indicator is any biological (anatomical or physiological) or behavioural 
feature that can be measured and used for the purpose or automated or semi-automated 
recognition of human beings. Examples of physiological features are face, fingerprint, 
hand, iris, retina or palm veins. Examples of behavioural features are voice, signature or 
keystroke sequence. Some biometric features persist over time while others change. All 
biometric features are deemed unique but some are less distinct than others. Biometric 
techniques can be used in two ways: (a) to verify that people are who they claim to be, 
(b) to discover the identity of unknown people. The first method requires a one-to-one 
check, whereas the second requires one-to-many checks. Once the identity is confirmed, 
appropriate decisions can be taken. 
 
Biometric systems are more secure than traditional recognition systems. As such they 
influence the level of trust in any activity that requires identification or verification of 
identity. In other words they can help to reduce fraud
96. But they only represent a secure 
recognition process in that they provide a strong link between physical persons with 
their identity data. This means that the linking process must be highly reliable. This will 
depend on the secure operation of each of the four stages of the biometric identification 
process, namely enrolment, storage, acquisition and matching (IPTS, 2005:12). 
 
In a society that is increasingly mobile, flexible and digital, there is an increasing need 
of  recognition  systems.  In  practical  terms,  biometrics  is  mainly  applied  for  four 
purposes: law enforcement, physical access control (including border control), logical 
access  control  to  information  systems  and  convenience.  With  more  and  more 
transactions such as e-banking, e-commerce, e-work, and e-government taking place on-
line, biometrics offer a promising way of establishing secure identities especially when 
face-to-face transactions are not feasible (IPTS, 2005:35). 
 
Main  biometric  technologies  are  anthropometry,  software  for  template  generation, 
pattern recognition and matching algorithms, and sensor devices to record the biometric 
features
97. Fingerprint uses the unique uneven surface of ridges and valleys that form a 
                                                 
96  As  many  other  security  solutions,  the  degree  to  which  biometrics  reduces  theft  and  the  possible 
displacement of fraud to other areas remains uncertain. Its impact on reducing the threat of terrorism 
could also be rather low (according to Davies and Hosein (2007:9) the UK government argues that a 
third of all terrorist use multiple identities). However, it is evident that this technology is inherently 
harder to spoof. 
97  Biometric systems first capture samples of the individual’s features that are then averaged to create a 
digital representation, known as a template. The stored template is used to match the characteristic 
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unique pattern from each individual. Iris uses the coloured tissue of the human eye 
surrounding the pupil  for recognition purposes based on a black and  white infrared 
image. Retina biometrics is based on the analyses of the layer of blood located at the 
back of the eye. These three techniques are the most accurate. Yet, retina scanning is too 
intrusive  and  invasive  as  well  as  too  expensive  for  wide  diffusion.  Face  and  iris 
technologies have the advantage that they operate in the two-meter range and need less 
cooperation from users. Hand biometrics compares the geometry of the hand such as 
width,  length,  thickness,  and  surface  area  to  confirm  an  individual’s  identity.  Its 
strength relies in its durability in extreme environmental conditions, high throughput, 
ease of use and non-invasive nature. The discrimination capability of hand geometry 
can be low for a large set of users. Facial recognition has also relevant restrictions
98. 
 
Voice biometrics, also known as speaker verification, is based on the unique geometry 
of the speaker’s vocal tract such as tract length, ratio of larynx to sinuses, resulting 
harmonics,  pitch,  and  range.  It  is  used  when  it  is  the  only  available  biometric 
recognition method such as telephony and call centres. The effect of ambient noise on 
accuracy, the fact that voices are not clearly unique, the likely changes over the lifespan 
of a user (or its temporal change due to a throat illness) and the perceived ease of 
falsification make this choice less valuable. 
 
Signature  recognition  measures  the  dynamics  of  signature  strokes  such  as  speed, 
acceleration, timing, pressure and direction. It compares not merely what the signature 
looks like, but also how it is signed. Since the individual signature  may  vary  from 
sample to sample, the recognition process may have non-ideal performance. Moreover, 
since  a  proficient  forger  is  quite  capable  of  selectively  provoking  false  accept 
verifications these systems are less secure. Multi-modal biometry combines less reliable 
technologies in sequence to strengthen the overall performance, or in parallel to increase 
flexibility by providing alternative modes for the identification or verification process. 
The expensiveness of these solutions, however, limits its general use. 
 
Government  applications  on  biometrics  focus  on  automatic  fingerprint  identification 
systems (AFIS) for law enforcement as well as to identity verification in passports, 
                                                                                                                                               
image) cannot be recovered from the template. Because the reference template is generated from 
multiple samples at enrolment, the match is never perfect. Therefore, systems are configured to verify 
the identity if the match exceeds an acceptable threshold. Consequently, all biometric technologies 
suffer false rejection and false acceptance rates that vary accordingly to each technology. Normally, 
lowering the false acceptance rate increases the false rejection rate, i.e. the chance that an authorised 
person  will  be  denied  access.  Whereas  authentication  performs  one-to-one  match  against  user 
credentials to verify identity (usually stored in a smart card), systems that have to consult a central 
database of templates to identify one individual against  a predefined population take longer –the 
bigger the database, the slower is the search– and are less accurate. Moisture, dirt, grime, or light 
conditions may also influence the performance of biometrics in fingerprint, face and hand recognition 
(GAO, 2002). 
98  Facial recognition is relatively inaccurate due to the presence of a lot of variability. This variability is 
due to changes that occur to people over time like ageing, or is simply due to external environmental 
conditions such as poses, facial expressions, hair, or usage of glasses. Its reliability is also related to 
recording conditions and the context of applications (static images or video, image quality, with or 
without uniform background, or lightning conditions). 2D face recognition is the most common by far 
and the one proposed for passports and visas. Face recognition is not yet ready for outdoor use, and it 
is unsuitable for a database with a large watch-list. Even for moderately-sized lists it has mediocre 
performance (IPTS, 2005:48). A short description of main algorithms (principal components analysis, 
linear discriminant analysis and elastic bunch graph matching) for facial recognition can be found in 
NTSC (2006) report. WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  71 
visas
99, personal identity cards
100, driver’s license, or e-government services like tax 
payment, vote, social security or unemployment.
101. According to Acuity (2009:21) the 
US-VISIT, the similar Japanese programme and the EU e-passport visa and passport 
programmes are the largest public procurement contracts in this field. The International 
Biometric Group estimates that 75% of the market addresses public administration in 
2009, a figure that does not seem to fall largely in the next years (Ecorys, 2009: 191). 
European member states like Italy, France, Belgium and Spain are implementing the 
new national identity card based on smart cards that store face and fingerprint biometric 
information. Germany is expected to move to smart cards in 2010. Unfortunately, no 
agreement has been reached within members states on a standard identity card. 
 
According to Acuity (2009), fingerprint and the AFIS / Livescan systems used by law 
enforcement for background checks and criminal investigations accounts for the largest 
market share. The other relevant markets are face and iris recognition, the market of 
remaining technologies is comparatively small. Frost & Sullivan (2008c) reports that 
Sagem Securité was the AFIS market leader in 2007 followed by Cogent, Inc., NEC 
advanced Security Solutions and Motorola’s Biometrics Business Unit. 
 
The use of biometric in borders and transport is evolving at a slow pace. There have 
been many pilot projects, but a wide diffusion is this technology is still pending. For 
example, iris recognition has been used for frequent travellers in Amsterdam Schiphol 
(Privium  Programme),  Frankfurt  International  Airport,  London  Heathrow,  London 
Gatwick, Manchester, Birmingham and several Canadian airports as part of the Nexus 
programme
102.  Fingerprint  identification  pilots  have  been  attempted  in  Charles  de 
Gaulle Airport (project PEGASE) and Heathrow (miSense in 2006/2007). New pilots 
projects in France (project PARAFES) and Spain (ABC System) were launched in 2009 
and 2010. The main advantage of such systems is the short-time (around 10 seconds) 
needed for automatic recognition and the corresponding reduction in waiting time
103. 
 
Biometric is also applied in highly reliable electronic access control as for example the 
Paris  Airport  Authority  based  on  fingerprint  and  contactless  smart  cards,  the  four 
months  pilot  project  implemented  in  the  Fiumicino  Airport  in  2003  using  facial 
                                                 
99  Regulation 2252 / 2004 sets the standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel 
documents issued by EU Member States. This means that since August 2006, all passport delivered in 
Europe contain a  wireless smartcard storing a digital image of the  holder’s  face compatible  with 
ICAO  standards.  Since  June  28,  2009,  second  generation  of  biometric  passports  integrate  also 
fingerprints.  The  European  Visa  Information  System  VIS  and  its  biometric  engine  the  Biometric 
Matching System should start operation in 2009 and be fully operational in 2012 (Ecorys, 2009:209). 
This is a joint development of Accenture and Sagem. The system will be able to store 70 million 
datasets. 
100 According to Acuity (2009:v) Mexico and India have announced plans to issue biometrically enabled 
national identity cards. 
101 Other envisaged areas are the use of biometrics to access electronic health records for the protection of 
privacy regulated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the United 
States <(F&S, N55F)>; and passenger processing based on biometrics. The latter will help to reduce 
the space consuming check–in kiosks and their related staff creating a more self-service orientated 
environment, while still maintaining proper security levels. For more details, see Frost & Sullivan 
(2005:3-16). 
102 The system is known as Iris Recognition Identification System (IRIS) and has been developed by the 
UK Border Agency. Details can be found in www.iris.gov.uk. 
103 Apart from fewer personnel for identification, quick passenger checking may pay for itself helping for 
example to increase the time spent buying in airport duty-free shops. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Applications  related  to  logical  access  control  are  mainly  based  on  finger-scan 
authentication solutions in mobile phones, PDA’s, cars, wireless computing devices, IT 
systems access, physical access control systems and portable web tablets. Companies 
like  Siemens,  Nokia,  Fujitsu,  NEC,  Sony  and  others  have  developed  such  systems. 
Anyhow, these solutions are not experiencing a widespread use in the market. 
 
Biometric systems are composed of computer systems, secure communication networks, 
characterization / comparison software (biometric engine), data encryption algorithms, 
secure data stores and biometric data capturing devices. They are supplied by system 
integrators and large software houses –such as IBM, EDS, Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
Grumman, Accenture, or Unisys– in alliance with the suppliers of these components. 
European  companies  involved  in  the  supply  chain  of  these  systems  are  Dermalog 
Identification  Systems  GmbH,  Greenbit  S.p.A.,  Daon  (USA  but  Irish  origin),  and 
Automatic Systems (Belgium), Precise Biometrics AB, UPEK (a USA company spin 
off  of  ST  Microelectronics)  according  to  (Ecorys,  2004:196).  Another  company  is 
Fingerprint Cards AB. 
 
L-1 Identity Solutions is the market leader in face recognition. Such leadership has been 
achieved through the purchase of Viisage  Technology,  Identix,  Inc., and A4 Vision 
(early  acquired  by  Bioscript  in  2007).  Two  important  EU  companies  are  Cognitec 
Systems GmbH and Ommiperception (UK). 
 
Iridian  Technologies  (now  L-1  Identity  solutions)  was  the  unique  provider  of  iris 
recognition technology until the patent fell into public domain in 2005. The company 
has licensed its technology to several partners for the development of hardware and 
camera platforms for various applications and environments such as LG Electronics, 
Oki, Panasonic, Sagem, IrisGuard (UK), Sarnoff, IRIS, Privium (NL), CHILD Project, 
CanPass, Clear (RT – Registered Traveller), IBM and EyeTicket Corporation. 
 
Retica Systems is the major participant in the retina biometric market. Hitachi, Bionics 
and Fujitsu (European partner TDSi) are the main suppliers of palm vein scanners, a 
technology that does not need to physically touch the sensor, a solution mostly preferred 
in Japan (Frost & Sullivan, 2009). 
 
It is expected that government investment gives way in the future to a wider use of 
biometrics in commercial and  civilian applications due to the falling price of smart 
cards, readers and software
105. However, government support has so far been unable to 
solve current shortfalls and problems that impede the widespread use of this technology 
such as: (a) total cost of ownership that makes it unsuitable for low demanding identity 
verification; (b) performance constraints on recognition with a low false alarm rate and 
quick  response  in  access  points  with  a  large  people  throughput
106;  (c)  customer 
                                                 
104 See U.S. Commercial Service (2005) Italy: Biometric Identification Devices Running Applications 
and Future Opportunities in the Italian Market. 
105 The EU Research Framework Program has been especially active in financing biometric programs 
(Hayes, 2009:47). 
106  Some personal disabilities, diseases of illnesses (e.g. finger amputation) may compromise the use of 
biometrics. These cases require the use of manual procedures to tackle the identification problem. WORKING PAPER 43 
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acceptance;  (d)  interoperability  and  lack  of  widely  accepted  standards  in  sensors, 
templates, and Application Program  Interfaces (API)
107; (e) expensive procedures to 
manage biometric information since being personal it is subject to data protection rules, 
(f) the large substitution costs of current systems and procedures in use, and (g) the 
difficulty  to  objectively  estimate  the  advantages  of  higher  reliability  that  blurs  the 
potential  benefit  (too  small)  compared  with  the  associated  substitution  costs.  These 
reasons may explain the slow pace of this technology and the small revenues of the 
European biometric market estimated by Ecorys (2009:191) in €708.4 million for the 
whole  European  industry,  whereas  Frost  &  Sullivan  (2008:30)  estimates  the  access 
control biometric market in only €23.8 million for 2009. They also explain the setbacks 
suffered by widely heralded biometrics programs such as the US-VISIT Exit program 
(two  failed  pilots),  the  scaling  back  of  the  US  Transportation  Worker  Identification 
Credentials (TWIC™)
108, the transformation of the UK National ID card to an opt-in, 
and  the  commercial  implosions  of  Pay-by-Touch  in  November  2007  and  CLEAR 
Registered Traveller projects in June 2009 (Acuity, 2009). 
 
The  slow  maturation  of  the  market  is  causing  considerable  changes  in  the  market 
structure  with  frequent  mergers  and  takeovers.  Some  examples  are  the  agreement 
between Cross Match technologies and Smith Heimann Biometrics GmbH in 2005; the 
creation  in  2006  of  L-1  Identity  Solutions  merging  Viisage,  Identix,  and  Iridian 
Technologies, followed by the takeover in 2008 of Bioscript and Digimarc; the purchase 
by Sagem of Motorola biometric business unit in 2009
109; the purchase in 2009 of Atrua 
Technologies by AuthenTec, or the takeover of L-1 by Sagem Morpho in 2010. 
 
Land vehicles surveillance 
 
Control of vehicles is based in Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems 
able to optically recognize the characters of the vehicle plate on an image captured by a 
camera. The technology was developed at the end of the 70s and now is a standard, 
reliable and widely diffused product as can be seen in the access control of many car 
parking  areas.  This  information  may  be  linked  for  example  to  a  law  enforcement 
database to check if the vehicle is stolen, or owned by a suspicious person. But also for 
checking if the vehicle is not insured or it has not paid a congestion fee. These systems 
can be installed on a patrol car. This capability can be used also to identify containers. 
These  systems  are  developed  by  industrial  control  or  software  firms.  The  United 
Kingdom is a big customer of these systems. 
 
Screening of personnel and their belongings 
 
Screening  is  necessary  to  verify  that  persons  do  not  hide  any  dangerous,  illegal  or 
hazardous material –such as weapons, explosives or drugs– below clothes or within 
their  personal  belongings  that  may  be  used  for  terror  or  criminal  purposes.  Manual 
screening methods tend to be slow, invasive, and labour intensive. Detection equipment 
may  improve  these  shortfalls  leaving  costly  manual  search  to  solve  inconclusive 
                                                 
107 See for example the Windows Biometric Framework and the standards developed by the bioAPI 
Consortium. Interoperable standards are a prerequisite to the wide diffusion of biometrics in large 
commercial applications such as bank ATM. 
108 This program focuses on longshoremen, truck drivers, port employees and others requiring unescorted 
access to secure areas of ports. 
109 This unit was acquired in 2000 from Printak, the first provider of AFIS systems. WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  74 
inspections. Standoff detection, out of the range of offensive weapons like an explosive, 
is other desired feature, however, technology is still immature to meet this goal and the 




Metal detectors are very effective to identify firearms and knives. They can be walk-
through portals that may include light bars to highlight the locations where the highest 
metal concentration is detected, or hand-held detectors to explore the body when the 
first system gives a warning. The equipment generates an electromagnetic field that 
causes metallic (or other electrically conductive) objects in the proximity to produce 
their own distinct magnetic fields altering the initial field that is sensed by a detector. 
This is a very mature technology that accurately detects the presence of most types of 
weapons with a portal throughput of 15-25 people per minute. Cooperative individuals 
can typically be scanned with a handheld detector in about 30 seconds. Companies like 
Smith Detection, CEIA, Rapiscan, L3 and GE Security are the main market suppliers in 
Europe. 
 
Equipment  to  quickly  identify  illicit  material  in  bulk  quantities  is  based  on  images 
generated  by  X-rays  using  single  energy,  dual  energy
111,  backscatter,  or  diffraction 
techniques;  nuclear  techniques  involving  neutron
112  or  gamma  ray  bombardment,  or 
millimetre  and  terahertz
113electromagnetic  waves.  Some  techniques,  like  millimetre 
waves and low power X-rays backscattering, can be used to safely see through clothing. 
Examples  of  these  systems  are  AS&E  BodySearch  and  the  Rapiscan  Secure  1000 
(GAO, 1996 and Theisen et al., 2004). 
 
The scanning equipment does not identify the material for the operator. It only provides 
him or her with tools (usually images) to examine persons and their belongings. Its 
throughput depends on: the amount of clutter in a bag or on a person, and the operator 
efficiency.  Clutter  occurs  where  several  dark  items  are  grouped  together  creating  a 
dense image. Operator efficiency is influenced by the monotony of the task, fatigue, 
time  pressure,  training  level  and  working  conditions.  Best  throughput  today  is  not 
higher than thirteen bags per minute, seven passengers per minute, and one vehicle per 
minute (GAO, 2002). This slow performance and limited number of inspection points 
                                                 
110 The EU 7
th European Research Framework Programme Project Optix goal is stand-off detection at a 
distance of 20 meters. 
111 This is the most common method to screen luggage. A colour code two-dimensional image is created 
by comparing the relative transmission of high and low X-ray beams to highlight substance density 
and distinguish between metal and organic material (Theisen et al., 2004:48). 
112 Neutron (three-dimensional) radiography, based on thermal or fast neutron activation, represents a 
promising technology. These systems use a source of neutrons to generate the emission of gamma-ray 
of  the  cargo.  The  signature  obtained  from  scanning  can  be  compared  to  a  library  of  gamma-ray 
signatures to detect substances with high content of nitrogen and oxygen in most explosives, and the 
high  chlorine  content  and  high  carbon  to  oxygen  ratio  in  certain  drugs  (NRC,2002b:vi).  Main 
limitations are depth of penetration and its ability to characterise certain explosives. Other practical 
limitations are large size and weight, long detection time for a small explosive quantity, the need for 
radiation shielding and regulatory and safety issues associated with nuclear based technologies (NRC, 
2002b). 
113 Terahertz can be used to detect non-metallic weapons. This technology is still immature due to the 
lack of efficient and low / moderate cost sources and detectors (EPOSS, 2009). Smith Detection and 
Teraview have signed an agreement to develop detection equipment based on this technology. The 
project TERASEC has been financed by the PASR. WORKING PAPER 43 
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generate queues that prevent the use of screening equipment in high traffic places such 
as commuting rail stations. 
 
Computer axial tomography provides the best capability for detecting and identifying 
materials due to its ability to see in three dimensions and measure object density with 
precision. Example of such equipment is GE CTX family of products or L-3 eXaminer 
3DX 6000. While this equipment was limited initially to large international airports, 
they  are  widely  used  today  in  US  Airports  where  around  1,500  units  are  deployed 
(Ecorys, 2009: footnote 136). According to Elias (2008: 33) bag screening equipment 
has shortfalls in its capability to screen air cargo due to object size, false alarm rate and 
throughput. 
 
Nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) is a non-imaging technique that can be used for 
explosive  detection.  It  is  based  on  the  analysis  of  the  weak  radiofrequency  signal 
emitted  by  the  nitrogen  quadrupole  nuclei  present  in  the  explosive  when  a  pulsed 
radiofrequency  field  is  applied  to  the  suspicious  object.  However  this  technique  is 
unable to detect liquid explosives
114. Invision / Quantum Magnetics, today a subsidiary 
of GE Security supplies screeners based on this technology. Lack of product diffusion 
suggests that the technology is still immature
115. 
 
The analysis of the residual traces of drugs and explosives deposited on the person or 
the  carry-on  luggage  may  indicate  a  recent  contact  with  such  substances.  It  uses 
separation and detection technologies to measure the properties of vapour or particulate 
matter  collected  by  the  equipment  and  compare  it  with  the  signature  of  drugs  and 
explosives and signal an alarm if the probability of match exceeds a threshold. Some 
examples  are  colour  change  of  test  papers  (chemical  reagents),  electron  capture 
detection  (ECD),  field  ion  spectrometry  (FIS),  gas  chromatography  /  chemical 
luminescence (GC/CL),  gas chromatography / electron  capture detection (GC/ECD), 
gas chromatography / ion mobility spectrometry (GC/IMS), gas chromatography / mass 
spectrometry (GC/MS), gas chromatography / surface acoustic wave (GC/SAW), ion 
mobility spectrometry (IMS), or Raman spectroscopy. Current technologies are capable 
of detecting most militarily and commercially available explosives and drugs. However, 
most  systems  are  designed  to  detect  only  a  subset  (GAO,  2002:12).  Ion  mobility 
spectrometry is the most widespread technology (GAO, 1996). This kind of detectors is 
mainly used as a secondary screening method due to longer inspection time
116. 
 
                                                 
114 According to Time, the 2006 transatlantic plot attempted to detonate non-nitrogen liquid explosives, 
namely  acetone  peroxide,  that  are  undetectable  by  current  systems  forcing  to  increase  control  of 
liquids  inside  personal  belongings.  See 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1225453,00.html retrieved May 13, 2009. 
115 Details of this technique can be found in Fraissard, Jacques and  Lapina, Olga (2009) Explosives 
Detection Using Magnetic and Nuclear Resonance Techniques. 
116 Attempting to reduce this time the USA has deployed 93 explosive detection portals in 36 airports in 
2006 that have been supplied by GE Security with Entry Scan and Smith Detection Ionscan Sentinel 
II. The portal detects explosive particles using a small blast of air siphoned through a vacuum to 
laboratory equipment. See pages 3, 4 and footnote 11 of CRS (2007). In 2007, 17 portals where 
installed by GE in the Warsaw airport. WORKING PAPER 43 
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GE,  L-3  Communications  and  Smiths  Detection  control  approximately  90%  of  the 
screening market according to Frost & Sullivan (2005:4-12)
117. Other companies are 
Rapiscan Systems, Bruker Daltonics, and Gilardoni (Ecorys, 2009: 113). 
 
Main  purchasers  of  these  equipments  are  essentially  transport  organisations  such  as 
airports, airlines, freight forwarders, customs, railroad companies, private companies, 
and  security  services  providers,  which  is  sometimes  responsible  to  purchase  the 
equipment  used  to  carry  out  their  operations  (Ecorys,  2009:96).  Government 
organisations such as prisons, military installations, embassies, public offices as well as 
companies  may  use  also  screening  systems  in  their  facilities  access  points  and 
mailrooms. Ecorys (2009:104) provides an estimate of the market size of around 100 
units per year for air cargo screening that is probably the main purchaser. 
 
Luggage  and  cargo  screening  equipment  performance  is  subject  to  certification 
according  to  EU  regulations.  Equipment  standards  are  set  by  the  European  Civil 
Aviation Conference. 
 
Dogs can be used for detection since they can be trained to respond in specific ways to 
smells of narcotics and explosives. They have the advantage of being highly sensitive in 
comparison  with  artificial  sniffers  and  less  susceptible  to  masking  interferents. 
Furthermore they are mobile and thereby able to follow a scent to its source. For said 
reasons they are ideally suited for drug or explosive detection that has a significant 
search  component  such  as  building,  properties,  vehicles  or  large  containers.  Main 
limitation is their duty cycle that requires a break after one hour of work. They are not 
usually used to screen people, since some people fear dogs and because a dog may bite 
someone. Labrador retriever is perhaps the most common. Other breeds used are golden 
retrievers, German shepherds, Brittany spaniels, German short-hair pointers and mixed 
breed. The cost to train a dog and a handler is about $17,000 and the annual operating 
cost of the team including the handler’s salary, is about $60,000 (GAO, 1996). Police 
forces or guarding companies usually train dogs in-house and consequently this activity 
does not create a big market around it. 
 
Goods and merchandise 
 
The  products  in  this  market  segment  are  aimed  at  two  main  goals.  The  first  is  the 
detection of illegal goods and merchandise such as weapons, drugs, nuclear materials, 
explosives,  C/B  agents,  legal  goods  subject  to  duty  or  subject  to  import  or  export 
restrictions –e.g. antiquities, ivory, hard wood, or strategic products– and goods that fail 
to meet health and safety standards. The second goal is to safeguard the logistic supply 
chain  from  theft  and  loss  of  merchandise  including  shops  and  department  stores. 
Because  containers  are  the  main  transportation  method  of  merchandise
118,  many 
products in the market are oriented to assure the integrity of the container from the 
loading to the delivery point, and to facilitate the inspection process to quickly verify 
that the cargo manifest corresponds to the actual load. The first is the responsibility of 
                                                 
117 These three large companies entered into this market through acquisitions. GE bought Invision in 
2004, L-3 acquired Perkin Elmer’s detection system in 2002 (Perkin Elmer had itself acquired Vivid 
Technologies in 1999), and Smith detection acquired Heimann Systems Gmbh in 2002 and Barringer 
Inc. in 2001. OSI acquired UK based Rapiscan Security Products Ltd. in 1993. 
118 According to Eurostat, the EU ports handled 69.8 million containers in 2009 (value measured in TEU, 
i,e. Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit). WORKING PAPER 43 
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the shipper who is the main beneficiary, whilst the second corresponds mainly to the 
government due to the negative social impact of smuggling. 
 
The metallic structure of the container protects it from hole-cutting and the use of seals 
from unnoticed door opening, thus avoiding the introduction of illegal cargo. However, 
these measures are insufficient to assure container’s integrity en route since they may be 
easily circumvented by criminals. Seals can be broken and rebuild, and the container 
can be cut by the side or the hinges for gaining access and later on wielded and painted 
(Van de Voort and O’Brian, 2003). 
 
Advanced  technology  can  help  to  solve  these  security  shortfalls.  The  container’s 
integrity can be monitored through an electronic sensor able to detect the opening of the 
door or inside movement and send out a signal to a control centre by means of a mobile 
communication  line.  The  container  may  also  incorporate  a  remote  location  tracking 
systems (RLTS) based on GPS. Because these systems are quite costly, only containers 
carrying high value loads can be protected through this way
119. As we will see later the 
preservation of container integrity is still a technology under development. 
 
Verification of container’s load is a time consuming process involving four hours using 
15 to 20 inspectors or three days for five agents (Martonosi et al., 2005). Therefore, 
methods are needed to speed up the inspection process and avoid significant delays. The 
technologies used are similar to the screening methods user for personal belonging, but 
with higher energy due to the size and thickness of containers. The captured image is 
cross correlated with the cargo manifest to assure that what is seen is what it is expected 
and  declared  by  the  shipper.  A  container  can  be  scanned  is  thirty  seconds,  but  an 
operator may take up to 15 minutes to review the image (Martonosi et al., 2005). Even 
being quicker, a rate above 30 containers per hour seems hard to achieve. The high cost 
of the screening equipment in the range of several million $ (Theisen et al., 2004:66 and 
Elias, 2008:34), the time required to scan, and the relatively high false positive rate that 
results from the inconclusive visualization are the main restraints for a wide diffusion of 
this equipment. Notwithstanding, they are very profitable since they generate a large 
income due to the imposition of fines and taxes in detected contraband (Van de Voort 
and O’Brian, 2003). 
 
Examples of X-ray equipment include CX 3800M from L-3 Communications and, the 
Silhouette Scan CAB 2000 from Smiths Detection. A system based on Gamma-ray is 
the VACIS imaging system of SAIC. Systems based on Thermal Neutron and Pulsed 
Fast Neutron Analysis were manufactured by Ancore Corp., a US company bought by 
OSI Systems Inc. in 2002 and later on integrated in Rapiscan Systems. Equipment for 
the detection of nuclear material is described in the CBRN early warning section. 
 
Computers can facilitate the tracking of containers and the electronic exchange of cargo 
manifest and thereby the inspection process. For example, SAIC provides with VACIS 
a system called Integrated Container Information System-ICIS to automate the process. 
However, such systems require for widespread success the establishment of standards 
for information exchange. The United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is 
strongly  investing  ($1.7  billion)  since  2001  in  the  development  the  Automated 
                                                 
119 For more details see Van de Voort (2003). See also the research made by the FP 6 EURITRACK 
project that includes a non-intrusive method, named Tagged Neutron Identification System (TINS), to 
identify the chemical composition of suspicious material detected by X-rays inside the container. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Commercial Environment (ACE), a system able to manage an electronic truck manifest 
(e-manifest) that facilitates the border processing of cargo. It is reported that the new 
system processes 30,000 trucks a day (DHS, 2009:26). 
 
The limitations of inspection methods means that 100% inspection is still a hard goal to 
attain
120. Known Shipper Programmes are aimed to qualify shippers that follow good 
practices in order to assess risk better and perform inspection only when the consignor 
or  shipper  is  not  qualified.  Profiling,  a  method  to  identify  potentially  suspicious 
merchandise based on risk analysis and intelligence information, may be used to avoid 
inefficient  random  inspection.  Automatic  profiling  can  be  quickly  performed  using 
information  systems  and  the  electronic  transmission  of  container  data
121.  Yet,  this 




One way to protect goods and merchandise against loss and theft is the attachment of 
coded tags that can be read and processed by computer system helping to identify and 
monitor  efficiently  the  corresponding  object.  Optical  character  recognition  (OCR)
122 
and bar codes may be used for this purpose. However, the advantages of electronic tags 




Radiofrequency identification (RFID), often referred as the internet of things, embraces 
a set of emerging technologies in widespread usage, with progressive application in 
various economical and societal domains such as security, supply chain management, 
and  assets  tracking
124.  RFID  may  be  used  to  identify  and  collect  attributes  about  a 
certain  object  or  person,  including  its  location and  environmental  information  when 
integrated with sensors. This provides enhanced visibility and as a consequence better 
predictability
125.  The  technology  helps  to:  (a)  reduce  inventories  and  lead-time 
variances;  (b)  prevent  the  loss  of  merchandise;  due  to  mishandling,  theft  and 
counterfeiting, (c) spare resources for control including labour and as a consequence 
raise productivity. 
 
                                                 
120 There is a mandate in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 
110-53) that requires 100% screening of all cargo placed on passenger aircraft by August 2010, with 
an  interim  requirement  of  screening  50%  of  such  cargo  by  February  2009.  The  Security  and 
Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act also requires that 100% U.S.-bound cargo containers be 
scanned using non–intrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports 
as soon as feasible. On the difficulties to implement such measures see GAO (2008). 
121 The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre has, in cooperation with the European Antifraud 
Office (OLAF), developed a software tool named Contraffic, which is able to perform a risk analysis 
on the likeliness that a container is transporting illicit material. U.S. Customs uses a similar system 
called the Automated Targeting System since 1999 (GAO, 2010a). 
122 It can be used to read ISO-codes of containers, truck / lorry license plates, and railway wagon codes. 
123 Such as automatic identification independent of position and direction of object and without requiring 
line of sight and a short distance (few inches), simultaneous reads of numerous tags (50 per second), 
low  error  rate,  better  protection  in  harsh  environment,  long  lifetime  in  re-use  applications,  and 
additional functionality such as read/write capability, and integration with other sensors. 
124 Other  applications  are  their  use  for  access  control  in  highways  (toll  collection),  public  transport, 
stadiums, or private vehicles (keyless entry). 
125 RFID  can  be  used  to  control  perishable  goods  like  temperature  compliance  of  pharmaceuticals 
between thresholds during transport. WORKING PAPER 43 
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The  main  components  of  a  RFID  system  are  the  tag  or  transponder,  the  reader  or 
transceiver,  and  the  middleware.  The  tag  is  composed  of  an  antenna,  a  wireless 
transducer and encapsulating material. Active tags have a rewritable memory that can 
be used to temporarily store data and transfer it when required to a reader. They usually 
have batteries and may be connected to sensors (e.g. temperature, intrusion, location). 
Passive tags carry a unique set of data. They have a longer life span and are lighter, 
smaller, and cheaper. Readers consist of an antenna, a radiofrequency module, a control 
unit,  a  coupling  element  to  interrogate  electronic  tags  via  radiofrequency  and  an 
interface to convey the collected data to the processing system. The middleware is the 
software required to link readers with the applications (EC, 2008:22). 
 
Active  RFID
126  tags  can  be  combined  with  other  technologies  to  create  intelligent 
containers able to guarantee their integrity
127. Prototypes and pilot projects have been 
initiated as for example the Smart and Secure Tradelanes Initiative in 2002. The project 
was  started  by  three  of  the  world’s  largest  port  operators,  Hutchison  Port  Holdings 
(HPH), P&O Ports, and PSA Corporation. These corporations manage over 70% of the 
world’s containers at their port facilities. Savi Technology, a company acquired in 2006 
by Lockheed Martin was the technology provider of the RFID tag named Sentinel. Yet, 
the initiative failed
128. According to GAO (2010a) the DHS has financed since 2004 
developments  in  container  protection  and  tracking  such  as  the  Advanced  Container 
Security Device (ACSD), the Container Security Device (CSD) and the Marine Asset 
Tag Tracking System (MATTS) with uneven success. According to Ecorys (2009:144) 
companies and products under development are Savi Networks and SaviTrack product, 
Motorola  /  IAS  Container  Visibility  System,  SPC  Global  Track  (USA)  Container 
Monitoring Unit (CMU) and European Datacomm (EDC). The JRC has also developed 
also a prototype called the Remote Monitoring System (RMS). 
 
RFID can be used for baggage tracking. According to AeroAssist (2008), some airports 
have made attempts to introduce this tracking method. They include pilot programs in 
Amsterdam Schiphol, London Heathrow, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Osaka Kansai Int. 
Airport and Hong Kong Int. Airport, McCarran Airport (Los Angeles) and other US 
airports. These pilot projects, however, are not experiencing a wide diffusion. This may 
suggest that this technology is not always cost-effective for luggage tracking (IATA, 
2008). Hence, it may well be that bar-code technology still remains as the dominant 
baggage tracking technology at airports for many years. 
 
Electronic  Article  Surveillance  (EAS)  actually  is  mainly  based  on  magnetic  tags,  a 
simpler technology than RFID. Articles attached with such tag raise an alarm if they are 
not retired or deactivated before leaving the shopping centre. This market is dominated 
worldwide by two large manufacturers Sensormatic – Tyco, and Checkpoint Systems, 
Inc. Big box retailers are the main purchasers of these equipment. Low-cost passive 
RFID  tags  are  also  been  successfully  applied  for  article  surveillance,  because  this 
technology is also able to trace articles and avoid counterfeiting (the tag becoming an 
                                                 
126 Since  RFID  use  radio  and  their  signal  can  be  eavesdropped,  encryption  is  required  for  certain 
applications. Adding such feature increases final product price (OECD, 2003). Stolen RFID tags may 
be used for false identification.  
127 Active tags can monitor the status of the container (where it has been, and how and by whom it has 
been handled, and other environmental conditions) and transmit this information over long distances. 
They may also store the manifest of cargo. 
128 According to Elias (2008:31) cost of electronic reusable seals is about $2,500. WORKING PAPER 43 
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authentication  mark  of  the  good)  reducing  in  such  a  way  the  losses  from  the 
manufacturing facility to the store. The massive deployment of this technology started 
in 2005 when Wal-Mart Stores, the world’s largest retailer, required some of its largest 
suppliers  to  use  RFID  technologies  (Frost  &  Sullivan,  2005:5-8).  Main  European 
retailers such as Marks & Spencer, Metro Group, Tesco or Carrefour have implemented 
or are evaluating this technology through pilot projects. 
 
According  to  Frost  &  Sullivan  (2006b:2-31)  main  passive  tags  producers  are  UPM 
Raflatac, Avery Dennyson, Sokymat, Texas Instruments and HID. Active tags include 
companies like Savi, Tagmaster or WaveTrend. RFID chips producers include Philips 
Semiconductors, Texas Instruments Radio Frequency Identification Systems (founded 
in  1991  and  the  market  leader),  ST  Microelectronics  and  Infineon  Technologies. 
Manufacturers  of  readers  are  Intermec  Technologies  Corp.,  Datamars  SA  and 
Checkpoint  Systems  Inc.  according  to  Frost  &  Sullivan  (2005:5-12).  Middleware  is 
provider by companies like IBM, Intel, or Sun Microsystems.  
 
Prime contractors are large companies able to integrate tags, readers, computers, data 
networks  and  middleware  with  database  system,  application  software  and  interfaces 
with  other  IT  systems  (e.g.  ERP)  to  provide  complete  solutions.  Examples  of  these 
companies are IBM, Raytheon, SAP, Microsoft or Savi Networks (Ecorys, 2009: 145). 
Other  solution  providers  include  Samsys,  Sybase  Inc,  Scan  Source,  TCS,  Alien 
Technology to name just a few . 
 
As a conclusion, it can be said that the slow transition of pilots to widespread systems 
suggest  a  RFID  security  market  still  in  its  infancy.  Revenues  estimates  were  only 
achieved from Frost & Sullivan (2007a:4-8) that measured world revenues of container 
tracking devices market in only $183.5 million, a value that seems certainly low. Yet, 
according  to  EU  (2008:6)  the  RFID  market  is  growing  fast  (27%  estimates  for  the 
period  2007-2009).  The  leading  users  are  the  transport  (27%)  and  the  retail  sector 
(26%); this indicating a steeper trend in non-security markets. This is an area where 
research is intense due to the large expected size of the market
129. However, important 
restraints to the development and widespread use of this technology remain. The first 
restraint is probably a fledgling, but not completely proven technology, still immature 
for certain applications where reductions in tag size and cost are needed in comparison 
with the inexpensive bar-code
130. The reduced margins into which transport companies 
operate due to competition limit nowadays the application of this technology to high-
value merchandise such as computers, microelectronic components, pharmaceuticals or 
weapons. The second may be due to the lack of stable standards
131 and regulations in a 
market where network effects are essential for success
132. The third is the replacement 
cost of large legacy systems, based on less powerful but still effective technologies as 
the named bar codes. These conditions explain the prudence of customers to bet in this 
technology. According to Frost & Sullivan (2007a:5-5) we are probably still a decade 
behind conditions are met for a wide diffusion of this technology. 
                                                 
129 See for example, EU Framework Research Program projects SToP (Stop Tampering of Products) and 
Bridge (Building Radio Frequency Identification solutions for the Global Environment). The latter 
program  provides  some  estimated  of  expected  growth  and  size  of  this  market:  3.2  billion  tags 
deployed in 2012 and 175.000 readers. 
130 Price today is in the range of 10-15 cents (EU, 2008:72). It is thought that price should be below 5 
cents to be competitive <(F&S, D387:21)>. 
131 Present standards are too fragmented and valid up to 10 years horizon (EU, 2008:8). 
132 See (EU, 2007:136). WORKING PAPER 43 
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CBRN early warning equipment 
 
Chemical, biological, radiological agents and nuclear weapons may be used by terrorist 
groups to meet their goals. Organised crime may be also involved, but being profits its 
main goal, it will be more focused on profitable smuggling or extortion schemes. CBRN 
attacks  may  entail  massive  response  and  recovery  expenditures  and  may  easily 
overwhelm  available  capabilities.  Even  if  the  number  of  casualties  is  modest,  the 
emotional, psychological and economic impact of such action may be enormous as the 
2001 anthrax attack in the US showed. 
 
Preventive  measures  focus  mainly  in  the  protection,  accounting  and  surveillance  of 
materials,  that  can  be  used  in  an  attack,  throughout  their  life  cycle,  i.e.:  creation, 
transportation,  distribution,  handling  and  disposal.  Because  these  measures  can  be 
imperfectly implemented, equipment is needed to unveil illicit traffic quickly warning 
of the agent release in the case of the attack in order to accelerate the deployment of 
preventive  measures  and  the  distribution  of  life  saving  treatment  with  the  aim  of 
decreasing casualties, injuries, illnesses and contamination. 
 
Many of the technologies and products in this market segment are applicable to defence. 
In fact most of them were originally  developed for defence needs and  still defence 
largely funds research in this area. Basic research is made sometimes in government 
owned  facilities  and  often  in  conjunction  with  the  private  sector.  In  particular, 
government support is needed to access agents and secure testing facilities such as BSL-
3 and BSL-4 laboratories (Knobler et al., 2002: 10). 
 
The chance of a CBRN attack has been a matter subject to intense analysis. See for 
example Rapoport (1999), GAO (1999), Jackson (2001), Ackerman and Moran (2006), 
Meade  and  Molander  (2006),  Enders  and  Sandler  (2006:250)  and  Rossof  and  Von 
Winterfeldt (2007) to name a few. A general agreement exists in that the hurdles to 
obtain and use these weapons in an effective way are significant and that the likelihood 
of an attack is smaller than popular literature claims. A confirmation of this hypothesis 
is the short number of incidents –the subway sarin attack in Tokyo in 1996 by Aum 
Shinrikyo
133 and the unidentified anthrax attack in USA in 2001– and the short number 
of fatalities. 
 
The  technological  difficulties  and  barriers  to  unfold  an  effective  weapon  of  mass 
destruction (WMD) –where funding could not be the biggest
134– cannot be dismissed. 
To fix these problems a terrorist group will have to amass considerable organisational 
capabilities, financial and logistic resources, knowledge, materials and technological 
skills. While a crude weapon could be made with less sophistication, it would be less 
likely to cause mass casualties. 
 
Examples  of  technical  difficulties  are  many.  Some  virulent  biological  agents  and 
precursor  chemicals  are  difficult  to  obtain,  and  others  are  difficult  to  process  or 
produce, especially in the quantities needed for mass casualties. The handling of these 
                                                 
133 Aum Shinrikyo endeavour was supported by an extensive scientific staff and nearly a billion dollars in 
assets (Rapoport, 1999). 
134 According to Ackerman and Moran (2006) a few hundred thousand dollars is the amount needed to 
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materials requires specific equipment to avoid contamination that is not easy to pass 
inadvertently. A failure to follow safety rules in the use of highly toxic or virulent 
agent may cause an accident, hurting group members and raising the chance of being 
detected,  putting  in  danger  the  whole  organisation.  These  groups  need  to  test  their 
weapons  to  assess  their  effectiveness:  a  challenging  task  when  they  are  trying  to 
conceal  their  operations.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  a  trivial  matter  to  disseminate  and 
disperse  efficiently  biological  and  some  chemical  agents  across  large  populations 
(NRC, 2002:67) and because of their sensitivity to weather conditions, these weapons 
also  have  significant  risk  of  simply  failing;  this  unpredictability  could  be  a  very 
significant  barrier  based  on  the  psychological  characteristics  of  a  given  group
135. 
Initiation  of  a  multi-month  to  several-year  research  program  to  perfect  a  chemical 
weapon  is  incompatible  with  a  group  which  may  disintegrate  unless  it  begins  its 
operations immediately (Jackson, 2001:35). 
 
Organisational problems are not smaller. Enders and Sandler (2006:250), for example, 
state that Al-Qaida’s decentralized structure protected it during the post-9/11 attacks, 
but at a price of not being able to develop CBRN weapons. In the same sense, Jenkins 
(2006)  states  that  major  operations  require  cooperation,  coordination  and  structure, 
which in turn require a basis for trust that is difficult to establish on a decentralized 
structure and a communication network like the internet. Religious groups which tend 
to isolate themselves from the world will hardly adopt the technologies required to 
develop such weapons (Jackson, 2001:14). 
 
The complexity of obtaining a nuclear weapon is analysed in detail by Mueller (2007). 
He  concludes  that  the  likelihood  a  terrorist  group  will  come  up  with  such  weapon 
seems to be vanishing small. Daly et al. (2005) reports also the difficulties of Aum 
Shinrikyo  to  purchase  a  nuclear  weapon  in  Russia  in  early  1990.  The  technical 
challenges dissuade it to build a nuclear weapon and devote its resources to acquire a 
chemical weapon. Al Qaeda attempts to acquire a nuclear capability was plagued also 
with problems and ultimately failed. 
 
The basic restraints already commented represent the most likely explanation for the 
limited use of these weapons by terrorists organisations to develop and use CBRN 
weapons  able  to  cause  massive  destruction  and  casualties.  This  rationale,  that  is 
expected to continue in the future, should be considered when analysing methods to 
cope with this threat. 
Box 4. The chance of a CBRN attack 
 
The main European supplier of CBRNE early warning equipment is Smith Detection 
(Ecorys, 2009:172). CBRN detection equipment is produced by  Bruker Daltonics, a 
USA based company, in their facilities located in Germany. Environics Oy, a Finnish 
company, is also a producer of chemical detection equipment. ICx technologies is a 
USA based company with offices in Europe. Company size and revenues in this market 
are small (€32 million Bruker Daltonic according to Ecorys (2009:172)). Products are 
usually sold directly to the end customer. 
 
Ecorys (2009:169) estimates the size of the world market of CBRN equipment between 
$2 and $5 billion of which 20% could correspond to EU demand. 
                                                 
135 Of twelve attempts made by Aum Shinrikyo with chemical and biological agents, only one succeeded 
partially (13 deaths) and ultimately Aum itself was crushed (Rapoport, 1999). WORKING PAPER 43 
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Main purchasers of detection equipment are governments and public agencies as well as 
first  responders  in  charge  of  homeland  defence.  The  private  demand  of  CBRN 
equipment is rather small having in mind the very unlikely nature of this kind of attack. 
 
There is no regulatory framework for the certification of CBRN detection equipment, 




Chemical  agents  are  substances  used  to  kill,  seriously  injure  or  incapacitate  people 
through their physiological effects. These agents attack organs of the human body in 
such a way that they prevent those organs for functioning normally. The results are 
usually disabling or even fatal. Based on their effects, they can be classified in nerve, 
blood,  choking  and  blistering  agents.  Common  toxic  industrial  materials  such  as 
ammonia  or  chlorine  used  in  refrigeration,  water  purification  and  other  commercial 
applications also have harmful effects on human beings (Fatah, 2000:5). 
 
The most plausible use of chemicals as weapons is in attacking aggregations of people 
in enclosed spaces (e.g. subways, airports, and financial centres) in ways that would 
cause disruption to crucial infrastructures services and render them unusable. Small 
quantities of chemicals would usually be all that would be needed (for nerve agents, a 
few hundred of grams would suffice). Use of a chemical agent in a non-enclosed space, 
however, is perhaps of less concern, because a toxic cloud would be subject to the 
vagaries of wind direction and thermal currents, thereby requiring large amounts (many 
kilograms) of the agent to cause numerous casualties (NRC, 2002:108). 
 
Another  form  of  attack  could  be  the  release  of  a  chemical  agent  from  industrial 
facilities (e.g. petroleum refineries, chemical plants, and oil and liquefied natural gas 
supertankers)  or  pipelines  using  explosive  charges  or  simply  by  cutting  pipes  or 
opening valves. Under some meteorological conditions, release from production and 
storage  facilities  could  permit  a  toxic  plume  to  pass  over  heavily  populated  areas. 
Terrorists could take advantage of the frequent proximity of vehicles for transport of 
hazardous chemical to potential targets like trains that travel under cities or barges 
located in harbours (NRC, 2002:112). 
Box 5. Plausible ways of a chemical attack 
 
Stand off detection of the agent is the most desirable method. Infrared images and laser 
technology  (LIDAR,  Laser  based  Raman,  vibrational  spectroscopy,  laser-induced 
breakdown spectroscopy, and tunable diode laser spectroscopy are being used for such 
purpose,  however  these  promising  technologies  are  still  not  completely  ready  for 
practical  use.  Point  detection  methods  to  measure  the  presence  of  the  agent  on  the 
surface  of  an  object  include  ion  mobility  spectrometry  (IMS),  flame  photometry, 
infrared  spectroscopy,  electrochemistry,  colorimetry,  surface  acoustic  wave  (SAW), 
photo ionization, thermal and electrical conductivity, or flame ionization. The detectors 
based on these technologies are used by first responders to provide a first warning that 
is  subsequently  confirmed  by  more  sensitive  analytical  instruments  to  accurately 
identify  and  quantify  the  agent.  These  instruments  include  technologies  like  Mass 
Spectrometry, Gas Chromatography, High Performance  Liquid Chromatography,  Ion 
Chromatography  and  capillary  zone  Electrophoresis  (Fatah,  2000:13).  According  to WORKING PAPER 43 
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OHS (2002:39) the technology to achieve affordable, accurate, compact and dependable 
chemical sensors is still immature. 
 
The  development  of  chemical  sensors  is  heavily  supported  by  the  industry.  Many 
industrial production facilities are routinely equipped with instruments to detect and 




People or livestock can be exposed to biological agents from inhalation, through the 
skin,  or  by  the  ingestion  of  contaminated  food,  feed  or  water.  After  exposure  to  a 
pathogen or toxin used as a biological weapon, physical symptoms can be delayed and 
prove difficult to distinguish from naturally occurring illnesses. Similarly, crops can be 
exposed to biological weapons in several ways –at the seed stage, in the field or after 
the  harvest  (NRC,  2002:65).  These  agents  have  the  capacity  to  infect  thousand  of 
people, contaminate soil, buildings and transport assets, destroy agriculture and infect 
animal populations and eventually affect food and feed at any state in the food supply 
chain. At least, theoretically, highly  contagious and lethal pathogens can present an 
even  greater  danger  than  nuclear  weapons  in  that  they  are  not  limited  to  the 
geographical target area, and can continue to spread indefinitely (Ackerman and Moran, 
2006). Biological agents include bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae and toxins such as anthrax, 




The means to combat such attack include environmental detection of agents together 
with preclinical, clinical, and agricultural surveillance and diagnosis (NRC, 2002:69). 
Because, no single sensor is able to detect all the agents of interest, several different 
technologies  are  needed  as  components  of  a  detection  network.  Most  biological 
detecting systems have significant logistic requirements, due to the use of wet chemistry 
and expensive and sensitive reagents
137. Sensors should be able to detect agents on the 
air, on the surface, or on the water supply. 
 
The challenge to an effective detection of these agents is the extremely high sensitivity 
–some highly infectious pathogens only need the inhalation of 1 to 10 organisms to 
cause disease (NRC, 2002:72)– and the unusually high degree of selectivity that the 
equipment shall have due to the large and diverse biological background environment. 
Air detection is the main early warning equipment since the primary infection route 
from exposure to biological agents is through inhalation. The detection system needs to 
discriminate between all of the naturally occurring particulates (such as dust, pollen, 
engine exhaust) and the biological agent particulates. For this purpose, it samples air 
and measures some inherent properties of the dry aerosol particles triggering a warning 
when  it  changes.  Examples  of  detectors  are  the  Aerosol  Size  and  Shape  Analyzer 
(ASAS) system that measures the particle shape from laser scattering, the Fluorescence 
Aerodynamic  Particle  Sizer  (FLAPS)  system  that  measure  size  and  the  presence  of 
ultraviolet  induced  fluorescence  and  the  Biological  Alarm  Monitor  (MAB)  which 
                                                 
136 A terrorist biological attack will most probably be based on an agent without genetical modifications, 
since otherwise it will increase the complexity of introducing changes, and the need to test the new 
agent in animals to confirm its efficacy without affording any other relevant benefit. 
137 A reagent is a test substance that is added to a system in order to bring about a reaction or to see 
whether a reaction occurs. WORKING PAPER 43 
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measures the elemental decomposition by flame spectrophotometry. These detectors can 
reach close to real-time warning but have relatively low specificity, sometimes resulting 
in  false  alarms  (Myers  et  al.,  2010).  The  identification  process  requires  additional 
sensors. Due to the large variety of agents they are limited to a preselected set and can 
only identify others with the addition of new chemistry equipment or pre-programming. 
These systems can be installed on a mobile platform like a helicopter or UAV (Fatah, 
2001:33). 
 
Laboratory approaches to identify agents include microbial cultivation, immunological 
(e.g.  antibody  based)  assays
138,  and  nucleic  acid  detection  schemes,  especially 
amplification  methods  such  as  the  polymerase  chain  reaction  (PCR).  The  last  two 
approaches  seek  molecular  evidence  of  agent  components,  such  as  characteristic 
immunological markers and genome sequences. A fourth broad approach relies upon the 
response of a subrogate host – such as cultivated cells from humans animals, or plants. 
Each of the mentioned approaches has its advantages and disadvantages. It is important 
to note, however, that even though cultivation is slow, limited in scope (by ignorance of 
appropriate grow conditions in the test tube and in human tissues for many pathogens), 
and  the  least  technologically  sophisticated  approach,  it  provides  the  most  ready 
assessment of complex microbial phenotypes (behaviour) such as drug  resistance.  It 
also is the most widely used approach in laboratories throughout the world specially in 
developing nations, and hence is currently the most common identification method for 
international surveillance (NRC, 2002:71). 
 
In short, the technology to detect efficiently biological agents today is still immature, 
due to the high requirements than an effective system demands such as large variety of 
agents,  short  detection  and  identification  time  and  expensiveness  (ibid.:71).  Such 
limitations impede a widespread use and the creation of early warning networks. Hence, 
considerable  research  is  still  needed  in  this  area.  Robust  disease  surveillance,  as  a 
second best solution, is the most appropriate method to early identify a bioterrorism 
attack. Classical epidemiological analysis like white blood count, fever, and relatively 
simple observations will remain the first line of defence in protecting human health 
(ibid.:74). 
 
Information systems networks may be rather useful in such cases to post and share 
information  between  organisations  involved  in  public  health  such  as  hospitals, 
emergency rooms, laboratories, public health departments, as well as law enforcement 
agencies for early warning. These systems may include medical records of patients with 
uncommon symptoms that might be related to the effects of a biological (or chemical) 
attack, records of biological incidents and so on. The information and communications 
industry is the main provider of such systems whose development is based on standard 
equipment  and  software  (web-based).  Customers  are  the  different  EU  and  national 
Rapid Alert Systems in charge of warning of biological contamination and pandemics. 
 
The United States is seriously committed in improving their early warning capability of 
a dangerous release of biological agents into the environment. With this purpose, it 
launched in 2003 the Biowatch project within the National Bio-surveillance Integration 
System (NBIS). The system, which operates in more than 30 major metropolitan areas, 
periodically  collects  and  analyses  samples  of  air  to  detect  pathogens.  The  system’s 
                                                 
138 Immunoassay  detects  biological  agent  using  the  reaction  of  cell  antibodies  to  the  pathogen.  The 
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sensors are being subject to intense research and continuous upgrade due to current 
shortcomings of the deployed sensors and analyzers that can require up to 36 hours in 
identifying a biological agent (GAO, 2010:48). Europe has not felt the need of such 




Protection  against  radiological  agents  is  mainly  achieved  securing  the  life  cycle  of 
radioactive  sources  through  adequate  regulations,  preventing  in  such  a  way  the 
unauthorized access to radiological sources
139 which are most dangerous and capable of 
weaponization. Since, despite measures, such material could be stolen and smuggled, a 
capability for detecting its illegal trade is needed. Non-intrusive devices can be used to 
support  this  capability  and  warn  of  any  abnormal  radiation  which  may  recommend 
further inspection. 
 
Radiological attacks using a dispersion device could be carried out in several ways. 
Radiation  sources  could  be  hidden  in  facilities frequented  by  large  numbers  of  the 
public (e.g. sports stadiums, subway systems)  or dispersed taking advantage of the 
building  ventilation  systems.  A  radiation  source  could  also  be  combined  with  an 
explosive to quickly disperse radioactive material over areas on the order of hundreds 
of square meters to a few square kilometres, depending on meteorological conditions
140 
(NRC, 2002:49). Although these attacks would not probably disperse large quantities 
of radioactivity, they could cause public panic, especially if the attack takes place in a 
high  populated  urban  area.  Anyhow,  a  radiological  attack  lacks  sufficient  media 
coverage of bloody bodies and smoking rooms (Brown, 2006:21). 
 
Detailed studies of Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) suggest that few if any 
human  deaths  would  be  expected  from  dispersed  radiation,  although  the  explosion 
itself could cause casualties. The presence of dispersed radioactivity in the attacked 
area could, however, confound rescue efforts. The most severe effects on human health 
are  produced  if  the  material  can  be  efficiently  dispersed  in  respirable  form.  For 
optimum particulate size, inhaled material can remain lodged in lungs, leading to either 
acute or chronic effects, depending on the amount and type of material respired. Even 
though there are methods to construct a RDD to obtain good dispersion of inhalable 
particles,  they  require  expert  knowledge  and  access  to  university  level  laboratory 
facilities (NRC, 2002:49). 
 
If  an  RDD  attack  were  to  occur,  the  casualty  rate  would  likely  be  low,  and 
contamination could be detected and removed from the environment, although such 
clean up would probably be expensive and time consuming. It is clear that the aim of a 
RDD attack would be to spread fear and panic and to cause as much disruption to 
society as possible. Given the public fear of anything nuclear or radioactive, even a 
minor  terrorist  attack  could  have  greatly  magnified  psychological  and  economic 
                                                 
139 A  wide  variety  of  radiation  sources  are  used  in  the  civilian  economy  for,  among  other  things, 
industrial  radiography,  radiation  therapy,  university  research,  energy  power  plants,  and  natural 
resource exploration. These sources contain penetrating gamma emitters like cesium-137, cobalt-60, 
and iridium-192; alpha emitters like radium-226 an americium-241; and beta emitters like strontium-
90 (NRC, 2002:48). A radioactive waste shipment could be more easily stolen while in transit. 
140 Food and beverages can be poisoned with radioactive isotopes. Yet this method seems to be less likely 
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consequences. In general, public fear of radiation and radioactive materials appears to 
be disproportionate to the actual hazards. Although hazardous at high doses, ionizing 
radiation is a weak carcinogen, and its effects on biological systems are better known 
than those of most if not all toxic chemicals (NRC, 2002:61). 
Box 6. Use of a Radiological Dispersion Device for performing a terror attack 
 
The  detection  of  radiological  and  nuclear  material  is  made  passively  sensing  the 
emission of gamma-rays or neutrons. Gamma radiation is emitted by all the materials of 
greatest  concern  and  neutrons  are  emitted  by  only  a  limited  number  of  materials 
including plutonium. The detection devices can be installed in portals for vehicle and 
cargo container screening. If the plutonium material is unshielded or lightly shielded, it 
can even be detected in vehicles at speed. On the contrary, passive detection of objects 
containing High Enriched Uranium (HEU) is very difficult and varies widely, being 
limited today to short ranges. In some cases, lightly shielded devices can be detected at 
portals, but in others, they can only be detected if they are essentially unshielded. HEU 
can be detected by active monitoring using, for example, pulsed neutron sources and 
neutron detectors (DSB, 2004 and NRC, 2002:55). 
 
Radiological and nuclear detection equipment has a high technological readiness vis à 
vis  chemical,  biological  and  explosive  detection  equipment.  Ecorys  (2009:  166) 
distinguish four types of devices. The first is fixed radiation portal monitors which are 
tailored to the kind of traffic like persons, vehicles, packages or other cargo. They can 
be deployed and set permanently at road checkpoints, cargo inspection stations, and 
ports
141.  The  second  type  is  personal  radiation  detectors,  commonly  referred  to  as 
pagers, which are small handheld devices that detect gamma radiation. They are mainly 
used by custom officials and police for detecting illicit radioisotopes and could be used 
by emergency responders as a mean to monitor a large number of people for radioactive 
contamination after a suspected radiological or nuclear incident
142. The third type is 
hand-held gamma and neutron search detectors which provide greater sensitivity and 
can  be  used  to  locate  the  radiation  source.  Finally  hand-held  radioactive  isotope 
identification  devices  (RIID)  are  devices  designed  to  determine  the  identity  of  the 
radioactive material through the analysis of the gamma radiation signature. Example of 
this kind of equipment is GR-135 RIID of SAIC, the personal radiation detectors of 
Berkeley  Nucleonics,  or  the  High  Performance  Radioisotope  Identifier  (HPRID)  of 
Smith Detection. 
 
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office of the USA will develop, acquire and support 
the deployment of a domestic system to detect and report attempts to import, assemble, 
or  transport  a  nuclear  explosive  device,  fissile  or  radiological  material  intended  for 
illicit use. This Office is spending a large amount, above $2 billion, in the development 
                                                 
141 This equipment is combined with X-ray active imaging in order to screen suspicious containers. One 
shortcoming of current radiation portal monitors is their inability to distinguish between legitimate 
commercial radioactive material (e.g. medical, industrial); naturally occurring radioactive materials 
(such  as  rocks,  minerals,  metals  processed,  scrap,  fertilizers,  ceramic  or  bananas),  and  potential 
terrorist weapons such as radiological dispersal devices or improvised nuclear devices. 
142 Sodium iodide scintillation detectors, Cadmium-Zinc-Telluride semiconductor detectors, Germaniun 
gamma-ray detectors, semiconductor charged-particle detectors, Geiger-Muller counters, ionization 
chambers, plastic scintillator detectors and high-pressure Helium proportional counters are the main 
technologies used (Myers, 2010). Dosimeters are also needed to measure radiation exposure of first 
responders.  They  are  based  on  quartz  fibre,  film-badge,  thermoluminescence  or  solid  state 
(Wikipedia). WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  88 
new detection equipment, namely the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitor (ASP), 
the  Cargo  Advanced  Automated  Radiography  System  (CAARS)  and  the  Human 
Portable Radiation Detection System (HPRDS). The first system will be able to identify 
the isotope causing the alarm thus avoiding a secondary inspection; and the second will 
be able to detect high density shielding. European companies have important knowledge 
on nuclear and radiological detection technologies (e.g. CEA, Areva Group, Siemens) 
and  the  7
th  ERFP  considers  such  topic.  Yet,  the  available  economic  resources  for 




Nuclear  attacks may include the attack to a nuclear facility, the explosion of a self 
constructed primitive nuclear bomb fabricated from stolen or diverted nuclear material 
and  components,  or  the  stealing  of  a  state-owned  nuclear  weapon
143.  The  main 
countermeasure is the early detection of materials used to fabricate the bomb, or the 
bomb itself, before the attack is made. It includes physical protection measures, control 
of radioactive sources, and measures against illicit trafficking. These measures have 
been analysed in the previous section. 
 
Systems to support intelligence operations 
 
Actionable  intelligence  is  essential  to  defeat  terrorism  and  organised  crime.  The 
activities of these groups entails gathering information, selecting a target, planning the 
attack, recruiting and training executors, purchasing goods, obtaining financial support, 
travelling  to  the  place  where  the  target  is  located,  performing  the  attack  and 
disseminating propaganda and revindication material. Whereas these groups attempt to 
disguise their identities and remain invisible against the backdrop of an enormously 
diverse and mobile society, they always leave in performing said activities, voluntarily 
or involuntarily, traces in large quantities and in dispersed ways, inside different public 
and  private  organisations  including  the  web.  The  timely  and  thorough  collection, 
analysis, interpretation and dissemination of information about the activities and plans 
of these groups allow the government to take immediate- and near term action to disrupt 
and  prevent  their  actions  and  to  provide  useful  warning  to  specific  targets,  security 
personnel or the general population. 
 
Such  capability  can  be  enhanced  with  the  aid  of  information  and  communications 
systems. These systems can store large databases of personal identities; information 
related  to  judicial,  police,  immigration  and  customs  historical  records  of  individual 
offenders committed or likely to be committed illegal activities, as well as complete 
dossiers  of  past  terrorist  or  criminal  offences  including  information  of  suspects, 
potential witnesses and collected evidences. Simple consultation to these databases may 
be  very  helpful  to  verify  identities  or  pursuit  orders
144.  Advanced  tools,  based  on 
retrieval and correlation of data, such as face images, fingerprint or DNA, may help to 
build conjectures and verify hypotheses, deriving in this way knowledge about terrorism 
and organised crime which may be used to identify members, networks, operational 
means and sources of support. 
                                                 
143 Attacks based upon stand-off weapons such as ballistic or cruise missiles should be considered out of 
the capabilities of terrorism and organised crime. 
144 This access may be even done from a vehicle data terminal using a wireless link able to upload the 
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There  is  a  general  believe  that  information  and  communications  technologies  will 
largely improve the intelligence capabilities to combat terrorism and organised crime 
(NRC, 2002:166). The knowledge of these groups is expected to increase through the 
use  of  high  performance  computers  and  sophisticated  algorithms.  Yet  these 
expectations are not shared by all and many question the value that can be obtained 
from this information (Anderson, 2001; Markle Foundation, 2002:2). 
 
The automated analysis of text, image, video, sensor, and other kinds of unstructured 
data by a computer may enable to sort efficiently massive quantities of data to bring the 
relevant evidence to the attention of the analyst. Information fusion, data mining and 
natural language processing are three main areas of research. These techniques may be 
applied  for  example  to  massively  analyse  online  information  such  as  e-mail,  news 
articles, memos, and web sites pages (NRC, 2002:169). 
 
Information fusion is defined as the use of computer technology to acquire data from 
many sources, integrate these data into usable and accessible forms, and interpret them 
generating new knowledge. Data mining is the automatic machine-learning of general 
patterns from large volumes of specific cases. Bayesian network learning and logistic-
regression-and-support  vector  machines  are  among  the  most  widely  used  statistical 
machine  learning  algorithms.  Natural  language  technologies  include  information 
extraction, cross-lingual retrieval, machine translation, summarization, categorization, 
filtering and link detection (NRC, 2002:168). Yet, the performance of these advanced 
tools to improve intelligence capabilities is, for the time being, largely unreported. 
Box 7. Promising technologies in intelligence based on computers 
 
Traces of suspicious activities may be recorded in private data bases such as phone 
calls, e-mails, economic transactions (e.g. credit cards), hotel and car rental record data, 
or passenger name records. Systems able to automatically access this information have 
been  forecasted.  Whereas  this  capability  is  so  far  hardly  achievable  due  to  the 
complexity and cost of developing the appropriate interfaces, the main issue is likely the 
adequate protection of privacy and civil rights
145 and the financing of the compensation 
amount for retaining and supplying such information by private agents. The principle 
that the access to private information shall be proportionate and necessary calls for a 
prior (judicial) authorisation mechanism granted on a case by case basis, to preserve 
these rights and impede the indiscriminate data retrieval from such databases. Only a 
change in citizen’s preferences between privacy and security could make feasible this 
kind of developments, a change that is not envisaged for the time being. 
 
Banking  information  can  be  especially  useful  to  fight  against  money  laundering, 
terrorism financing, and other illegal transactions such as armament or drug trade. The 
source and destination of the transfer may be correlated with available intelligence (e.g. 
financial sanctions lists) to identify and trace suspicious transfers and proceed to freeze 
or confiscate these assets
146. Directive 2005/60/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1781/2006 
                                                 
145 See  on  this  issue  the  opinion  of  the  EU  art.  29  data  protection  working  party  10/2006  on  the 
processing of personal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT). Project PRISE concluding Conference Statement Paper (undated) demands that access to 
such information should be based on specific suspicion and should require court orders. 
146 Terrorist  attacks  are  relatively  inexpensive.  For  example  according  to  the  European  Commission 
(2004b), the Madrid bombs did not cost more than €8.000; Hoffman (1998) reports that the cost of the 
1993 World Trade Centre bomb was only $400, but caused over $500 million in damages; and the WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  90 
provide  support  for  such  activities.  Finance  Intelligence  Units  of  member  states  are 
customers of information and communications systems applied for such activities. The 
EU FIU-net system is aimed at sharing such information among member states. 
 
Sharing intelligence across agencies and nations provides important advantages, but it 
requires the development of interoperable standards and software tools that allow the 
exchange of information between these agencies and nations (Munday et al., 2006:14). 
This entails the agreement on interfaces and the development of translation gateways to 
automate the data access when standards did not exist at the time the system was made. 
Success in information sharing has been achieved in the Schengen Information System 
(SIS)
  147,  the  Visa  Information  System  (VIS),  the  EURODAC  (the  EU  asylum 
applicants fingerprint database), or the European Custom Information System (1995) for 
exchanging  of  information  on  smuggling  led  by  the  European  Anti-Fraud  Office 
(OLAF). Yet, there are areas where interconnection has not been still been achieved as 
for  example  AFIS  systems  of  Member  States  (IPTS,  2005:117).  Europol,  as  an 
organisation  aimed  at  improving  cooperation  in  combating  terrorism  and  organised 
crime, and Eurojust, as an organisation aimed at increasing judicial cooperation such as 
the access to criminal records, are two essential institutions in the development of these 
systems. 
 
These intelligence tools help to discover recurrent patterns or ‘profiles’ permitting the 
classification  of  people,  objects,  or  actions  into  different  categories.  Some  of  these 
categories may be considered to deserve further attention or special treatment, helping 
in this way to more focused searches and inspections. They can be applied to identify 
trustworthy  (low  risk)  people  or  cargo  and  circumvent  routine  inspections  that  are 
always costly and of limited efficiency
148. 
 
Main suppliers of these systems are prime-contractors and software companies which 
implement the system with the support of specialised companies that provide software 
modules  and  computer  hardware.  Governmental  law  enforcement  and  intelligence 
agencies  are  the  main  customers  of  these  systems.  Data  on  this  market  segment  is 
unavailable since procurement programmes are usually classified. Basic technologies 
used  are  mostly  of  dual  nature  and  are  applicable  to  other  areas  like  business 
intelligence and knowledge management. 
Other markets related with intelligence and surveillance 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Economist  (2003,  p.45)  reports  that  the  9/11  attack  cost  less  than  half  million  dollars.  However, 
terrorist  groups  need  a  constant  financial  flow  for  propaganda,  recruitment,  facilitation,  etc.  that 
requires methods to covertly collect and transfer funds. They may include the electronic transfer of 
small amounts of money that will not raise suspicion, cash payments, or informal cash transfers like 
the hawala (also known as hundi) system that makes difficult to disguise who is making the transfer to 
whom. The development of anonymous payment technologies, such as stored value-type smart cards, 
poses new risks since they may be abused by money launders and other financial criminals. These 
transfers of money are hard to detect since bank intermediation is unnecessary (Molander, 1998). 
147 This  system  contains  information  about  persons  to  be  arrested  and  surrendered,  stolen  passports, 
objects to be seized, persons or vehicles to be searched, etc. 
148 Whereas profiling is not inherently bad, the classification based only on external indicators is always 
subject to error giving way to false positives. This rate can be enough high to reduce inspections to an 
affordable level. Even a low rate may not be too helpful for large flows such as people or cargo 
crossing borders. Profiling may give way also to false negatives, and, once the system is learned, 
features that will not raise a warning may be used to improve this rate (Martonosi and Barnett, 2006). WORKING PAPER 43 
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In addition to the abovementioned market segments, there are other segments with some 
relevance whose size is comparatively smaller in terms of revenues as for example: 
communication interception equipment, microphones and transmission system used by 
intelligence operations, special radars to locate people behind walls, devices attached to 
suspect vehicles to allow their tracking, GPS based bracelets to control prisoners on 




Protection is needed should intelligence, surveillance and other preventive measures 
fail. It means hardening potential targets so that their disruption or destruction becomes 
difficult to attain. In the field of protection the following areas have been identified: 
 
·  Building protection 
·  Vehicle protection 
·  Personal protection 
·  Manned guarding services 





The protection of buildings mainly focuses the most likely kind of attack, that is to say 
explosives. The protection is based on the design of a layered architecture composed of 
different physical barriers (e.g. fences, bollards) and obstacles,  as well  as perimeter 
surveillance and access control systems to screen individuals, vehicles and other objects 
entering  into  the  building,  as  the  ones  that  have  been  previously  described.  When 
feasible, appropriate buffer/safe zones and forward holding areas for visitors are drawn 
up  to  reduce  effects  of  an  explosion  within  a  dangerous  distance  of  the  building, 
especially when a (suicide) car or truck bomb is used
150. Yet these measures have to be 
balanced with other constraints such as accessibility, cost, or aesthetics
151. The design is 
also  aimed  for  limiting  and  mitigating  damages  and  facilitating  rescue  efforts.  It 
includes measures to resist effects on the building façade (e.g. limiting flying debris), 
reinforced structures to resist progressive collapse, and the maintenance of emergency 
functions  (using  for  example  redundancy)  until  evacuation  is  complete.  Reinforced 
concrete and laminated glass (to avoid glass laceration) are some of the materials used 
for  this  purpose.  Access  control,  surveillance  systems,  and  early  fire  detection  and 
extinction  are  nowadays  integrated  within  the  building  management  system  that 
controls all the relevant building functions such as lightning, elevators, power supply or 
communications. 
 
The second most probable kind of attack would be a chemical, biological or radiological 
attack. Protection is mainly achieved through improved design of the Heat, Ventilation 
                                                 
149 For more details see FEMA (2003). 
150 However, the number of attacks with large trucks loaded with explosives has been rather small. Air 
attacks by small crafts loaded with high explosives as 9/11 can be feasible as well. The protection 
against this threat is only partially achieved through air space control able to early warn of a renegade 
aircraft. 
151 For example, the access control system cannot be so rigid that it prevents the safe exit of a building’s 
occupants during emergencies such as a fire. WORKING PAPER 43 
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and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system such as hard-to-access outdoor air intakes, air 
filtering using HEPA filters and air cleaning using sorbent filters
152. 
 
The construction sector is the main supplier of secure buildings. Specific designs to 
reinforce  the  building  do  not  substantially  differ  from  similar  methods  used  for 
protection against natural or man-made disasters such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes 
or fires. Specific security enhancements are usually provided through the subcontracting 
of  specialised  companies  in  areas  like  intrusion  detection,  fire  detection,  or  voice 
communications systems. Examples of this kind of companies are Siemens Building 
Technologies, Schneider Electric, or Software House (Tyco). A secure building may 
raise its total cost between 5 and 15%. However, only a limited fraction of buildings 
(e.g. embassies and some critical infrastructures) deserve such protection. No economic 





Vehicles for the transport of cash and valuables and vehicles for transport of VIPs are 
the two kind of vehicle protected against terrorism and organised crime. Both are based 
on a standard vehicle design modified to endure an attack such as runflat tires and the 
use of steel or reinforced glass to protect passenger area, fuel tank and batteries. Since 
protection  adds  extra  weight,  the  car  suspension  and  brake  systems  are  usually 
reinforced. The vehicle changes to integrate these elements are made by the proper car 
builder or by small specialised companies. 
 
The number of vehicles that require protection is rather small. The main customers of 
vehicles  for  cash  and  valuables  transport  are  guarding  companies  that  provide  this 
service. VIPs vehicles are reserved to a short number of high rank public officers as 
well  as  presidents  and  CEO  of  large  companies.  Examples  of  suppliers  are  SVOS 
Company, or Hartmann Spezial Karrosserien GmbH. 
 
Electromagnetic  shielding  is  also  required  to  neutralize  radio  controlled  improvised 
explosive devices. Such weapons may be easily activated using modified cell phones, 
cordless phones, or remote garage door openers. Such equipment is mainly provided by 
suppliers of electronic jamming equipment for defence as for example Warlock made by 
EDO Communication and Countermeasures Inc. (a subsidiary of ITT Corporation), ICE 
made by Raytheon, or K9 International Corp. 
 
After a CBRN attack, adequately protected vehicles may be needed for reconnaissance 
within the contaminated area. They are based in an overpressure in the sealed interior of 
the vehicle combined with a filtering system to avoid the entry of agents thus avoiding 
that  the  crew  dresses  special  protective  suits.  The  defence  industry  that  supplies 
battlefield vehicles with this protection also supplies the civilian market as can be the 
company Rheinmetall AG. Civil protection organisations are the main purchasers of 
these vehicles. 
 
                                                 
152 Air filtering is used to protect against agents that travel in the air as an aerosol whereas air cleaning is 
used against agents that travel as a gas. Further details can be found in NIOSH (2003). 
153 The  sophisticated  equipment  under  development  to  protect  airliners  from  missile  attack  is  being 
developed by the defence industry. Wheeled armoured vehicles for police special operations are also 
supplied by this industry (e.g. Dingo 2 vehicle of Krauss-Maffei Wegmann). WORKING PAPER 43 
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Personal protection 
 
Personal protection equipment (PPE) is aimed at protecting police and first responders 
from: 
 
·  Small arms and shrapnel of explosives. 
·  Fire to rescue people from heat and flame. 
·  CBRN contamination. 
 
The  equipment,  especially  designed  to  resist  the  different  threats,  includes  clothing, 
gloves, boots, a mask or helmet, respirators, and sometimes shields. The heaviness and 
bulkiness of the equipment means a physiological burden –due to limited mobility and 
vision as well as heat stress– that interferes with the operational duties of the user. 
 
Clothes  are  made  using  high-resistance  fabrics  such  as  aramids
154.  For  protection 
against bullets and shrapnel ceramic tiles can be used. The heavy weight of vest limits 
protection to the more vulnerable parts of the body such as the thorax. Chemical and 
biological protective clothes use special tissues, such as active carbon, to avoid that 
chemical or biologic particles reach the skin. A mask with a breath filter is required to 
protect the face and avoid the entry of noxious agents into the lungs. 
 
Vests are made by the apparel industry which normally provides uniforms and dresses 
to armed forces, police forces, or guarding companies. The company size has to be 
enough large to supply in time the number of units demanded. Sales are made directly 
from manufacturers to the customer. Fibres are dominated by a group of global market 
players like Dupont (USA) and Teijin Aramids (JP). European fabrics manufacturers are 
Tencate (NL), Ibena (GE), Utexbel (BE), Seyntex (BE) and Klopman (IT). The high 
value of these fabrics, which require large investment and specific skills, makes that this 
industry is still competitive against Far East countries more focused on low-end quality 
fabrics. Main suppliers are Seyntex, Sioen industries (BE), Lion Apparel (USA), Bristol 
Uniforms (UK), Remploy Frontline (UK), Cosalt (Ballycare), Arlen (PL). Some small 
companies provide also support services such as cleaning (Ecorys, 2009: 258). 
 
Main  customers  are  police  forces,  fire  brigades  and  manned  guarding  companies. 
Purchases are very fragmented since customers are many times local or regional. The 
industry also supplies this kind of equipment in other civilian markets like chemicals, 
oil and gas. This is a ‘replacement market’ with a limited amount of new customers and 
a vegetative growth. Ecorys (2009:247) estimates the revenues of this market in Europe 
between €525 and €875 million. Research on light materials for this kind of equipment 
is a permanent need for the reasons mentioned before. Nanotechnology and smart or 





                                                 
154 Aramid fibres are very frequently used in civilian products like sails, cables and wings of aircrafts. 
Most known trademarks are Kevlar, Nomex, or Twaron. 
155 In this section, we analyse only Private Security Companies as opposed to Private Military Companies 
based on mercenaries that provide security services to firms (e.g. BP) with interest in foreign countries 
involved in some kind of armed conflict. On this issue, see Holmqvist (2005). WORKING PAPER 43 
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Many market agents that are willing to pay for improving their security, due to the 
benefit they perceive or because regulations impose them the implementation of some 
security measures. In such a case, guarding services can be hired to specialized private 
companies when in-house provision is more expensive and less effective such as for 
example the screening of passenger personal belongings that airports usually outsource. 
The main services these companies provide are: 
 
·  Protection of people and property, and the maintenance of law and order (De 
Waard, 1999) in a wide variety of environments such as factories, warehouses, 
offices,  shopping  centres,  hospitals,  transport  hubs,  car  parks,  concerts  and 
sports venues, official sites or residences. 
·  Transport and storage of cash and valuables. 
·  Operation of security equipment, including intrusion detections systems, access 
control systems and personal inspection of belongings. 




According to Frost & Sullivan (2008b) report the market of guarding services is large in 
Europe. Revenues in 2007 accounted for €24.5 billion with an expected growth rate of 
5.4%. This steady growth is also noted by Van Steden and Sarre (2007) that attribute it 
to  the  perceived  need  of  higher  security  and  the  advantages  of  outsourcing  these 
services. 
 
According to this report static guarding is the main service supplied representing the 
68%  of  total  revenues,  alarm  monitoring  and  response  follows  with  19%  and  cash 
services is around 13%. Services are sold to the industrial (32%), commercial (49%) 
and government [including public transport] (19%) sectors. The demand of individuals 
is not recorded, probably because it is not significant. Revenues, employees and number 
of companies in 2007 are resumed in the next table: 
 
Country  Rev.  Rev./GDP  Empl.  Companies  Concentration 
Austria  212  0.08%  10,000  200   
Belgium  715  0.21%  18,000  300  90-95% top 4 
Bulgaria  55 
0.18% 






42,000  5,600  70% among top 10 
Denmark  345  0.15%  6,000  350  56% top 2 companies 
Estonia  140  0.88%  6,500  10  70% one dominant player 
Finland  300  0.17%  8,000  150  70-80% top 4 
France  4,050  0.21%  150,000  4,600  less than 30% top 4 
Germany  4,300  0.18%  171,000  3,300  less than 20% top 3 
Greece  223 
0.10% 
48,000  1,027  Fragmented  market  dominated  by 
15 companies 
Hungary  859  0.85%  80,000  3,000  Dominant player 36% 
Ireland  400  0.21%  12,000  300   
Italy  2,510  0.16%  52,000  1,300  36% top 9 
Latvia  110  0.52%  5,500  360  80% top 6 
Lithuania  90  0.31%  10,000  135  Dominant player  more than  30%. 
                                                 
156 The operator of the system can investigate the sensor triggered by the alarm and, being the case, send 
a patrol to the household or warn police. The patrol sent to respond to the potential security incident is 
usually in constant contact with the control centre via radio. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Top 5 80% share. 
Netherlands  1,135  0.20%  35,000  500  60-65% top 3 
Poland  1,435  0.46%  200,000  4,000  38% top 6 
Portugal  664  0.39%  36,000  105  51% top 5, 82% top 10 
Romania  219  0.18%  92,000  1,055  60% top 6 
Slovakia        1,730   
Slovenia  1.3  0,00%  6,300  100   
Spain  3,350  0.32%  89,000  1,134  80% 18 members of APROSER 
Sweden  669  0.20%  17,000  250  85-90% top 3 
United 
Kingdom 
2,520  0.12%  140,000  1,600  47% top 4 
Total
157  24,541  0.20%  1,267,300  30,236   
Source: Austria, Ireland, Slovakia and Slovenia (CoESS), remaining member states Frost & Sullivan 
(2008b). Revenues in million €. 
Table 14. Guarding services market in the European Union (2007). 
 
As can be seen from the table, the sector is highly atomised with a large number of 
companies  of  small  and  medium  size  (nearly  96%  in  2008  according  to  Eurostat 
sbs_sc_1b_se_r2 table) and only very few of large size and with a large market share 
(47% using the same table). National preferences on guarding services largely differ 
across member states as the rate between revenues and GDP shows. 
 
According to INHES and CoESS (2008), there are one and a half times as many public 
security  employees  in  Europe  as  private  security  employees.  Yet,  deviations  of  this 
average  value  across  member  states  are  considerable
158.  This  profession  is  very 
unattractive due to routine and uninteresting work, lack of career opportunities and low 
salaries. Nevertheless, the sector provides job opportunities to individuals with little or 
no skills and some shelter in time of crisis. These factors result in very high turnover in 
most  European  countries.  Yet,  this  rapid  turnover  becomes  a  quite  convenient 
management method to companies for adjusting their workforce based on demand. 
 
Today, private sector employees are globally recognized as vital partners in preventing 
and detecting crime (Van Steden and Sarre, 2007). The majority of member states have 
specific  legislation  regarding  this  industry,  but  no  EU  regulation  still  exists  on  this 
issue. Authorisation to operate in the market is conditioned to have sufficient working 
capital,  and  suitable  qualified  personnel.  Staff  members’  judicial  records,  personal 
circumstances  and  conduct  must  be  such  that  they  do  not  present  any  risk  to  the 
organisation. Staff members are required to receive training in order to guarantee their 
professional  skill.  Training  programmes  (basic  and  follow-up)  have  often  to  be 
approved by the  governmental authority in charge to ensure a reasonable quality of 
service. Other operating conditions ruled are the use of uniform, identification badge 
and weapons. Companies, often, must submit an annual report based on a prescribed 




                                                 
157 INHES and CoESS (2008) provides different numbers: 1.7 million jobs, 50,000 companies and €15 
billion of revenues. Eurostat sbs_na_1a_se_r2 table estimates this value in the same year in 31,743. 
158 In the United States private security guards outnumber law enforcement personnel in the early eighties 
according to Amy Goldstein, Washington Post January 7, 2007. 
159 According to Van Steden and Sarre (2007) the Czech Republic lacks of a regulatory framework on 
this sector. And SEESAC (2005) reports that there is a growing professionalization and legislative 
efforts to introduce controls in the industry located in South Eastern Europe. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Network and information security (NIS) 
 
The business of many agencies, organisations, companies and individuals requires the 
assurance of the availability, authenticity, integrity
160, and sometimes the confidentiality 
of information. This market segment encompasses the goods and services required to 
solve this need whether the information is stored on paper or in digital form. Paper 
documents are stored safely using armoured safes and boxes. Safe transport is usually 
made by security services companies. Sealed envelopes and containers are the common 
method of preserving confidentiality of this information. This is a rather mature market 
with a slow evolution and growth with only small technological advances in electronic 
locks. According to Eurostat prodcom table the production value of the EU was €762 
million in 2009. 
 
The  societal  trend  to  store  information  in  digital  form,  the  development  of  the 
worldwide web, and the appearance of new data transmission means such as wireless 
networks (e.g. wi-fi and mobile PDAs) have created a new set of vulnerabilities and 
have leveraged a complete new market of products and services to fight the new threat 
already known as cyber crime. This is one of the areas where illegal organisations can 
accrue  important  benefits  if  they  copy,  modify  or  destroy  key  information;  execute 
unauthorised  operations  such  as  the  electronic  transfer  of  funds,  cause  harm  to 
computers  reducing  their  performance  or  use  them  to  perpetrate  other  attacks  using 
malicious software (malware) such as virus, spyware, worms, Trojan horses, backdoors, 
keystroke loggers or root-kits. This problem could be particularly important if the attack 
is against information and communication systems that support critical infrastructures 
since  such  attack  can  impair  or  even  disrupt  the  essential  services  they  provide  to 
society
161.  The  magnitude  and  losses  of  cyber  attacks  are  hardly  known  and  most 
companies  do  not  publish  their  figures  on  the  basis  of  a  potential  loss  of  customer 
confidence.  According  to  OECD  (2008:6  and  39)  malware  has  evolved  from 
occasionally exploits to a global multi-million dollar criminal industry. Direct damages 
of malware were estimated in €9.3 billion in 2006. 
 
Cyber crime can be defined as criminal acts committed using electronic communication 
networks and information systems or against such networks and services
162. It involves 
three  types  of  criminal  activities  related  to  information  systems.  This  first  covers 
traditional  forms  of  crime  such  as  fraud  and  forgery  but  made  over  electronic 
information and communication networks systems with the aim of procuring, without 
right, an economic benefit such as identity theft or information copy which may be 
labelled  with  copyrights  as  for  example  digital  films.  The  second  concerns  the 
                                                 
160 Data integrity is a requirement that information and programs are changed only in a specified and 
authorized manner. System integrity is a requirement that a system performs its intended function in 
an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system. 
Source:  An  Introduction  to  Computer  Security:  The  NIST  Handbook.  Special Publication  800-12 
(1995). 
161 SCADA systems are used to control the physical elements of such infrastructures. Since these systems 
are increasingly being linked with other systems (such as electronic business) through the internet, 
they are more vulnerable to attacks (NRC, 2002:208). Whereas such attack seems not to be easy, 
OECD (2008:43) reports that malicious hackers in Russia used a Trojan to take control of a gas 
pipeline run by Gazprom. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency analyst Tom Donahue announces at a 
meeting hosted by the SANS Institute on January 16, 2008 that web hackers penetrated overseas 
power grids, compromising service while demanding payment in exchange for cessation. 
162 COM (2007) 267 final. Towards a general policy in fight against cyber crime. WORKING PAPER 43 
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publication of illegal content over electronic media (e.g. child sexual abuse material or 
the incitement to racial hatred). The third includes crimes unique to electronic networks 
and against the confidentiality, integrity
163 and availability of data and systems
164. The 
aim  of  these  often  well  organised  attacks  is  sabotage,  extortion,  or  political  and 
ideological goals. Cybercrime uses different techniques to gain computer access and 
perform their misdeeds. For example, it can exploit inside information, use dictionary or 
brute  force  attacks,  use  social  engineering
165,  as  well  as  signal  interception  and  the 
deciphering of information to get passwords. 
 
Computer crime may involve the physical access to computers. Such access may be 
easily  restricted  through  some  of  the  physical  protection  measures  commented  in 
previous sections. The majority of attacks, however, are made through communication 
lines and the protection is fundamentally achieved by means of software modules and 
programs able to identify and authenticate users, grant their access, track their actions, 
as well as detect malicious software attempting to find a backdoor of the system through 
which it can attain its goals. 
 
Specialised software companies offer a large set of products and services to counteract 
this threat. They range from software to protect personal computers to large enterprise 
integrated security solutions. Products include: (a) methodologies to design and develop 
software  systems  without  weak  points;  (b)  middleware  for  dependable  user 
identification  and  authentication  based  on  passwords,  cards,  tokens  or  biometrics  to 
authorise the access to data, systems and software applications; (c) strong encryption 
algorithms for secure exchange and storage of data
166; (d) network real-time monitoring 
and data flow analysis to detect anomalous users or unusual traffic patterns which may 
indicate an attack; (e) filters that avoid suspicious data packets (firewalls), malware, 
unsolicited  mail  (also  known  as  spam),  or  access  to  harmful  material  (through  web 
browsers); (f) logs and audit data tools to perform forensic analysis, and (g) tools to 
easily recover from an attack, using some kind of data or equipment redundancy (off-
site backup / storage system). Their ultimate objective is that the system’s user enjoys a 
trusted on-line environment.  
The increasing complexity of developing and maintaining effective security operations 
and the lack of in-house expertise explain the development of a wide range of services 
by the industry, which includes: (a) consultancy in areas like strategy and planning, 
assessment on best practices, audits, forensics; (b), implementation of tailored solutions 
that  may  encompass  activities  of  design,  development,  integration,  test  (e.g.  system 
                                                 
163 For example malware is designed to encrypt or scramble users’ data so that the owner cannot retrieve 
it. Often the owner will be asked to pay a ransom (OECD, 2008:16). 
164 The most common type of attack is the well-known Distributed Denial of Service for companies that 
provide just in time services (e.g. e-commerce) and risk losing significant revenue for every minute 
their website or network is unavailable. This is also the case of government agencies who rely on 
websites to provide services to citizens. The attack uses a larger number of compromised computers 
called botnets to send  massive amounts of queries and overwhelm the  system (OECD, 2008:15). 
Botnets are also used to distribute spam and phishing attacks, distribute spyware and adware and 
harvest confidential information that may be used in identity theft. The plethora of launch points and 
routes for cyberattack greatly complicates the ability to counteract it, as well as to identify the source 
(NRC, 2002a). 
165 Social engineering refers to techniques designed to manipulate users into providing information or 
taking an action which leads to the subsequent breach in information systems security (OECD: 2008: 
12). It involves for example the masquerading of a trustworthy person or web site to obtain password 
or credit card details to steal an identity. 
166 Like the ones used in Virtual Private Networks (VPN) such as IPSec and SSL protocols. WORKING PAPER 43 
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penetration),  or  migration;  and  (c)  operations  such  as  managed  security  services
167, 
hosted services, outsourced services (e.g. incident response).  
 
IDC (2009:2) estimated the value of the European NIS market in 2007 in €10.7 billion 
of which €4.8 corresponded to software products, €4.7 to services and only €1.13 to 
hardware
168. Average forecast growth rate was estimated in 13.1% for the period 2007-
2010.  The  demand  of  these  products  concentrates  in  the  Member  States  where  the 
information society is  more evolved.  The market is dominated by a small group of 
global vendors, differentiated by application area, competing with a high number of 
smaller European or international suppliers. Dominant players are Symantec (US) for 
the  software  solutions  segment,  IBM  (US)  for  security  services  and  Cisco  (US)  for 
hardware security. McAfee (US) and Trend Micro (JP) are also relevant players. These 
top five vendors had 20% of the EU NIS market in 2007. According to the IDC report 
main EU suppliers, while showing a positive dynamism, are not  global players. No 
single vendor is capable of addressing the full spectrum of security issues, primarily due 
to  the  fact  that  the  investment  in  skills  required  to  develop  such  a  broad  range  of 
products is prohibitive (IDC, 2009:31). They operate in their native country and some 
other markets only. The cumulative market share of EU suppliers was 16.5% of the total 
EU NIS market revenues. New entrants in the market are large players diversifying into 
security from their native markets like Cap Gemini or Atos Origin, or telecom operators 
and ISPs such as BT Global Services, Telefónica, Deutsche Telecom (T-Systems) or 
Telecom Italia. To be competitive in this market companies need to be aware of the 
future growth of the internet and their threats on a worldwide basis. 
 
Total  Hardware  Software  Services 
Symantec  7.9  Cisco  23.1  Symantec  17.9  IBM  6.5 
IBM  4.5  Juniper  8.9  McAfee  7.0  Accenture  4.0 
McAfee  3.1  Netasq  4.3  Checkpoint  4.3  Cap Gemini  3.9 
CISCO  2.5  Fortinet  3.7  Trend Micro  5.0  EDS  3.4 
Trend Micro  2.2  Gemalto  2.4  IBM  3.6  HP  3.4 
Table 15. Top 5 vendor in the European Security Market and revenues in million € (2007). 
Source: IDC (2009) 
 
The network of distribution channels is rich and complex. It includes direct distribution, 
distribution through the web, and third parties such as retailers and OEM. Telecom and 
ISPs also offer security solutions embedded with their subscription and services (IDC, 
2009). 
                                                 
167 Valued in $1.9 billion in 2009 according to Gartner (2009a). 
168 Gartner (2009) estimated for 2008 a smaller value for software, namely $3.2 billion. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Financial services  
2.268 M€ 21%






Services 3.456 M€ 
32%
 
Figure 5. Market demand distributed by sectors. 
Source: IDC (2009) 
 
As can be seen from the figure above, the demand for protection against cybercrime is 
dominated by the business sector (public and private) playing the individual consumer 
demand  a  minor  role.  The  main  customers  are  companies  supplying  basic  internet 
services as well as companies providing e-commerce, e-government applications and 
other on-line services such as banks, virtual stores, tax agencies or ministries because 
they are high-pay off targets to cybercrime. Small companies are less likely than large 
corporations to implement controls (EU, 2005:7). Individual demand is mainly supplied 
with standard low-cost security products. 
 
Computer  Emergency  Response  Teams  (CERT)  plays  an  essential  role  in  the  NIS 
market. They are specialised organisations financed by governments to monitor, prevent 
and  detect  computer  security  incidents  and  circulate  information  about  them.  Such 
services  are  provided  for  free  or  at  subsidized  rates.  These  teams  facilitate  the 
development of products and services to respond to new identified threats. The CERT® 
Program is part of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a federally funded research 
and development centre at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. In 
Europe,  it  has  been  created  the  European  Governmental  CERT  Group  (EGC)  an 
informal group of governmental CERTs that is working out effective co-operation on 
incident response matters between its members. 
 
INTERDICTION / CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 
When an impending security incident is discovered means are needed to frustrate it 





Personal  equipment  is  composed  of  surveillance  gear  (e.g.  night  vision  equipment), 
personal  protective  equipment;  communication  radios;  and  effectors  to  neutralise 
potential offenders and their weapons. We will comment here briefly effectors, since 
personal  protection  equipment  has  been  discussed  formerly,  and  communication 
equipment,  being  the  same  as  the  ones  used  for  response  and  recovery,  will  be 
commented in that section. 
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Effectors are based on different type of light weapons, some of them of low lethality 
such as tear gas or stun grenade launchers. The most common weapons are small arms 
such as pistols, rifles and submachine guns. Main suppliers work simultaneously for 
defence and security and sometimes for sport and hunting. Examples of these firms are 
FN Herstal (Belgium), Heckler and Koch (Germany), or Beretta (Italy). Europe is also a 
large  producer  of  high-quality  (following  NATO  design  and  safety  standards) 
ammunition for these guns such as for example RUAG Anmotec or Namno A.S. The 
low technology and skills needed for manufacturing explain that small arms production 
facilities is spread worldwide, where some nations may enjoy competitive advantages 
due to low labour costs and a softer environmental protection legislation in comparison 
with advanced countries as could be the case of Singapore and Brazil. Police forces 
(national, regional or local) and guarding companies, apart from armed forces, are the 
main customer of light weapons. The production and sale of this material, with clear 




For certain operations land vehicles, helicopters or maritime craft are needed to interdict 
criminal actions and prosecute malefactors. These vehicles are usually standard vehicles 
with small design changes and specific mission add-ons such as increased surveillance 
or communications equipment (e.g. radios, night lights, vision equipment, and locating 
radars). Some of them are specially prepared for coordinating the operation (see next 
section) with increased command and communication capabilities. The main supplier 
tends to be the company who has the largest share in the total value that usually is the 
system  integrator.  This  role  is  played  by  the  vehicle  manufacturer  (automotive, 
aerospace or shipyards industry) or the supplier of the electronic equipment. 
 
Robots are of special utility in security due to their ability to sense and manipulate the 
environment with great precision –in the absence of such human limitations as physical 
vulnerability, fear, boredom and discomfort– make them ideal tools for some security 
missions  such  as  close-in  surveillance  (in  which  small  size  is  critical);  sampling  of 
nuclear,  biological  and  chemical  contamination;  urban  search  and  rescue;  ordnance 
disposal; decontamination; debris removal, or fire fighting. 
 
Products in this market are tailored to security needs based on civilian designs. Units 
demanded tend to be small with the only exception of law enforcement land vehicles. 
Advances  in  the  area  are  coming  mainly  from  civilian  developments,  such  as  for 
example, an area that is subject today to an intense research. 
 
RESPONSE AND RECOVERY 
 
Response to a security incident or disaster provides for the immediate protection of life 
and  property,  the  re-establishment  of  control  and  the  minimization  of  effects.  It 
encompasses the issuance and dissemination of predictions and warnings; planning and 
preparation  immediately  before  the  event;  evacuation  and  other  forms  of  protective 
action; mobilization and organization of emergency personnel, volunteers and material 
resources;  search  and  rescue;  care  of  casualties  and  survivors;  damage  and  needs 
assessment; damage control and restoration of public services; and maintenance of the 
political and legal system (Rao et al., 2007:17). 
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Disaster  recovery  encompasses  both  short-term  activities  intended  to  return  vital 
physical and social systems to operation and long-term activities aimed at restoring the 
situation to its pre-disaster state. The concept of recovery encompasses both objective 
measures,  such  as  reconstruction  and  assistance  efforts,  as  well  as  the  subjective 
experiences of disaster victims and processes of psychological and social recovery (Rao 
et al., 2007:17). 
 
Means for response and recovery are indistinctly used for any kind of emergency or 
disaster independently of its source (nature or man-made) including those originated by 
terrorism and organised crime. The industrial analysis will focus in the activities and 
means needed in the aftermath of an attack that has been grouped in the following ones: 
 
·  Firefighting 
·  First response health care 
·  Logistic support 
·  Coordination and management 
 
The main customers of these systems are first responders and emergency units of the 
public administration. These units have local, regional, national or European nature and 
they will enter into action depending on the disaster size. Hence purchasing capabilities 




Fire  protection  within  buildings  and  facilities  is  achieved  primarily  using  own 
capabilities  based  on  fire  detectors,  alarms,  and  extinguishing  systems  which  are 
mandatory according to building regulations. However, fire-fighting units and brigades 
are needed when the fire becomes large and out of control. The main equipment used to 
fight against fire is industrial vehicles (such as MAN, IVECO, Renault or Volvo) that 
integrate movable turrets with built in pumps that project water, foam or powder on to 
the fire. Sometimes these vehicles are modified by SMEs that sell them to the final end 
customer (municipalities, civil protection units, airports). The most common version is 
for urban fire, but there also exists for forest fire or air crashes. The special fire-fighters 
garment market has been described in the Personal Protection Equipment section. 
 
The rescue of survivors also requires additional equipment such as special vehicles for 
cutting reinforcing concrete and structural steel and removing debris and rubble. The 
equipment is of the same kind used by public works and demolition industry and has a 
dual nature. 
 
First response healthcare 
 
First response healthcare requires advanced medical posts or even field hospitals for 
large  disasters.  Equipment  includes  first  aids  to  stabilise  injured  people  and  being 
further aid required carry them to a hospital. Products include burn care, bloodborne 
pathogens care, cardiopulmonary resuscitation and automatic external defibrilators, eye 
care,  ointments,  antiseptics,  pain  relief  products,  over  the  counter  medications, 
protective equipment including gloves, examination gloves, ear protection, head and 
body protection, respirators and face masks, safety glasses, etc. Such kind of standard WORKING PAPER 43 
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equipment is provided routinely by the health care industry. Hence, a market segment in 
this area for security can be hardly considered. 
 
Affected  public  and  crisis  responders  have  to  deal  with  different  forms  of  (post-
traumatic)  stress  disorders  and  other  psycho-social  strains,  thus  requiring  quick  and 
professional psycho-social support to preserve their mental health. Yet, this support is 
one of the activities of professional psychologists to care mental distress and is not 
mainly bound to security issues. 
 
The CBRN case 
 
CBRN  attacks  require  therapies  to  treat  contaminated  people.  For  example, 
radioprotectants  that  block  internal  absorption  can  help  against  acute  and  long-term 
radiation  exposure
169  (Civitas,  2007).  Drugs,  antibiotics  and  antivirals  can  be 
administered to reduce or palliate effects of chemical or biological agents, and vaccines 
can be used to avoid further spread of a biological disease. 
 
The biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry is the main supplier of these remedies. 
The development of drugs and vaccines is a very risky business, since it requires large 
investments. A new drug may cost hundreds of millions euros and may take years until 
it  is  ready  to  use.  Rate  of  failure  is  considerably  high  and  return  of  investment  of 
commercialised  products  is  not  always  assured  (NRC,  2002:99).  Therefore,  the 
traditional market mechanism for the development and production of pharmaceutical 
products to respond to a terrorist attack may consequently fail since incentives for the 
private industry as we have seen are few. Even success may not be welcome with a 
large demand. Only products with potential application to natural and common diseases 
may have a better chance to receive private funds for research (NRC, 2002:100). 
 
Governments  are  able  to  remedy  this  market  failure.  This  is  the  reason  of  project 
Bioshield signed the July 21, 2004 by President Bush. The main goal of the project is: 
(a) relaxing procedures  for some CBRN terrorism-related spending, including hiring 
and awarding research contract; (b) guaranteeing a federal government market for new 
medical  countermeasures;  and  (c)  permitting  emergency  use  of  unapproved 
countermeasures. Total appropriations are $5.593 billion for fiscal year 2004 to 2013. 
The  act  is  designed  to  guarantee  companies  that  the  government  will  buy  new 
successfully developed CBRN countermeasures for the Strategic National Stockpile
170. 
This guarantee reduces the market risk for the company, but does not affect its exposure 
to development risk, i.e. the risk that the countermeasure will fail during testing and be 
undeliverable.  Critics  of  such  programme  suggest  that  because  of  the  high  product 
failure rate in  advanced development, the  government will inevitably  fund unusable 
products (Grotton, 2009). There is no similar programme in the EU. 
 
                                                 
169 Like  Prussian  blue  to  help  block  internal  absorption  of  cesium-137,  calcium-  and 
zincdiethylenetriaminepentaacetate (Ca-DTPA and Zn-DTPA) to treat internal contamination from 
radioactive elements, and potassium iodide (KI), which blocks thyroid radioiodine uptake. However, 
they are not effective to treat acute radiation sickness, guard against DNA mutations, and mitigate 
other health consequences of acute radiation exposure (Civitas, 2007:13). 
170 Rapoport (1999) questions the rationale of the stockpiling of vaccines and drugs because toxins and 
pathogens used in an attack will be very different in the next and they usually are only effective for 
the agent they were designed for. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Logistic support 
 
Logistic support is required to attend people after a security incident, especially in the 
case of large and catastrophic incidents. This support may include: (a) transportation 
capabilities to move people to a safe place; (b) infrastructures like public buildings to 
provide shelter and a living and sleeping place to the population; (c) an emergency 
supply chain of food, water and health services. 
 
Ambulances are the main equipment required to transport injured people to hospitals 
after  a  security  incident.  Such  vehicles  are  the  same  used  for  medical  emergency 
services. They are supplied by specialised companies that adapt the vehicle inside from 
different manufacturers to integrate the first aid medical equipment to the special needs 
of the purchasing health care organisation in a similar way as fire-fighting equipment. 





Decontamination  of  personnel,  equipment  and  facilities  is  an  essential  step  in  the 
response  and  recovery  of  an  attack.  The  complexity  of  this  task  may  delay 
normalization of activities and create social disruption and economic losses in particular 
when  the  strictness  of  the  environmental  regulations  that  govern  post-attack 
decontamination and reoccupation are high (Zimmerman and Loeb, 2004). Non-volatile 
chemical  agents,  radiological  particles  and  some  persistent  biological  agents  require 
decontamination processes that may take months or even years (Rossof, 2007). Wind 
dispersion  and  chemical  reactions  with  the  surface  in  contact  may  hinder  the 
decontamination process. 
 
Decontamination  aims  at  destroying,  reducing  or  removing  contaminant  to  an 
acceptable level. Main methods consist of physical, chemical and thermal processes. 
Physical processes are used to remove CB agents from surfaces. High pressure systems, 
sorbents  (simple  inert),  and  solvent  washes  are  examples  of  physical  processes. 
Chemical processes involve the use of reactive or catalytic chemicals to neutralize CB 
contaminants.  Thermal  processes  remove  CB  contaminants  through  vaporization. 
Means  to  detoxify  the  agent  or  store  the  contaminated  material  in  a  safe  place  are 
necessary. Shelters are also needed to host the decontamination processes (NIJ, 2001). 
 
Main limitations of decontaminants are that they do not fully neutralize all the agents, 
and  they  are  not  completely  safe.  Strong  neutralizers  tend  to  destroy  parts  of 
decontaminated element. Some decontaminants have shelf-life or storage issues, some 
are flammable, and most are not friendly to the environment (ESRIF, 2009:146). Such 
limitations suggest potential research needs in this area. 
 
European companies operating in this area are Kärcher Futuretech, OWR AG, Jervän 
SEDAB, NBC Sys or Hughes safety showers. USA companies operating in this field are 
Bioquell, Inc., Certek, Inc., and CDG Research Corporation, or Advanced Sterilization 
products (Ethicon Inc.). Due to the specificity of the demand, this industry is likely to 
be  of  small  size.  Products  have  dual  use  either  to  manage  industrial  accidents  or 
decontaminate hospitals. 
                                                 
171 Rettmobil the large Europe's largest exhibition of rescue and mobility vehicles and equipment in 2010 
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Coordination and management 
 
The coordination and management of emergency operations pose some issues. First, 
response to disasters can only be anticipated, and so planned, up to a certain point. Yet 
despite the sheer diversity of disasters, it would seem that certain generic conditions 
tend  to  apply  that  make  for  more  effective  responses.  Beyond  that  point,  however, 
effective response depends crucially on the ability of all concerned to react flexibly and 
in an innovative fashion to the situation as it unfolds since each disaster will to some 
extent be unique (OECD, 2003b:182). The availability of means to gather and share 
information about the overall situation, authorise and coordinate the use of resources 
into something like a supply chain, and track execution to adjust and alter prior plans 
and  commitments  based  on  the  evolving  situation  can  make  the  difference  in  the 
effectiveness of the response
172. 
 
Systems able to support these essential capabilities, popularly known as Command and 
Control systems, are based on a network of communications and information systems. 
The communication capabilities (voice and data) facilitate the sharing and distribution 
of timely and accurate information to the various response teams and agencies involved 
–as well as the general public–, keeping them aware about the extent of the damage
173, 
continuing  threats  and  actions  to  take.  Such  networked  environment  facilitates 
cooperation and joint / distributed decision improving the consistency and coherence of 
the  response  and  speeding  up  the  response  time  and  action  to  save  life,  limb  and 
property and curtail economic and environmental damage. Specialised software is also 
used for precise location of personnel and assets based on maps and cartography. 
 
Desired features of the communication’s backbone are robustness, easy deployment, 
mobility, priority-sensitive and large broadband. Professional Mobile Radio networks 
provide some of these features by means of redundancy, use of specific frequencies of 
the spectrum, as well as special services to subscribers like group call, emergency call, 
direct call or broadcast call (Ecorys, 2009:217). These networks have also encryption 
capabilities  to  ensure  confidentiality.  The  infrastructure  is  composed  of  radio  base 
stations,  switching  and  control  nodes,  managing  centres,  applications,  and  interface 
elements. TETRA is the most extended standard, however there are others operating in 
the market. Motorola is the leader on the high-end PMR market (50%), followed by 
EADS  (20-25%).  Other  European  players  are  Thales  (FR),  Selex  (IT),  Rohill 
Engineering B.V. (NL), Sepura Ltd. (UK), Frequentis (AU), Rodhe Schwarz (GE), and 
Teltronic (SP). There is a market pressure to increase bandwidth (to support for example 
videoconference).  Technologies  like  secure-WiFi  and  secure-Wimax  or  IP-based 
communications like Thales are pressing to enter into this market (Ecorys, 2009:230). 
Communications satellites may provide broadband communication deployable in a very 
short time to back up / substitute (damaged) terrestrial communication infrastructure. 
However, they are of no use in enclosed and indoor areas and allow an inferior number 
of  parallel  users  and  connections.  Moreover,  the  cost  of  this  service  is  so  far  too 
expensive. 
 
                                                 
172 According to NRC (2002:277) the accumulated body of research of natural disasters reveals all too 
many instances of scarce information, deficient communication, poor coordination, and jurisdictional 
conflict among nominally coordinating organizations. 
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The  capability  of  these  systems  to  interoperate  across  jurisdictions  and  among 
emergency  service  units  –like  fire,  police,  or  medical–  is  an  essential  requirement. 
However,  acquisition  of  this  communications  equipment  is  characterised  by  local, 
agency-level  acquisition  and  deployment  driven  by  local  budgets  from  local  taxing 
bodies and by local priorities. The outcome is that often different public safety agencies 
are unable to communicate and share information with each other. Since interoperation 
is not typically considered when these systems are acquired, it is not surprisingly that 
often limited technical interoperability  exists (Rao et al., 2007:41). In brief, lack of 
standards and coordination mechanisms combined with a fragmented demand may be 
detrimental, at the end of the day, for the development of the market. 
 
This is an area of intense research due to large market opportunities of products with 
improved capabilities and is a priority in the ERFP. Examples include reliable radio 
communications  inside  (destroyed)  buildings,  software  defined  radios
174,  data  fusion 
and data mining tools, decision support to select the best course of action, deployable 
sensor  networks  for  awareness,  damage  assessment,  and  computer-assisted  disaster 
simulation tools to predict the evolution of the situation and point out new impending 
threats  and  risks.  Most  of  these  developments  are  still  in  the  infancy  stage  being 
implementations of limited functionality. 
 
The purchaser of this kind of systems is the Public Administration. Frost & Sullivan 
(M453-16)  estimated  the  European  market  revenues  around  €1.5  billion  in  2009. 
Suppliers of Command and Control systems are usually prime contractors with strong 
capabilities  in  ICT  and  system  integration.  Thee  large  similarities  with  defence 
Command  and  Control  systems  makes  that  the  main  suppliers  in  this  market  are 




Forensics refers to the set of activities aimed at investigating crimes and terrorist events 
and getting evidence which combined with intelligence information may help to identify 
perpetrators  and  present  the  case  to  the  Court.  Forensics  involves  a  large  set  of 
disciplines  that  includes  general  toxicology,  firearms  /  tool-marks,  questioned 
documents  (e.g.  forgery  and  alterations,  handwritten  signature),  trace  evidence  (e.g. 
hair,  textile  fibres),  controlled  substances,  biological/serological  screening,  fire 
debris/arson  analysis,  impression  evidence  (e.g.  fingerprints,  shoe/tire  prints),  blood 
pattern analysis, crime scene investigation, medico-legal death investigation, and digital 




Most common forensic tools are laboratory equipment for analysis such as equipment to 
test  the  presence  of  blood  fluids,  DNA
175  analyser,  blood  and  urine  analysers, 
magnifying  glasses  and  microscopes,  photographic  and  digital  imaging  equipment, 
                                                 
174 These radios are able to use different waveforms and communication protocols due to programmable 
hardware. 
175 DNA  identification  is  based  on  techniques  using  a  specific  part  of  the  non-coding  DNA  regions 
(regions that do not bear genetic information). It is mainly used in forensic laboratories as it does not 
allow real-time identification. DNA identification is expensive (around $4.500), time consuming (4-5 
hours) and needs skilled human intervention (IPTS, 2005:17). WORKING PAPER 43 
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equipment  for  detecting  the  presence  of  different  substances  as  drugs  or  poisons, 
equipment for collecting items of evidence, software tools to examine digital evidence 
stored in computers and electronic devices
176, laser equipment for diagramming crime 
scenes, x-ray screeners to locate radio-opaque objects like bullets, etc. 
 
This kind of equipment stems for different sources, mainly from scientific, medical, 
biological,  chemical  and  industrial  laboratories  without  specific  differences.  The 
demand  of  this  equipment  can  be  considered  rather  low  in  comparison  with  other 
security equipment, with the exception of Automatic Fingerprint Identification System 
(AFIS).  The  main  difference  of  these  systems  is  that  they  do  not  require  real  time 
response, but a high level of accuracy to determine whether a person is in a database of 
several million records (NTSC; 2006:8 and 80). Only a short number of companies have 
the capability to develop such systems. 
 
Current limitations of forensic technologies to identify perpetrators of radiological and 
nuclear  attacks  (DSB,  2004:14)  are  stimulating  research  in  this  area  in  the  USA 
(Civitas, 2007:13). NRC (2002:8) has also identified attribution gaps in bioterrorism 




Detectives and private investigators are mainly demanded by companies to investigate 
security incidents such as theft, fraud, due diligence, background checks and system 
break-ins.  There  is  a  European  Council  of  Detectives  and  Private  Investigators. 
However, the association does not provide any economic information about it or its 
members. According to Eurostat sbs_na_1a_se_r2 table investigation activities employs 
24,295 people across the EU. Revenues are in the range of €1,217 million. 
 
RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has analysed the different segments into which the security market can be 
divided. At first sight, it can be observed a market that provides  a large variety  of 
security  goods  and  services  which  do  not  share  any  pattern  due  to  their  diversity. 
However, when segment are analysed, a more coherent picture appears where some 
specific features can be pointed out. 
 
Many security needs are often supported by unspecific products that are sold in other 
markets,  being  even  security  not  the  biggest  demander.  This  dilutes  the  identified 
security market segment into a broader category impeding a deeper analysis. In other 
cases, the demand is rather small and do not generate large revenues of any economic 
relevance, being information about them scarce. Government purchases often involve 
tailor made developments giving way to a new market segment which usually fades 
after acquisition ends. 
 
It has been shown also in many areas that technology immatureness is impeding the 
formation of markets. Companies and customers tend to explore these markets through 
the development of prototypes and pilot projects to assess demand and unfold more 
advanced solutions. Governments and large companies are the main customer of this 
                                                 
176 For example: address and phone books, audio/video files, calendars, databases, documents, e-mails, 
text / voice messages, graphic files, spreadsheets, etc. WORKING PAPER 43 
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R&D market. The formation of these new markets seems often to follow a rather low 
pace. 
 
Some market segments largely benefit of network economies in which the development 
of standards do play a key role. Large projects like national identity cards or passports 
show a large maturation time. Yet, they seem essential for the consolidation of some 
trade activities like e-commerce. 
 
When we examine capabilities of the European industry, we see a prominence of the 
industry  of  the  more  industrialised  Member  States,  namely  the  United  Kingdom, 
France, Germany and Italy being ensued by far by other nations like Sweden, Spain or 
the Netherlands. Other European member states play a marginal role in the security 
equipment market and often have to purchase the equipment from abroad. 
 
When we compare the industry with other parts of the world, we see that there are 
important  industrial  capabilities  of  Europe  in  the  majority  of  market  segments. 
However, it seems in many areas that U.S. industry enjoys a technological lead. The 
United  States  shows  more  advanced  capabilities  such  as  border  control  using 
biometrics,  early  warning  of  biological  and  chemical  attacks,  radiological  detection 
equipment at ports of entry, baggage inspection using computer tomography, explosives 
inspection system, customs cargo inspection (e.g. ACE), container security, unregulated 
border  protection  (e.g.  SBInet),  computer  security,  PMR  emergency  services,  AFIS 
systems,  unmanned  air  vehicles  (UAV),  or  remedies  against  chemical  or  biological 
agents, to mention the more relevant. 
 
Japanese companies seem to be also very competitive in certain market segments such 
as biometrics, computer security, or CCTV surveillance equipment. Korean companies, 
such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai, are also suppliers of security equipment. Finally, 
Chinese  companies  are  everyday  more  present  in  international  markets,  mainly 
competing on price rather than on quality. This is the case, for example, of Nuctech, a 
company specialised in inspection equipment. WORKING PAPER 43 
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V. THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT 
 
This chapter analyses the fundamental role of government in the security field. The four 
main  roles  are  as  entrepreneur,  main  supporter  of  the  industry,  main  purchaser  of 
equipment, and market regulator. All these roles have a relevant effect on the market in 
both the demand and supply side, which may even extend to the whole economy, as for 
example some security policies with large impact on transport and trade. EU legislation 
with impact in the security market is shortly described. EU and European unilateral 
initiatives are also briefly commented. Since government behaviour may generate rents, 
industry may behave strategically with the aim to appropriate such rents. Such conduct, 
with a potential effect on market performance, will be analysed in chapter VII. 
 
GOVERNMENT AS ENTREPRENEUR 
 
Public  ownership  is  more  uncommon  in  the  European  security  market  than  in  the 
defence market. Ownership, however, appears in companies that operate simultaneously 
in the security and defence market as may be the case of Thales,  Finmeccánica, or 
EADS.  Ownership  do  also  appear  in  companies  involved  in  the  production  of 
documents hard to counterfeit like national identity cards, paper money, or software 
certificates such as Bundesdrückerei GmbH, the Fabrica Nacional de Moneda y Timbre 
in  Spain,  or  the  Istituto  Poligrafico  e  Cecca  dello  Stato  from  Italy.  The  desire 
governments  of  keeping  a  tight  control  of  a  business  strongly  related  to  national 
sovereignty  is  probably  the  main  rationale  to  explain  public  ownership.  Yet,  such 
ownership may nourish inefficiency due to the absence of important incentives such as 
capital market pressures in the form of the threat of take-overs and bankruptcy and the 
lack  of  competition  in  the  products  or  services  provided  (Tisdell  and  Hartley, 
2008:chapter 8). 
 
INDUSTRY ASSISTANCE AND R&D FINANCING 
 
The security industry, as any other kind of industry, may receive State aids according to 
regulations  established  by  the  European  Commission  whether  regional  or  horizontal 
aids such as R&D, training, SMEs and so on. The most important source of aids is 
probably R&D where the state finances totally or partially the project, or provides tax 
relief for amounts allocated to this activity. In this way, government raise incentives for 
industrial  innovation,  an  activity  that  is  frequently  underprovided  by  the  market 
mechanism (Arrow, 1962) achieving in such a way a more optimal outcome from the 
societal point of view. 
 
As we have seen in chapter II, outlays of member states for security R&D are not too 
high  with  the  exception  of  Germany  and  UK.  The  German  national  Research 
programme  for  Civil  Security  has  a  funding  of  €150  for  the  period  2007-2011.  It 
focuses in the protection of the transport and the supply chain as well as the protection 
and rescue of people. The EU is been very active in coordinating and financing security 
research with European dimension. This support started with the Preparatory Action on 
Security  Research  (PASR)  and  the  Security  Programme  of  7
th  European  Research 
Framework Programme, which finances DG Enterprise and Industry. These research 
activities are done through European consortia formed by Member States companies. 
Advices on research topics was  given by the European Security Research Advisory WORKING PAPER 43 
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Board (ESRAB) and its successor the European Security Research Information Forum 
(ESRIF) which aims also at collecting and harmonizing needs and priorities on security 
research across European Member States. A Security Advisory Group with a relevant 
participation of the industry provides advice in the preparation of the programme calls. 
The active role of industry in setting this agenda is critically assessed in Hayes (2009). 
 
Industrial state support, however, has a potential distorting effect on competition that 
may have undesired effects on market performance. This question is analysed in more 




Government plays an important role in the security market, since it is the main buyer of 
some security goods and services and sometimes the unique purchaser (monopsony). Its 
power  to  purchase  novel  and  advance  products  and  its  capability  to  finance 
precompetitive R&D through public procurement, can help to ensure the rapid transfer 
of the best results of innovation to market, breaking the barriers of companies to invest 
in the production of new equipment and facilitating their achievement of economies of 
scale.  This  can  be  done  financing  pilot  projects  to  validate  solutions  that,  being 
successful, may be followed by large purchases. The returns received by the industry 
will help to reduce prices, and raise innovation and the company portfolio. This will 
contribute to stimulate the demand of similar or derived products by (private) market 
agents and thus contribute to the consolidation of new markets (e.g. computer security). 
A  demanding  and  sophisticated  buyer,  as  governments  can  be,  able  to  request  the 
fulfilment of tough standards may improve the international competitive position of the 
industry  (Porter,  1990:651).  A  paradigmatic  case  may  be  for  example  biometrics;  a 
technology that was pushed forward by the FBI in the USA for crime investigation 
during the decade of the 70s and now is being massively used in national identity cards 




The  security  market  is  an  economic  sector  subject  to  government  regulations.  Such 
intervention is justified when transactions costs and other barriers can lead to significant 
coordination problems (Coase, 1960), as the case of standards mentioned in chapter III. 
Government regulation may compel the implementation of minimum security measures 
by market agents and in some cases like air transport the use of qualified equipment. 
These norms stimulate the purchase of security goods and services when they provide 
effective  solutions  in  terms  of  fewer  resources,  less  inconvenience  and  enhanced 
security. Regulations may be accompanied with aids or incentives to soften the burden 
of  implementing  such  measures,  such  as  low  interest  loans  or  tax  deduction  of  the 
amount invested in security when public security is at stake. This is the case of TSA 
that, according to Ecorys (2009:104), provides a reimbursement of $375,000 per facility 
for Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF) under its Certified Cargo Screening 
Program (CCSP). Another example is the security fee charge of flying tickets since 9/11 
in the USA to finance improved security measures. 
 
Regulations concerning minimum security practices 
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Examples of such regulations are many. For instance, inspection of personal belongings 
and passenger identity verification are mandatory in air transport. Regulations for the 
protection  of  dangerous  goods
177  define  requirements  for  handling  facilities  and 
transportation, such as physical protection, access control and strict accounting methods 
to avoid the illegal stealing, selling and trafficking of such material. Nuclear power 
plants  have  strict  security  requirements  defined  by  the  IAEA.  Fire  detection  and 
protection  measures  are  compulsory  in  the  construction  of  new  buildings.  CBRNE 
capabilities  for  civil  protection  are  stated  in  Decision  2008/73/EC.  Directive 
2008/114/EC  states  two  main  obligations  to  EU  critical  infrastructures:  the 
establishment of an Operator Security Plan and the designation of a Security Liaison 
Officer, however it does not state any specific investment obligation in security goods 
and services. 
 
Regulations  need  to  be  carefully  assessed  since  they  may  have  several  unintended 
consequences  on  production  capability,  competitive  position  and  innovation,  whose 
outcome may be an overall reduction in social welfare that cannot commiserate with the 
security  improvement  (Ghose  and  Rajan,  2002).  For  example,  mandated  air  cargo 
inspection may place an undue financial burden and reduce the competitive advantage –
speed–  that  it  has  vis  à  vis  other  modes  of  transportation  (Riley,  2006).  The  rather 
inflexible nature of regulations may easily lead to a misallocation of resources (Spulber, 
1989:92). 
 
Regulations concerning the provision of security goods and services 
 
Government regulation may call for specific conditions to operate in the market that are 
not usually  requested in other economic sectors, as is the case of manned guarding 
services companies. Such regulation assures the quality of service within the market and 
avoids negative effects on customers and other collateral effects on society such as an 
improper management of a security incident. Government monitors compliance with 
regulatory requirements and can rescind or suspend a company’s license or exact fines 
if the company infringes operating provisions. This intervention is required, because the 
market  mechanism  may  be  unable  to  crowd  out  of  poorly  functioning  companies, 
especially in a growing industry. Keen competition may, in fact, force margins down to 
the point where companies are strongly motivated to undercut competitors by paying 
under-award wages and misrepresent service levels (Van Steden and Sarre, 2007). 
 
Government may also set regulations on performance, quality or fulfilment of standards 
of products and services without which they cannot be sold. For example, EU security 
equipment that process and store personal information, as is the case of surveillance and 
video recording equipment in public areas shall fulfil the rules related to the protection 
of individual privacy rights as stated in the data protection Directive. 
 
Regulation  demands  the  monitoring  of  goods  and  services  provided  in  the  security 
market. This means on the one hand that the industry will undergo additional costs and 
delays to have their products and services certified, and on the other hand a social cost 
in  terms  of  government  organisations  or  agencies  in  charge  of  this  monitoring  that 
should be netted out from the benefits of compliance with the regulation. 
 
                                                 
177 Like  explosive  precursors,  chemical  agents,  collections  of  dangerous  pathogens  and  cultures,  and 
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International conventions and resolutions related to terrorism and organised crime 
 
Many security regulations are the result of agreements within international regulation 
bodies  with  a  direct  or  indirect  effect  on  the  security  industry.  The  following  table 
shows the most relevant. 
 
ICAO  1963  Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. 
ICAO  1970  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. 
ICAO  1971  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts  against  the  Safety  of  Civil 
Aviation. 
UNO  1974  Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  Crimes  against  International 
Protected Persons, including Diplomat Agents.  
UNO  1979  International Convention against taking of Hostages. 
IAEA  1980  Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. 
ICAO  1988  Protocol  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts  of  Violence  at  Airports  Serving 
International Civil Aviation. 
IMO  1988  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation.  
IMO  1988  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  Unlawful  Acts  against  the  Safety  of  Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.  
IMO  1988  Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).  
ICAO  1991  Convention on the marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.  
UNO  1997  International Convention of the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing. 
  1999  International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
UNO  1999  Security  Council  Resolution  1267.  Imposing  limited  air  embargo  and  funds  and 
financial assets embargo on the Taliban. 
UNO  2000  General  Assembly  resolution  55/25.  Convention  against  Transnational  Organized 
Crime. 
UNO  2001  UN Security Council Resolution 1373: Combating Terrorism. 
IMO  2002  International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), amendment to the Safety 
of  Life  at  Sea  (SOLAS)  Convention  to  enhance  the  security  of  ships  and  port 
facilities. IMO (2002). Entered into force in July 2004. 
UNO  2003  General Assembly Resolution 58/4 Convention against Corruption. 
UNO  2004  UN Security Council Resolution 1540: Counter proliferation initiative on WMD. 
UNO  2005  International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. 
UNO  2005  UN Security Council Resolution 1617: Threats to international peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts. 




The EU promotes measures aimed at improving the security of the whole Union based 
on the TFEU where it is stated: an area of freedom, security and justice (article 67); a 
framework for administrative measures to combat terrorism money laundering (article 
75); judicial cooperation in criminal matters (article 82); minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions with cross-border dimension (article 83); 
measures to promote  and support the action of  member states in the field of  crime 
prevention  (article  84);  Eurojost  mission  (article  85);  European  Public  Prosecutor’s 
Office  from  Eurojust  (article  86);  police  cooperation  (article  87);  Europol  mission 
(article 88); civil protection (article 196), and a solidarity clause in case of a terrorist 
attack (article 222). 
 
The EU action materialises in leading and coordinating activities of member states. It 
involves  the  launching  of  security  programmes,  the  promotion  of  research  and 
development, the enactment of directives and regulations that shall observe member WORKING PAPER 43 
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states,  and  the  development  of  standard.  Such  action  has  a  relevant  impact  on  the 
industry. 
 
The development of directives and regulations is essential for two main reasons. On the 
one hand they are needed to avoid weak points due to different level of protection stated 
by member states like the ones agreed by the European Civil Aviation Conference. They 
are developed as a consequence of international agreements on security issues. On the 
other hand, common or harmonised rules are needed to provide a level playing field 
where market  agents have same opportunities, otherwise differences may  negatively 
impact on competition since companies will endure different burdens (and overhead 
costs) for providing the nationally stated security level. 
 
In  the  following  tables  EU  main  general  policies  and  strategies,  directives  and 
regulations are depicted. 
 
COM (2001) 298 final  Network  and  Information  Security:  Proposal  for  a  European  Policy 
Approach. 
  Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism. 
  Council Resolution of 28 January 2003 on a European approach towards a 
culture of network and information security. 
COM (2002) 233 final  Towards integrated management of the external borders of the member states 
of the European Union. 
COM (2004) 221 final  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament on measures to be taken to combat terrorism and other forms of 
serious crime, in particular to improve exchanges of information. 
COM (2003) 63 final  Proposal for a regulation of  the European Parliament and of the  Council 
establishing the European Network and Information Security Agency. 
COM (2004) 262 final  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament  on  the  prevention  of  and  fight  against  organised  crime  in  the 
financial sector. 
COM (2004) 698 final  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament – Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Terrorist Attacks. 
COM (2004) 700 final  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament on the Prevention of and the Fight Against Terrorist Financing. 
COM (2004) 701 final  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament on the Preparedness and Consequence Management in the Fight 
against Terrorism. 
COM (2004) 702 final  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament. Critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism. 
  The European Union Counter-terrorism strategy 14469/4/05 (2005). 
  EU  Plan  of  Action  on  Combating  Terrorism  9809/1/05  (update  of  2001 
Action Plan Against Terrorism) 
COM (2005) 113 final  Proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  establishing  a  Rapid  Response  and 
Preparedness Instrument for major emergencies. 
COM (2005) 232 final  Developing a strategic concept on tackling organised crime. 
COM (2005) 565 final  Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): from concept to 
reality. 
COM (2005) 576 final  Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
COM (2006) 251 final  A strategy for a Secure Information Society – “Dialogue, partnership and 
empowerment”. 
COM (2006) 474 final  Green  paper  on  detection  technologies  in  the  work  of  law  enforcement, 
customs and other security authorities. 
COM (2006) 688 final  On Fighting spam, spyware and malicious software. 
COM (2006) 733 final  Reinforcing the Management of the EU’s Southern Maritime Borders. 
COM (2006) 786 final  On a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
COM (2006) 787 final  Proposal  for  a  Directive  of  the  Council  of  12  December  2006  on  the WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  113 
identification and designation of European Critical Infrastructures and the 
assessment of the need to improve their protection. 
COM (2007) 96 final  Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: steps  towards a policy 
framework 
COM (2007) 267 final  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  European  Parliament,  the 
Council and the Committee of the Regions. Towards a general policy on the 
fight against cyber crime. 
COM (2007) 399 final  Green paper on bio-preparedness. 
COM (2007) 651 final  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on enhancing the security of explosives. 
COM (2007) 654 final  Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes. 
  Council Decision on 5 March 2007 establishing a Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument (2007/62/EC). 
  Commission Decision 2008/73/EC of 20 December 2007 amending Decision 
2004/277/EC, Euratom as regards rules for the implementation of Council 
Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom establishing a Community civil protection 
mechanism. 
  Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
protection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. 
COM (2008) 68 final  Examining  the  creation  of  the  European  Border  Surveillance  System 
(EUROSUR). 
COM (2008) 69 final  Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union. 
COM (2008) 130 final  On reinforcing the Union’s Disaster Response Capacity. 
COM(2008) 360 final  On a common immigration policy 
COM (2009) 149 final  On  critical  Information  Infrastructure  Protection.  Protecting  Europe  from 
large scale cyber-attacks and disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security 
and resilience. 
COM (2009) 273 final  On Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Security 
in the European Union – An EU CBRN Action Plan. 
COM (2009) 538 final.  Towards the integration of maritime surveillance: A common information 
sharing environment for the EU maritime domain. 
Table 17. General policies and strategies 
 
1989/686/EEC  On  the  approximation  of  laws  of  the  Member  States  relating  personal 
protective equipment (note: does not include law and order PPE). 
1995/46/EC  On the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data. 
1999/93/EC  On a Community framework for electronic signatures. 
2000/31/EC  On  certain  legal  aspects  of  information  society  services  in  particular 
electronic commerce in the internal market. 
2001/97/EC  Amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the 





Access,  authorisation,  framework  and  universal  directives  on  electronic 
communications networks and services. 
2002/58/EC  Concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications). 
2004/82/EC  On the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. 
2005/60/EC  On  the  prevention  of  the  use  of  the  financial  system  for  the  purpose  of 
money laundering and terrorist financing. 
2005/65/EC  On enhancing port security. WORKING PAPER 43 
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2006/24/EC  On  the  retention  of  data  generated  or  processed  in  connection  with  the 
provision  of  publicly  available  electronic  communications  services  or  of 
public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC. 
2008/68/EC  Inland  transport  of  dangerous  goods.  This  Directive  replaces  Council 
Directive  94/55/EC,  Council  Directive  96/49/EC  and  Council  Directive 
96/35/EC. 
2008/114/EC  On the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and 
the assessment of the need to improve their protection. 
Table 18. EU Directives 
 
45/2001  On the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data by the Community institutions and on the free movement of such data. 
2580/2001  On specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities 
with a view to combating terrorism. 
178/2002  Laying  down  the  general  principles  and  requirements  of  food  law, 
establishing  the  European  Food  Safety  Authority  and  laying  down 
procedures in matters of food safety. 
2320/2002  Establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation security. Replaced by 
Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 (the latter being supplemented by Regulation 
272/2009). 
622/2003  Measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation 
security.  Amended  by  Regulation  1546/2006  and  replaced  by  Regulation 
820/2008. The latter replaced by regulation 185/2010. 
1217/2003  Laying  down  common  specifications  for  national  civil  aviation  security 
quality control programmes. 
1486/2003  Laying down procedures for conduction Commission inspections in the field 
of aviation security. 
725/2004  On enhancing ship and port facility security. 
884/2005  Laying down procedures for conduction Commission inspections in the field 
of maritime security. 
648/2005  Amending the Community Customs Code and introduction of Authorized 
Economic Operators (AEO) and 24 hours advance notification. 
1717/2006  Establishing an Instrument for Stability. 
1781/2006  On information on the payer accompanying transfer of funds. 
1875/2006  Amending  Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions  for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the 
Community Customs Code. 
Table 19. EU Regulations 
 
Reg. (EC) 1683/1995  Laying down a uniform format for visas and successive amendments. 
Reg. (EC) 1334/2000  Setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use items 
and technology. 
Reg. (EC) 1030/2002  Laying  down  a  uniform  format  for  residence  permits  for  third  country 
nationals and successive amendments. 
  Proposal for a Council regulation amending (EC) 1683/95 (uniform format 
for VISA) and (EC) 1030/02 (uniform format for residence permits). 
  Council decision (2004/512/EC) establishing the Visa Information System 
(VIS). 
Reg. (EC) 2252/2004  On  standards  for  security  features  and  biometrics  in  passports  and  travel 
documents issued by Member States. 
  Commission  Decision  C(2005)  409  on  the  EU  –  Passport  Specification WORKING PAPER 43 
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(28.02.2005). 
  Commission  Decision  C(2006)  2909  of  28  June  2006  establishing  the 
technical specifications on the standards for security features and biometrics 
in passports and travel documents issued by Member States. 
  Commission Decision 2006/804/EC of 23 November 2006 on harmonisation 
of  the  radio  spectrum  for  radio  frequency  identification  (RFID)  devices 
operating in the ultra high frequency (UHF) band. 
  EU – Passport Specification. Working document (EN) 28/06/2006. 
Reg. (EC) No 767/2008  Concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data 
between Member States on short stay-visas (VIS regulation). 
  Council  Decision  2008/615/JHA  of  23  June  2008  on  the  stepping  up  of 
cross-border  co-operation,  particularly  in  combating  terrorism  and  cross-
border  crime,  incorporating  in  the  framework  of  the  Union  important 
provisions  of  the  Prüm  Treaty  dealing  with  police  co-operation  and 
information  exchange  on  DNA-profiles,  fingerprints  and  vehicle  number-
plates. 
  Commission Recommendation of 12 May 2009 on the implementation of 
privacy and data protection principles in applications supported by radio-
frequency identification. 
Reg. (EC) 444/2009  Amending  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2252/2004  on  standards  for  security 
features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member 
States. 
Table 20. Regulations on interoperability and data standardization 
 
Single sided initiatives 
 
Security initiatives without international agreements may have anyhow impact in other 
countries as is the case of regulations to travel or trade with such country. The USA and 




·  The  requirement  to  send  airlines  electronically  the  Passenger  Name  Record 
(PNR) within 15 minutes of a plane taking off to the DHS Customs and Border 
Protection
178 
·  The  Enhance  Border  Security  and  Visa  Entry  Reform  Act  of  2002  which 
requires a machine readable passport, if issued before 26
th October 2004, and a 
biometric or e-passport, if issued after 26
th October 2006, to enter the USA 
without visa (US-VISIT program)
179. 
·  The 96-hour advance notification of vessel arrival to U.S. ports. 
                                                 
178 A similar requirement exists for sea passengers. 
179 According to DHS (2009:84) US-VISIT leads the collection, maintenance, and sharing of information, 
including biometric identifiers, on foreign visitors to assist in determining  whether the individual 
should  be  prohibited  from  entering  the  United  States;  can  receive,  extend,  change,  or  adjust 
immigration  status;  has  overstayed  or  otherwise  violated  the  terms  of  admission;  should  be 
apprehended or detained for law enforcement action; or needs special protection or attention (e.g. 
refugees).  US-VISIT  provides  identity  management  and  screening  services,  offering  diverse 
capabilities,  including  timely  biometric  and  biographic  matching  functions  to  other  department 
stakeholders  for  immigration  and  border  management  as  well  as  other,  federal,  state,  local,  and 
international  stakeholders.  The  program  is  also  charged  with  the  developing  of  a  comprehensive 
biometric exit solution that will capture biometric information from travellers as they exit the USA. 
The program was awarded to a consortium led by Accenture in 2004. WORKING PAPER 43 
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·  The 24-hour rule advanced manifest rule, launched in 2002 that requires vessel 
carriers to transmit such data to the CBP Automated Manifest System 24-hours 
before U.S.-bound cargo is loaded onto a vessel at a foreign port
180. 
·  The Container Security Initiative (CSI) aimed at inspection of containers in the 
port of origin before delivering it to its final destination is the United States
181. 
·  The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
182 and the Known 
Shipper Program, a similar version of C-TPAT for air cargo. 
·  The DOE’s Megaports Initiative that provides foreign nations with radiation 
detection  devices  to  prevent  the  smuggling  of  a  nuclear  weapon  or  a 
radiological dispersion device in the United States (GAO, 2008:6). 
·  The  Security  and  Accountability  for  Every  (SAFE)  Port  Act  launched  in 
December  2006  is  aimed  at  improving  maritime  and  cargo  security  through 
enhanced  layered  defences.  A  key  provision  of  this  program  is  the  Secure 
Freight Initiative (SFI), a follow up of CSI and the Megaports Initiative, aimed 
at improving the current container scanning capability through radiation portal 
monitors, non-intrusive imaging and optical character recognition. 




·  The  Authorised  Economic  Operator  (AEO)  is  a  similar  version  of  USA  C-
TPAT. 
·  The European Passenger Name Record (PNR). 
 
Some of these initiatives do impose an important burden to foreign countries wanting to 
trade  with  the  USA  and  Europe  in  terms  of  investments  to  implement  measures  or 
transport delays (increased inspection for merchandise that do not follow security rules).  
For example, a 100% inspection of U.S. bound containers on maritime transport will 
raise  about  a  10%  the  transport  cost  according  to  PRC  (2009).  These  measures 
consequently have a negative impact on trade that will differ depending of the kind of 
agent. 
 
RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
                                                 
180 The cost of the measure was estimated in 5-10 billion year according to OECD (2003c:48). 
181 The  main  goals  of  this  initiative  launched  in  2002  are:  (a)  to  identify  high-risk  containers  using 
automated targeting tools, (b) pre-screen and evaluate containers before they are shipped, (c) use 
technology to quickly pre-screen high risk containers, and (d) use smarter, more secure containers in 
order to avoid tampering. As of August 2006, CSI was operational in 44 ports in Europe, Asia, Africa, 
the Middle East and America (US CBP, 2006). The EU and the US signed an agreement on April 22, 
2004 expanding customs cooperation to trade security. 
182  The goal of this programme launched in April 2002 is to push responsibility for cargo security onto 
stakeholders in the supply chain. C-TPAT is a voluntary program that shippers and carriers can enter 
to assure CBP that they have put into place the best security practices for the packing, tracking and 
distribution of all containers and goods en route to the US. In return shippers and carriers are rewarded 
through quicker processing (e.g. fast lanes) and reduced probability of inspection delays (CBP, 2004). 
Examples of good practices include: web enabled cameras to monitor manufacturing and the loading 
of goods onto trucks; credentialed drivers with satellite tracking of trucks to identify deviations from 
prescribed  (and  randomly  selected)  routes;  electronic  truck  locks  that  can  raise  and  alarm  if 
improperly accessed (Willis and Ortiz, 2004). Such measure, however, will have a different impact 
between shippers, intermediaries and carriers depending on their current level of implemented security 
measures, mainly against theft that will impact on their competitive advantage (OECD, 2003c: 52). WORKING PAPER 43 
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In  this  chapter  the  important  role  of  government  in  the  security  market  has  been 
analysed. Four main roles plays the government in the market: entrepreneur, supporter 
of the industry, purchaser and regulator. Government entrepreneurship is less prominent 
than  in  the  defence  market.  It  focuses  in  the  development  of  secure  documents. 
Government is the main supporter of the industry through the awarding of different aids 
where R&D aids have special relevance. Apart from some member states, the EU is 
especially active in financing projects of European dimension, nonetheless at the large 
scale  of  the  USA.  Government  is  also  a  large  purchaser  of  security  products  and 
services this helping to create and consolidate some market segments. 
 
Government  is  also  a  market  regulator.  On  the  one  hand,  it  sets  minimum  security 
requirements that stimulate the demand of products and services as for example manned 
guarding services. And, on the other hand, it sets minimum quality standards of security 
goods and services as for example cargo inspection. Main international and European 
agreements and regulations with some impact in security are shown in different tables. 
As it can be seen, the  European  Union is particularly active in the development of 
regulations, directives and standards (see also last section of chapter III). All of them 
have an impact on industry. 
 
Government security initiatives may have economic impact on foreign countries. They 
may be unilaterally set and create a burden, in terms of higher transaction cost, that will 
suffer those who have relations with such country. WORKING PAPER 43 
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VI. MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
This chapter analyses the structure of the security market after having studied with some 
detail  the  basic  market  conditions,  the  main  market  segments  and  the  role  of 
government. Questions that will be addressed are buyers and sellers; conditions with 
influence on the structure like entry barriers, product differentiation or cost advantages; 
industrial concentration, and the role of imports. 
 
The analysis of the structure is important since it lays down the degree of competition 
and the achievement of economies of scale; two characteristics with impact on market 
performance.  An  excessive  concentration  may  weaken  competition  and  facilitate,  in 
such a way, the misallocation of resources and a less efficient market. On the other 
hand, a large market share brings up some important economies related to the firm size 
that  may  result  in  products  and  services  of  lower  costs  and  so  a  better  market 
performance. 
 
As we have seen in the previous  chapter the industry  related to security  is of very 
different nature, since the products and services it supplies is quite diverse in methods 
and technologies. Such varied industry explains to some extent the large number of 
companies in the market and the relatively independence between market segments due 
to  the  little  synergies  that  exist  in  design,  production  or  marketing  methods. 
Nevertheless, some general patterns emerge after a detailed analysis. 
 
BUYERS AND SELLERS 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters the main customers of security products are the 
public administration, private organisations (mainly companies), and individuals. Public 
administration  and  operators  of  critical  infrastructures  are  the  ones  who  have  more 
resources to spend in security in comparison to private organisations and individuals. 
Market purchases of the public sector, as opposed to defence, are fragmented between 
the  different  state  organisations,  agencies  and  critical  infrastructures  operators  thus 
resulting  in  a  large  number  of  purchasing  orders  but  of  smaller  value  (e.g.  first 
responder  equipment).  Public  administration,  infrastructure  operators  and  large 
companies tend to be well-informed and sophisticated buyers that enjoy an important 
bargaining power when negotiating supply contracts with the industry, anyhow not to 
the extent of a monopsony. 
 
The security industry can be sorted out in three different kind of companies. The first 
kind  is  companies  whose  main  activity  is  the  equipment  manufacturing.  They  have 
excellent  skills  in  some  niche  technologies  to  design  and  produce  state  of  the  art 
equipment  in  large  quantities.  The  equipment,  usually  very  standard,  is  sold  to 
customers  mainly  through  distributors,  retailers  and  installers  since  it  is  and 
intermediate product of a more complex system, or being the demand too fragmented it 
is not economical to sell it directly to end users (only for expensive products). 
 
The second kind of companies focuses its business on customers whose security needs 
are solved supplying complete systems composed of a mixture of different products and 
services. Core competences of these companies are project management combined with 
technical expertise to understand client’s needs and offer a complete system with the WORKING PAPER 43 
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desired capabilities. They are able to define the operational concept, evaluate the system 
feasibility, design and develop prototypes, integrate components and software, manage 
the full scale production, control quality, deploy and install the system, train the user 
and provide multi-year maintenance services and in some cases complementary services 
like system operation. These companies have good skills in negotiation and contracting 
and are able to manage the large number of specialised subcontractors and suppliers of 
subsystems  and  components  that  the  solution  requires.  Companies  with  the  highest 
capabilities are the main supplier of  governments, infrastructure operators and large 
corporations, whereas companies with lower capabilities attend less sophisticated and 
wealthy customers. 
 
The  third  kind  of  companies  is  security  services  providers.  These  companies  are 
contracted by organisations wishing to outsource some security services. They perform 
specialised activities like manned  guarding services, operation of  alarm system, and 
remote monitoring. 
 
Consultancy  services  are  also  provided  in  this  market,  especially  in  the  high-end 
customer  segment.  The  assessment  these  companies  provide  may  help  to  reduce 
information gaps or asymmetry that security purchasers may experience. They are able 
to evaluate client objectives and security requirements, write project specifications and 




Product  differentiation  reduces  the  price  elasticity  of  a  good  since  it  is  harder  to 
substitute with others, avoiding in such a way a purchasing decision based on price. 
Differentiation  isolates  the  product  to  some  extent  from  competence  allowing  the 
industry to demand a price premium –i.e. price above marginal cost (Tirole, 1988:277) 
– increasing in such a way sales and profits. To do so, companies incur substantial R&D 
and marketing costs reducing bottom line profits. 
 
Market conditions, however, place restrictions on differentiation. On the one hand little 
diversity is possible among certain products when differences have a marginal value for 
the  customer.  In  such  cases  firms  may  nonetheless  seek  to  differentiate  themselves 
through  other  means  like  better  services  associated  to  the  sale  such  as  marketing, 
training, support, or after sales services. Advertising or aesthetics may be used also for 
this purpose but the case is less relevant for the security market where functionality or 
performance plays a more important role. 
 
On the other hand only few designs are selected even though thousands are feasible a 
priori. This incomplete spectrum of goods is closely related to the existence of fixed 
costs (capital, personnel, research and development, etc.), because the production of all 
imaginable goods would imply a huge expense in these costs, and the demand for most 
of these products would never be sufficient to make them profitable (ibid.:278). 
 
Differences are more apparent in the early stage of new equipment. However, as market 
matures and some designs show a higher value for end-customers, differences tend to 
play a less relevant role whereas price and the fulfilment of technical standards become 
more important in the purchasing decision. The achievement of economies of scale also WORKING PAPER 43 
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creates pressure over time for less variety and standardization despite distinct buyers 
needs. 
As has been seen in chapter IV, security products show prima facie relevant differences 
as for example the large variety of explosive trace detectors. Such differentiation may 
indicate a strong market competition, a relevant role of product quality and performance 
as well as a relative inelasticity to price. In many market segments, it is noticeable a 
trend toward the creation of products attempting to outrange competitors’ performance 
and increase market share. Analysing the product variety, there are reasons to believe 
that, being other things equal, differences tend to be more frequent when development 
cost are smaller (Martin, 1993:381). 
 
Differentiation  occurs  also  as  result  of  the  tailoring  process  to  adapt  the  security 
solution  to  users’  needs.  These  needs  translate  into  operational,  functional  or 
environmental  requirements  (e.g.  building  perimeter  protection)  which  results  in 
different designs. But even for a single customer potential bidders will propose different 
solutions in order to maximise the price performance ratio of its providers within the 
supply chain. 
 
In the case of manned guarding services, differences between providers may be rather 
small  and  competition  is  mainly  driven  by  cost.  Conversely,  consultancy  services 
exhibit large differences because they are usually tailored to user needs. 
 
Another typical form of differentiation is based on quality dimension when customers 
have relevant income differences (ibid.:295). Such differentiation is clearly reflected in 
CCTV and alarm systems when customers have different incomes as is the case of large 




Entry conditions are another important aspect to consider since being difficult they will 
restraint  entry  of  new  companies.  A  barrier  to  entry  may  be  defined  as  a  cost  of 
producing which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter the industry but it is not 
borne by firms already in the industry (Martin, 1993:174). Large barriers mean that 
existing  players  believe  they  can  act  without  fear  of  new  competition  from  market 
entrants, and being few it may suggest that contestability may not be high. This may 
facilitate  the  creation  of  market  power  that  enables  companies  to  set  prices  above 
competition level (the more difficult it is to enter a market, the more incumbents
183 can 
raise price above the competitive level without inducing entry). In such a case, the force 
of competition cannot be relied upon to ensure optimal market performance. 
 
Entry conditions are mainly driven by the expected post-entry profit. Markets with a 
large  and  growing  demand  will  attract  new  investors,  all  other  things  being  equal. 
However, if there are established firms in the market that enjoy relevant advantages 
over new entrants, expected post-entry profit will be smaller and incentives to enter will 
not be so high. Main advantages which influence on entry are: economies of scale, 
product differentiation and absolute cost advantages (ibid.: 172). 
 
                                                 
183 We will call incumbents to established firms in the market as opposed to new entrants. WORKING PAPER 43 
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It is not just simple these entry conditions which may cause a barrier to entry, but rather 
these  conditions  combined  with  irreversible  capital  commitments  (also  known  as 
sunken costs) that will be hard to recover without losses as for example specific assets 
(e.g. machinery) hard to be reused, or failed R&D cost (ibid.:180). 
 
Economies of scale 
 
Economies of scale arise if average cost falls as output rises, and may simply be a 
characteristic of the technology used (Martin, 1993:173). Economies of high volume 
production allow a cheaper good due to investments in large fixed costs unaffordable to 
new entrants. Often, they stem as result of learning curves of larger production that 
result in improved processes in terms of quality, speed and resource consumption due to 
an increase in manual, engineering and managerial skills (Tisdell and Hartley, 2008: 
144). Economies of scope also arise if large firms are able to bargain with suppliers and 
obtain  inputs  at  lower  cost  than  small  firms  as  for  example  electronic  components. 
These economies are common in the case of OEM that produce standard off-the-shelf 
security equipment such as CCTV cameras, card readers, RFID tags, electronic cards, 
and sensors. 
 
Research made by Freeman (1986:101) shows that a doubling of output in the electronic 
industry  would  result  in  average  costs  falling  between  20%  and  30%.  Dowdall  and 
Braddon (2005) even rise this value up to 66%-75%. Since most security equipment is 
based on electronics, it is reasonable to believe that the security market benefit of such 
economies.  The  large  size  of  suppliers  of  this  kind  of  equipment  confirms  this 
hypothesis. 
 
Economies of scale mean that large companies are systematically favoured over small 
ones  that  will  face  larger  costs  and  fewer  profits.  It  would  mean  also  that  leading 
companies may benefit against second entrants that will confront harder conditions, or 
even no chance. The accumulation of a large capacity allows firms to charge a low 
price, even if the price is above average and marginal price, and discourage entry, since 
entrants will not earn profits (Tirole, 1988:306). 
 
Economies of scale, however, cannot realise where production runs are extremely low 
as  occurs  in  some  security  markets,  whose  demand  is  one-off  or  small  customized 
batches of 12, 15 or 20 units. This is because manufacturing processes cannot be fully 
optimised, using for example machinery to automate processes and reduce labour needs, 
whereas designs may be hardly reusable in new products. In these cases, the efficiency 
of design and development, rather than production, plays the central role of the supply 
(Hobday, 1998). These economies arise not only in the production processes, but also in 
other activities if they are more effective when carried out at large scale such as R&D, 




Buyers might have blunting preferences for established brands and for the products of 
firms with established reputations. Therefore, entrants would have to spend more than 
incumbents,  per  unit  of  output,  to  reach  the  final  consumer.  Patents  might  give 
incumbents  temporary  legal  monopolies  over  the  use  of  favoured  products,  which 
would  make  duplication  by  entrants  either  impossible  or  possible  only  on  terms  of WORKING PAPER 43 
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licenses dictated by incumbents (e.g. biometrics, encryption). Established firms might 
control  access  to  major  wholesale  and  retail  outlets,  implying  higher  per-unit 
distribution costs for entrants (Martin, 1993:173). 
 
If the current degree of differentiation enjoyed by incumbents depends in part of past 
design, advertising, and sales efforts, the cost of such activities constitutes a barrier to 
entry. That is to say costs that must be incurred to create a good reputation, to bear risk 
of innovation, and to build a scale of operations appropriate to the economical servicing 
of  consumer  demands  such  as  the  provision  of  marketing  and  technical  support  to 
operation and maintenance (ibid.:174). 
 
Product  differentiation  often  demands  in  the  security  market  a  permanent  R&D 
capacity. It requires investments above a threshold level without which it will normally 
be impossible to develop new products with lead times short enough to survive and 
eventually  grow  (Freeman,  1986:146).  These  differences  may  be  safeguarded  by 
intellectual  property  rights  (IPR),  patents  and  copyrights  and  hamper  rivals’  entry. 
However, such comfortable environment may be crumbled by new competitors through 
imitation
184 or through the exploitation of new and radical technologies. 
 
Attaining  such  differentiation  constitutes  often  an  insurmountable  barrier  for  new 
entrants  and  small  companies,  which  are  only  able  to  enter  in  some  market  niches 
upstream of the supply chain. For example in high-end markets incumbents may benefit 
from domain specific knowledge of systems, procedures and protocols that come only 
from  experience  on  past  supplies.  Moreover,  demand  is  often  built  on  legacy 
dependencies in existing supplies, and in some cases incumbents may have privileged 
access to inside information about government demand. This situation repeats again 
upstream the supply chain, where new entrants will experience difficulties due to lack of 
reputation when they try to create links and become suppliers of system integrators 
(Dowdall and Braddon, 2005). 
 
Absolute cost advantage 
 
Incumbents enjoy absolute cost advantage over entrants if patents or secrets gave them 
control  over  the  production  processes.  Incumbents  might  control  access  to  higher-
quality or lower-cost input suppliers. If, as seems likely, the possibility of bankruptcy is 
greater for entrants than incumbents (banks unable to objectively evaluate the risk), then 
financial markets can be expected to impose a higher cost of capital on entrants than 
incumbents
185. The resulting cost advantage will be greater the more capital intensive 
production processes are (Martin, 1993:173). 
 
Incumbents enjoy also cost advantages in the management of the supply chain since 
inputs and intermediate products to manufacture a security system have a large share in 
                                                 
184 Martin (1994: 373) shows that strong IPR protection is a fleeting advantage. In one of the reports he 
mentions that 60% of successful patented innovations were imitated within four years of introduction. 
The second report from a survey of R&D executives concludes that only in a minority of R&D-
intensive industries were patents regarded as more important than secrecy, lead time, moving down 
the learning curve, or sales and service efforts as a way of protecting the competitive advantages 
associated with new products or processes. 
185 In complex developments sufficient funds and robust financial support is necessary to accommodate 
the extremely drawn out development and production timeframe and the inevitable gaps between 
financial investments and returns (Dowdall, 2005). WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  123 
the  final  price,  a  value  that  often  surpass  the  50%.  Incumbents  may  have  a  large 
knowledge and experience of the supply system and detailed information on capabilities 
and resources scattered  through the supply  chain, being able to combine them on a 
project  specific  basis  to  achieve  fundamental  advantages.  This  knowledge  and 
experience may help to optimize overall cost because: (a) fewer costs related to the 
search of suppliers able to provide raw materials or intermediate products is needed, (b) 
the choice will be better in term of products with good performance and low price, (c) 
long-term  agreements  with  suppliers  may  reduce  transaction  costs.  The  higher 
capability  of  incumbents  to  manage  an  international  supply  chain  favours  the 




Durability and specificity of assets, singly or in combination, give rise to sunken costs. 
Sunken  costs  create  barriers  to  entry  because  entrants  must  duplicate  assets  whose 
opportunity cost is higher than that for incumbent firms and because the assets have 
limited scrap value which increases the risk of entry (owing to large losses associated 
with unsuccessful entry). The sunken cost characteristic of the assets also represents a 
barrier to exit for incumbent firms since the committed assets represent non-recoverable 
costs (they do not have intrinsic value to other firms). Incumbents are therefore bound 
to their markets by the inability to divest (Martin, 1993:204). 
 
The amount of capital investment for entering in the security market represents a barrier 
and explains to some extent the market structure. The large number and small size of 
installers of security equipment in the residential market is probably a consequence of 
the limited sunken cost of entry. In effect, products can be bought from a large list of 
OEMs’ manufacturers, skills to design and install the equipment are rather low, and the 
infrastructure to supply such equipment to local customers can be rather small. 
 
Conversely, the short number of system integrators can be explained by the difficulty to 
manage the complexity of large projects that requires large investments to be enough 
efficient  and  competitive,  as  can  be  the  case  of  container  inspection  equipment. 
Similarly, a large investment in productive assets is required to manufacture efficiently 
in terms of quality and cost. This explains the large size and market share of some 
manufacturers.  The  cost  and  the  indivisibility  of  these  productive  assets  make  that 
efficiency is only reached with a minimum production scale. Hence, these costs become 
a relevant barrier to entry. 
 
Sunken costs explain that market entry is usually made at a relatively small scale, trying 
to expand over time
186. It also explains that entry is likely attempted from neighbouring 
sectors,  since  entry  costs  are  smaller  because  companies  share  similar  technologies, 
production facilities, or sales and distribution capabilities. Such attempts can be more 
likely when the demand in the new market is  growing and there exists some spare 
development  or  production  capabilities,  and  the  traditional  demand  is  frozen  or 
stagnant. Some illustrative examples found during the survey are: 
 
·  Siemens  Building  Technologies  and  Honeywell  Inc.  that  come  from  the 
electronic and building equipment market. 
                                                 
186 A minimum scale to achieve an average cost able to successfully compete with incumbents is also 
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·  Defence  prime  contractors  with  large  experience  in  system  integration  are 
leading  large  security  projects  such  as  Northrop-Grumman  in  the  UK  AFIS 
project, or Lockheed Martin in the USA IAFIS system. 
·  ICT companies like IBM or Cisco are entering in the CCTV market due to the 
development of IP-cameras (Frost & Sullivan, 2005a:2-34). 
·  Companies with a large customer base coming from energy, telecom, banking 
and  insurance  sectors  seeking  to  complement  their  portfolio  with  security 
services such as EPS in France, Hafslund in Norway or British Gas in UK (Frost 
& Sullivan, 2006:2-31). 
 
Impact of research and development in entry conditions 
 
Research  and  development  requires  facilities  such  as  laboratories,  design  offices, 
computers tools, testing facilities and highly skilled personnel that constitute a relevant 
fixed cost for the industry. These investments, of uncertain outcome and return, raise 
the minimum efficiency scale, and the capital requirements, thus raising entry barriers to 
newcomers.  These  hard  conditions  are  softened  when  industry  benefits  from  the 
technological advances that come from other economics sectors, such as video cameras, 
vehicles or aircraft, which require only slight transformations to be integrated with other 
components into a security system as for example a truck transformed for demolitions 
or fire extinguishing. Government may also soften these conditions when they provide 
aids for this activity, a question that will be analysed in more detail in chapter VIII. 
 
Labour and capital 
 
A specific pattern regarding the intensity of labour and capital in the security market is 
hard to discern due to the different kind of industries operating in it. Furthermore, no 
quantitative assessment has been feasible during the survey. However, some patterns 
can be identified for certain kind of industries. 
 
The massive production of security equipment and the development of complex security 
solutions are very demanding in capital investments. Mass production usually requires 
advanced production equipment to satisfy quality standards and reduce the amount and 
(sometimes) skills of personnel. Even multiple plants may be needed for developing and 
integrating the different components of a system. The development of complex systems 
requires  also  sophisticated  equipment  for  performing  the  engineering,  design, 
development and test of the system, whereas computer tools are needed to manage the 
complex supply chain. These needs raise entry barriers into this market. Conversely 
distributors need a considerably inferior infrastructure to perform its business. These 
needs still decrease more for small installers of security systems, which needs even less 
infrastructure. 
 
The development of new equipment is also a labour intensive activity that requires the 
ingenuity of sophisticated and skilled teams formed by scientifics, engineers, computer 
programmers and other qualified personnel with high wages this raising fixed costs. 
Qualification of distributors and installer personnel is considerably smaller. 
 
Companies that provide security services are fundamentally labour intensive with more 
austere capital needs. Their main investments are armoured cars for funds transport, 
remote  monitoring  system  for  home  alarms,  personal  protective  equipment  and WORKING PAPER 43 
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communication equipment. Labour cost represents the main proportion of total costs, 
which  includes  training  that  is  another  relevant  cost  source  in  a  market  with  high 
employee turnover
187. The weight of personnel cost in the total cost of the service and 
the limited qualification that security personnel requires help to explain the low wages 




A market where the industry has a large market share is considered positive since the 
chance of realizing economies of scale is high. However, research in this field shows 
that market concentration in most industries appears to be much higher than it needs to 
be for leading firms to take advantage of all but slight residual scale economies (Martin, 
1994:240).  Having  in  mind  that  large  industrial  concentration  can  generate 
diseconomies of scale and less efficiency as more stages of production are combined in 
a single management since bounded rationality limits the scope of such management
188, 
it  could  be  feasible  that  mergers  are  more  due  to  strategic  motives  than  efficiency 
search, in particular considering that it may take years to fully integrate operations and 
achieve  synergies  (Martin,  1994:270  and  283).  Empirical  studies  of  mergers  also 
produce negative results: they lose market share and suffer reductions in profitability 
more rapidly than similar firms that do not engage in mergers (Martin, 1993:235). 
 
The  existence  of  many  security  suppliers  integrated  into  large  business  groups  may 
endorse  the  idea  that  such  concentration  may  be  driven  by  strategic  considerations 
rather than economies of scale. Yet, such concentration shows superior performance. 
This kind of firms consists of a set of semi-autonomous operating divisions organised 
on a product basis and is known as the multi-divisional (M-form) structure. Williamson 
(1985:283)  explains  that  ‘this  structure  removes  the  general  office  executives  from 
partisan involvement in the functional parts and assigns operating responsibilities to the 
divisions. The general office… is supported by an elite staff that has the capacity to 
evaluate divisional performance. Not only…is the goal structure altered in favour of 
enterprise-wide considerations, but an improved information base permits rewards and 
penalties to be assigned to divisions on a more discriminating basis, and resources can 
be reallocated within from less to more productive uses’. (Martin, 1993:226) resumes 
saying  that  these  business  groups  should  be  thought  of  as  a  way  of  organising 
transactions  that  are  intermediate  between  the  firm  and  the  market.  The  firm  can 
economize on the transaction costs that it would have incurred if the transaction had 
been done through the market, and at the same time, it can avoid the scale diseconomies 
or control loss that would have occurred if it had expanded internally and performed the 
transaction within the firm. Tisdell and Hartley (2008:165) confirm also this hypothesis. 
 
As has been said in chapter II, the concentration pattern of the security market in Europe 
is characterized by a low number of large companies with international and European 
dimension  and  a  relevant  market  share.  It  is  followed  by  medium-size  companies 
operating at national or regional level, and a large number of companies operating in the 
residential and private companies market. Market share is low in many markets being 
                                                 
187 According to Eurostat sbs_na_1a_se_r2 table, the share of personnel costs in production in the private 
security activities is 64.36% in the EU for 2008. 
188 Coase  (1937)  cites  two  reasons  of  decreasing  returns  to  the  entrepreneurial  function:  the  cost  of 
organizing additional transactions within the firm, and the failure to place the factors of production in 
the use where their value is greatest. WORKING PAPER 43 
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rare a value above 20% (Frost & Sullivan, 2004:3-1). Therefore, there are reasons to 
believe  that  concentration  is  smaller  than  the  aerospace  and  defence  market. 
Concentration, however, appears higher in certain specialised equipment or components 
within  the  supply  chain  such  as  cargo  screening,  CBRNE  detectors,  or  fibres  for 
personal  protection  (Ecorys,  2009:34).  The  lack  of  alternative  suppliers  helps  these 
companies to negotiate more favourable contracts. 
 
Entry  conditions  may  explain  to  a  large  extent  this  market  structure.  Economies  of 
scale, product differentiation, and absolute cost advantages tend to favour large firms. 
Conversely low concentration can be appreciated in market segments where entry is 
easier  as  is  the  case  of  distributors  and  installers  of  security  equipment  for  small 
businesses or the residential market. Their higher knowledge of local market and higher 
flexibility provide these companies enough competitive advantages to operate in the 
fringe  against  larger  incumbents.  Start-up  companies  are  common  place  in  new 
technology-driven  market  segments  such  as  biometrics  or  RFID,  having  the  most 




The  degree  of  vertical  integration  refers  to  the  extent  to  which  successive  stages 
involved in the production of a particular product or service are performed by different 
firms. Vertical integration may respond to different needs, such as (a) the efficiency 
increase  of  integrating  successive  processes  in  time  and  place  or  economies  of 
information exchange; (b) the saving in transaction cost when the market is not used, 
such as advertising, inventory, suppliers search, contract negotiation and enforcement; 
(c) the wish of suppliers in forward integrating to gain access to distribution channels, 
or  (d)  conversely  firms  performing  backward  integration  to  guarantee  a  dependable 
source or to capture margins normally paid to suppliers
189. 
 
On the negative side, vertical integration may have an adverse impact on efficiency 
since it can: (a) raise costs when external suppliers can perform more cheaply due for 
example to economies of large scale production of intermediate products when they are 
produced for many customers, (b) create inflexibility because the relationship with the 
supplying unit becomes captive and the market cannot be used to find a more efficient 
or  innovative  supplier.  Vertical  integration  may  also  unfold  anticompetitive  effects 
since  intermediate  product  suppliers  will  have  more  difficulties  to  reach  the  end 
customer (market foreclosure) and hence it will raise entry barriers, since rivals will 
need to integrate forward themselves to ensure access to downstream market (Martin, 
1993:69). 
 
Patterns of vertical integration are not discernible due to the variety of the security 
industry.  In  some  cases  the  end  product  and  a  large  number  of  their  parts  are 
manufactured internally, whereas in others companies assembly parts provided by first 
tier suppliers. Yet, integration does not further than two stages of the supply chain. It is 
reasonable to assume that in-house production will be preferred when its cost is below 
that of outsourcing, i.e. production plus transaction cost. This internal  cost tends to 
                                                 
189 Strategic  alliances,  ‘teaming’  arrangements  and  other  (exclusive  and  long-term)  agreements  with 
preferred suppliers or dealers may be seen as a soft vertical integration. WORKING PAPER 43 
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increase due to the diseconomies of scale of the managerial span of control
190 whilst the 
digital  economy  tends  to  decrease  outsourcing  cost
191.  Usually  core  capabilities  are 
preserved, while elements of the value chain that do not require highly specific assets 
are more easily outsourced (Williamson, 1979).The analysis of Table 21 shows that 
many mergers and acquisitions do result in vertical integration which is mainly aimed at 
reaching better consumers or internalising specific capabilities considered essential for 




The suppliers of security equipment in Europe are often divisions of large diversified 
conglomerates whose core business is rather uniform. Three main reasons explain this 
structure. The first is the ability of these conglomerates to capture integration economies 
(economies of scope) associated with the simultaneous supply of inputs common to a 
number  of  production  processes  geared  to  distinct  final  firms’  products  (Martin, 
1994:279)  such  as  know-how,  specialised  indivisible  physical  assets,  and 
complementarities in production or existing technologies. These synergies seem so far 
high enough to offset the cost of coordination, compromise, and inflexibility of business 
strategies for jointly serving different market segments with shared activities
192. The 
second  reason  could  be  the  small  size  of  the  security  market  and  the  possibility  of 
market fluctuations. As Martin (1993:250) reminds markets for the goods and services 
of specialised assets are likely to be thin and it is often cost effective for a firm to 
diversify across sectors in which the assets can be utilized, this providing a kind of 
insurance  against  demand  changes.  The  third  is  the  concept  of  M-firm,  already 
commented.  Such  internal  structure  facilitates  synergies  and  cross-subsidisation  of 
activities that may be important in the early stages of the life-cycle of a product. 
 
As  could  be  expected,  due  to  the  nature  of  most  security  products  whose  core 
technologies are electronics, information and communication, these divisions are part of 
large  conglomerates  involved  in  electronic  and  defence,  but  also  to  safety, 
environmental protection, industrial control, building management, and ICT. This is the 





Joint ventures and consortia, which can be seen as some sort of partial or temporal 
merge,  are  another  figure  used  to  create  the  industrial  structure  that  large  security 
projects  require  (e.g.  UK  IDENT1,  Spanish  SIVE).  This  kind  of  structure  is  quite 
common  in  research  projects  such  as  those  financed  by  The  European  Research 
Framework  Programme,  which  mainly  finances  consortia  formed  by  companies  of 
different member states. 
 
                                                 
190 This result in a control loss: signals are distorted in transmission from corporate headquarters to the 
shop floor; supervisors are less effective in monitoring performance the farther removed they are from 
the level at which productive work takes place (Martin, 1993:214). 
191 As for example CAD design, flexible manufacturing, data communications or electronic commerce. 
192 Flexible manufacturing technology may facilitate the production of different product varieties in the 
same facility. WORKING PAPER 43 
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Main motives for the formation of joint ventures are: (a) taking advantage of economies 
of scale; (b) diversifying risk across members; (c) overcoming entry barriers into new 
markets;  (d)  pooling  complementary  bits  of  knowledge  and  achieve  synergies;  (e) 
allaying xenophobic reactions when entering a foreign market (Martin, 1993: 256 and 
Ecorys, 2009:227)
193. All these reasons tend to raise efficiency. 
 
However,  Joint  ventures  and  consortia  may  stifle  competition  when  two  competing 
companies decide to form a single consortium for bidding to a supply contract, which 
may have effects very much likely tacit collusion (Martin, 1993:235). R&D consortia 
may  slow  down  the  innovation  pace  (fewer  research  threads),  but  enhance  social 
welfare since fewer resources are invested and results are available to their members 
that  may  compete  later  on  in  the  post-innovation  market  (ibid.:376).  Consortia, 
however,  may  not  be  exempt  of  rigidities,  due  to  the  ex-ante  distribution  of  work 




The capability to import products may play an important role in the market limiting the 
ability  of  domestic  firms  to  wield  control  over  price.  The  existence  of  foreign 
competitors  with  better  products  may  overrun  the  market  when  quality  or  price  of 
domestic manufacturers is not competitive. As we have seen in geographic markets in 
chapter III, customers of member states may profit purchasing security equipment from 
other member states or countries outside the European Union. Yet, national security 
product  regulations  may  put  at  disadvantage  foreign  products.  Furthermore  foreign 
bidders may be unfavoured in public procurement against proposals that offer a large 
work-share to national companies especially in the case of large projects. 
 
Imports of security focus onto two kinds of products. The first kind is first-class systems 
usually bought from U.S., Japan, Israel or other European countries. A large number of 
examples can be given such as X-ray equipment for personal inspection (L-3), explosive 
detection devices (GE), video surveillance cameras (Panasonic, etc.), security software 
(Trend  Micro,  Check-Point  Software  Technologies)  or  UAVs.  These  non-EU 
companies often have commercial offices and other infrastructures within the European 
Union to better sell their products. 
 
The second kind of equipment imported by Europe usually competes on cost rather than 
brand quality. They usually come from countries like Taiwan, Korea, or China. They 
are fundamentally video surveillance equipment and intrusion detection components for 
residential or small business security. These companies attain competitive advantages in 
price  mainly  due  to  limited  research  effort  (based  on  licenses  or  copies  of  mature 
products), low labour costs, and economies of large production to supply world markets 
(Freeman, 1886: 179). This is also the case of DVR for video surveillance that is being 
produced in Eastern Europe (Frost & Sullivan, 2007: 3-3). This capability is attracting 
some  European  companies  specialised  in  security  components,  mainly  for  intrusion 
detection, to outsource their production to these countries (Frost & Sullivan, 2006:1-4). 
 
                                                 
193 An  example  of  this  kind  of  joint  venture  is  the  supply  of  a  TETRA  network  to  the  Guanzhou 
municipal  government  awarded  to  EADS  and  CETC-7  Ltd.  (China  Electronic  Science  and 
Technology Group Corporation No. 7 Research Institute). WORKING PAPER 43 
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As a final remark, it has to be said that unspecific components that are part of the supply 
chain of security equipment, such as computers or screens, are often imported. 
 
RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has analysed the structure of the security market. While a general pattern 
cannot  be  established  due  to  the  diversity  of  the  industry,  some  driving  forces  and 
characteristics of the structure has been described. 
 
As opposed to defence the security market shows a large number of companies with 
lower concentration levels, both from the demand and the supply side. Companies with 
a large market share (monopolies or duopolies) only appear in a short number of cases. 
Instead, markets prevail where few companies together have a large market share. The 
main  reasons  that  explain  the  market  structure  has  been  identified  being  especially 
relevant entry conditions. The main entry conditions are economies of scale, product 
differentiation, cost advantages, and sunken cost. They are the main reasons that impede 
the entry and the formation of market with a large number of suppliers. Yet economies 
of scale seem not so large to talk about a market characterised by natural monopolies. 
 
The different forms of industrial concentration in this market like vertical integration, 
conglomerates, joint ventures and consortia have been analysed describing their positive 
and negative effects. Concentration as can be expected is higher when entry barriers are 
important.  Suppliers  are  often  conglomerates  (M-firms).  Vertical  integration  of  the 
different stages of the supply chain does not show a clear pattern. This may be due to 
the varied reasons that may make in-house or outsourcing the most economic option. 
 
A special attention is devoted to the role of imports as a mechanism that improves 
market competition. More sophisticated products tend to come from USA and Japan, 
whereas simpler and more mature products come from nascent economies like China, 
Taiwan or Korea. 
 
As a final conclusion, it can be said that the security market structure gives margin to 
competition. Yet, product differences and intermediate providers with few competitors 
may  facilitate  the  creation  of  some  power  with  a  potential  negative  impact  on  the 
market. Whereas a low number of suppliers may exist in some markets, competition 
however may be rather fierce
194. In other areas, such as distributors and installers of 
security  equipment,  suppliers  could  be  considered  excessive  since  their  small  size 
impedes the achievement of economies of scale. Anyhow, the derivation of more solid 
conclusions requires a deeper analysis and suggests an area of future research. 
                                                 
194 A confirmation of this fact is the considerable variation in market share with the passage of time that 
can be observed in Frost & Sullivan security industry reports. WORKING PAPER 43 
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VII. MARKET CONDUCT 
 
This chapter analyses the conduct of the security industry. It attempts to investigate the 
behaviour of companies and determine whether it has a positive or negative impact on 
market performance. Pricing, product strategy, and mergers  and acquisitions are the 
main areas that will be analysed. 
 
According to Martin (1994:258), it can be thought, without fear of incurring in error, 
that behaviour of firms is mainly aimed at maximizing some combination of profits, 
growth and size, being over the long-run, profit maximization probably the best single 
explanation of firm behaviour. Profit-maximization firms in an oligopolistic market will 
engage  in  strategic  behaviour  –i.e.  the  investment  of  resources  for  the  purpose  of 
limiting rivals’ choices (Martin, 1993:46)– to acquire and maintain some market power, 
provided that the expected profit to be gained from such behaviour exceeds its cost (this 
cost depending of competition policy) (Martin, 1994:538). 
 
Admittedly,  strategic  behaviour  is  strongly  limited  by  Treaty  rules  that  forbid 
agreements and concerted practices with the aim of restricting or distorting competition 
such  as  price  fixing,  market  sharing,  cartel  and  production  quota,  discriminating 
commercial policies, or restraints to the free movement of goods, services, capital and 
technology  (articles  101-106  of  the  TFEU).  Yet,  as  we  will  see,  within  this  legal 





Pricing behaviour is influenced by the market  structure.  In markets where there are 
many sellers and buyers the chance to raise prices above marginal cost are smaller than 
in markets where concentration is high, there are entry barrier to newcomers, products 
are  imperfect  substitutes  of  each  other,  and  demand  is  inelastic.  While  collusion 
agreements are forbidden by competition laws, tacit or implicit collusion may appear 
more easily where suppliers are few and prices can be agreed without direct contact. In 
addition,  companies  may  use  predatory  or  exclusionary  practices  such  as  temporary 
price  reductions  to  deter  or  crowd  out  the  market  of  competitors.  Finally,  vertical 





Many security products are sold in markets where the number of sellers and buyers are 
large  enough  to  assure  an  independent  and  competitive  behaviour  which  may  even 
increase with the presence of foreign suppliers. Products features and prices are largely 
publicized,  a  reasonable  number  of  substitutes  exist,  and  customers  have  enough 
information to make a proper choice. This situation impedes that companies exert some 
kind of market power, since increases in product price will be immediately responded 
with a demand fall. 
 
Nevertheless, there are cases where competition may be restricted. The first is within 
the supply chain, where vertical integration or exclusive deals may close markets to WORKING PAPER 43 
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firms downstream the supply chain and become a source of anticompetitive behaviour 
that may result in some market power. This may be the case of complex supplies where 
companies offering intermediate products could be excluded from the supply chain, if 
competition is not used to choose partners. 
 
The  second  case  is  when  governments,  large  infrastructures  operators  and  large 
companies  purchase  complex  security  solutions  where  only  a  few  or  even  a  single 
supplier may exist. In such a case, situations of bilateral monopoly may easily appear 
where  the  bargaining  power  of  each  side  will  decide  the  final  price.  But  due  to 
asymmetry of information that both sides manage, a situation of adverse selection may 
appear  since  suppliers  may  have  a  better  knowledge  of  cost,  risks  and  system 
performance  and  the  novel  system  may  not  be  well  specified  (Laffont  and  Tirole, 
1993:10). This implies that market allocations may fail to be ex-post efficient (Spulber, 
1989: 62). Efficiency may also be jeopardised when governments force the participation 
of  non-competitive  national  industry  within  the  supply  chain  in  international  public 
procurement. 
 
The last case is buying additional products or services related to security equipment 
already purchased, such as for example maintenance or upgrade, that are tied to the 
original supplier (no alternative supplier exists). This again facilitates the development 




Incentives  to  tacitly  collude  –and  set  a  price  above  marginal  cost–  may  appear  in 
concentrated  markets,  where  products  and  services  are  to  some  extent  standardised 
sharing a similar cost structure and where barriers to entry are high. Tactics such as 
price signalling, price leadership or pricing rules may be used for this purpose (Martin, 
1994:156). 
 
Yet, this practice requires the coordination of sellers that is difficult to achieve when 
they  are  heterogeneous  or  follow  very  diverse  strategies  as  for  example  when  they 
compete for a fundamental cost or quality advantage to get ahead of their competitors. 
In such cases, the chance of adhering to such practice may be small. This is a common 
case for many security products and solutions that largely differ in performance and cost 
structure.  This  practice  to  be  successful  requires  high  entry  barriers.  Otherwise 
companies that easily enter the market will challenge the collusive agreement. The case 
of manned guarding services firms or installers of household security systems where 
these barriers may be not too high suggest a practice hard to be followed. 
 
The use of open bidding for acquisition of security equipment used in high-end markets 
like  government  and  large  companies  discourages  also  tacit  collusion  since 
opportunities  to  enter  the  market  are  sporadic,  the  premium  (e.g.  a  large  multiyear 
contract)  is  high,  and  the  auction  type  method  only  rewards  a  single  company. 
Moreover,  since  information  about  price  cuts  may  be  somewhat  hidden  or  delayed, 
retaliation  is  less  costly  and  tacit  collusion  is  harder  to  sustain  (Tirole,  1988:241). 
Collusion may only appear when consortia are created with the aim of reducing the 
number of bidders. 
Predatory and exclusionary practices 
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Predatory pricing is aimed at eliminating competitors and increase market share through 
price reductions. While this practice may be beneficial to the customer in the short term, 
it  may  be  detrimental  in  the  long  run  when  it  crowds  out  the  market  of  rivals  and 
reduces  the  number  of  available  choices.  This  practice  requires  some  kind  of  entry 
barriers to be profitable. However, predation is hard to ascertain, price reductions may 
be attribute to other, more innocent, considerations such as fluctuations in demand or 
cost, or a normal reaction to a decline in the residual demand curve due to market entry 
(Tirole, 1988:374). 
 
One form of predation may occur if consumers incur costs in switching suppliers. In 
such case, incumbents may find it profitable to expand sales, as a way of attracting 
consumers (who are later locked-in by switching costs) and tying them to his brand, 
leaving  fewer  customers  available  for  potential  entrants  and  making  entry  more 
difficult.  This  involves  some  sacrifice  of  short  run  profit,  a  strategic  investment  in 
customer base (Martin, 1993:72). Whereas, there is a chance of this practice, as for 
example home alarm systems, no practical example has been found during the survey. 
 
Predatory pricing may occur when only a short number of firms receive state aids. The 
worst  scenario  could  be  when  disproportionate  aids  are  improperly  used  to  cross-
subsidise general activities of the company that will allow it to set prices below the ones 
competitors could offer. However, R&D aids, even if properly granted, may nonetheless 
provide  knowledge  and  experience  which  provide  the  industry  with  absolute  cost 
advantages over non-awarded competitors. Only a case by case analysis could lay down 
whether firms conduct follows this practice. 
 
Some kind of predation may occur, especially in public procurement, when companies 
offer  products  with  overstated  performance  and  undervalued  costs.  Companies  may 
prefer  to  incur  in  some  risks  when  they  foresee  long-term  gains  after  gaining  a 
monopolistic position once awarded. Such company may recover these potential losses 
by means of engineering change proposals, system upgrades and future production and 
maintenance  contracts  where  the  bargaining  may  be  more  balanced.  This  may  be 
particularly true in the case of complex products that entail considerable development 
and integration, and where the cost of substituting the supplier, due to large incurred 
costs, is too high to become a credible alternative. Such practice is well known in large 
programmes in particular in the field of defence (Marshall and Meckling, 1962).This 
overoptimism may be the outcome of the large uncertainties of such programmes that 
cannot always be anticipated in the initial proposal. However, since firm’s optimism 
will  be  financed  by  the  government,  penalties  for  underestimation  may  be  absent 
(Tisdell and Hartley, 2008:384). 
 
Non-price exclusionary behaviour may occur in the case of setting standards when firms 
are able to influence standardisation bodies based on proprietary technologies subject to 
some form of intellectual proprietary rights as is the case of Savi e-seals. This case is 
closely related to what it is known as predatory innovation, where incumbents enjoying 
market power define or change product interface, making incompatible the accessories 
developed by independent manufacturers for the old product (Martin, 1994:484). This is 
a well known practice in the field of information and communication systems. Frost & 
Sullivan (2008d:46) report similar practices in the security market. This is the case of 
companies like Siemens and Honeywell that do prefer proprietary systems and protocols 
incompatible with the products of other suppliers. In this way, they force end users to WORKING PAPER 43 
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rely on a single provider for the whole range of systems and the associated services they 
might  need,  instead  of  using  open  products  (e.g.  IP-based)  that  are  more  easily 
integrated in an IT network. Such behaviour may be more related to companies with a 
superior overall package in terms of product offering, installed base or reputation (Katz 
and Shapiro, 2004). Nevertheless, this may be a long-term self-defeating strategy in a 
market that rewards open systems and interoperability. This explains the preference of 
new entrants to use a more open approach and benefit from network effects. This is the 
case of Open Access Alliance Program launched by Lenel (a UTC company) to partner 
with software developers and hardware manufacturers, or the Open Platform Integration 
Software XProtect of the Danish Milestone company. 
 
A last form of predation is the industry conduct geared towards achieving long term 
service contracts with the aim to increase customer loyalty and exclude rivals from the 
market. For example public/private partnership for the supply of certain services like 




Vertical restraints are conditions set by suppliers to distributors that limit their conduct. 
The most common restraints are: (a) a minimum retail price; (b) to sell only in a certain 
territory or from a certain location; or (c) to sell a minimum quantity over a given period 
of time. According to (Martin, 1993:326) recent work on this behaviour suggests that 
vertical restraints may serve to certify product quality, may serve to induce retailers to 
carry a greater range of services, or may be a response to uncertainty. As a conclusion, 
it can be said that vertical restraints may not always have an efficiency motive, nor are 
always a support for market power (ibid.:350). 
 
Such restraints may be applied by manufacturers to the sale of their products made 
through distributors. These practices are in general forbidden by article 101 and 102 of 
the TFEU in order to preserve market competition. Exemptions are only granted when 
they  do  not  restrict  competition  or  their  benefits  outweigh  any  anti-competitive 
effects
195. A consultation to DG Competition cases database has not found any sanction 




Product strategy is mainly aimed at increasing its uniqueness as solid as possible from 
imitation. This uniqueness will attract buyers’ preferences and loyalty thus weakening 
price competition and commanding a premium (monopolistic) price. Such strategy may 
raise barriers to new entrants and eventually provide some market power. It includes the 
development or enhancement of products’ performance and quality, the creation of new 
brands to crowd the product space, advertising, and the promotion or the adhesion to 
new  standards.  Non-price  competition  is  likely  to  be  important  in  an  oligopolistic 
market, since it is less risky than initiate a price war (Tisdell and Hartley, 2008:226). 
 
All these methods are common place in the security industry, but the achievement of 
product differences grounded on features and performance able to improve deterrence 
or lessen inconvenience is probably the most relevant. They are achieved, as we have 
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seen  in  previous  chapters,  through  the  use  of  better  technologies.  The  number  of 
varieties will depend, however, on the sunken cost needed to produce a new variety 
(Martin, 1994:335). 
 
When  differences  are  not  easily  ascertained,  signals  of  value  such  as  reputation, 
installed base, or large market share may be an indicator to the purchaser of security. 
Such indicators tend to favour incumbents. 
 
Economic theory predicts that firms with market power are likely to invest too much 
from a social point of view in product differentiation (Martin, 1994: chapter 8; Tirole, 
1988:282).  While  this  may  be  a  potential  risk,  an  initial  assessment  suggests  that 
product  differentiation  in  security  is  often  related  to  the  different  user  needs  and 
budgets, thus favouring the creation of profitable market niches. 
 
Research, development and innovation 
 
Research and development is essential to achieve differentiated products more fitted to 
customer  needs  or  less  expensive,  as  for  example  computer  tomography  to  detect 
explosives and drugs inside travelling baggages. Successful R&D will help to obtain 
technology  leadership  and  innovate  faster  than  competitors  offering  more  attractive 
products  in  the  market.  This  provides  companies  with  an  important  temporary 
advantage until imitators begin to deliver similar products. R&D may unfold new or 
improved production process favouring more massive and cheaper production able to 
feed a large customer base as for example smart cards or RFID tags. R&D is a desirable 
market  feature  with  a  positive  impact  on  market  performance.  It  may  have 
consequences on market structure propelling successful firms to the forefront. 
 
It can be said that the security sector is a moderate to large investor in research and 
development in many market segments as can be seen by the large number of new 
products that are yearly launched into the market. This is because innovative and better 
products and services which improve security are largely rewarded by customers. Prime 
contractors, value added resellers and equipment manufacturers are the main investors, 
whilst distributors and installers are less involved in this activity. Innovation in security 
services is, however, less visible and no practical examples have been found. 
 
The research and development process 
 
Security systems are usually engineering intensive products that require the integration 
of different technologies and intermediate products to achieve the desired performance. 
Technologies  may  be  obtained  from  other  market  sectors,  but  they  often  require 
significant developments to adequate them to security needs. Certain products require 
sophisticated technology research, which usually needs the support of universities and 
research  centres  to  exploit  basic  scientific  knowledge,  like  a  sensor  or  a  CB  agent 
antidote
196. Advances are only achievable by means of multidisciplinary teams able to 
amass enough know-how, expertise and synergies
197. The formation of R&D consortia 
is a way to build up such teams as well as to share the large cost and risk associated to 
                                                 
196 Usually being this research cost not the largest share of the total development cost. 
197 For example, biological detection equipment requires cross-cutting, interdisciplinary science such as 
microbiology, cell biology, biophysics, electronics, material science, microfabrication, microfluidics 
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this activity. Such consortia are usually led by large companies that integrate companies 
with niche expertise, research university departments or their spin-off companies. 
 
The process initiates establishing a system concept whence the desired product can be 
defined. This definition will be translated into a set of requirements that will guide the 
design and development phase. Once a basic design is unfolded, an exhaustive test and 
evaluation phase starts. The chance to become successful the first time, even with a 
clear view of users’ needs and design options, is low and the process iterates through 
design  changes  and  improvements  until  performance  offsets  current  systems’ 
capabilities. Whereas a systemic approach is applied to the whole process trial and error 
methods  predominate.  Failure  rate  is  high  and  many  prototypes  never  pass  to  the 
production stage. Successful prototypes still will need further developments to achieve 
efficient  production  methods.  These  methods  may  include  new  materials,  design 
changes, new tools or new technologies able to reduce price until the product can be 
accepted by the market as for example printed Thin Film Transistor Circuits for chipless 
RFID tags (EU, 2008:79). According to (Freeman, 1986:123) the whole process may 
take years to mature for very disruptive products and the gestation process –akin to 
animal reproduction– cannot be artificially shortened easily. 
 
In a nutshell, research and development is an inherently risky, uncertain and wasteful 
activity. The reasons behind have been deeply  analysed in the literature. Rao et al. 
(2007:72) argue that systems requirements and specifications are inherently incomplete 
and may include ambiguous and contradictory features that, even worse, may change 
over time. Therefore considerable efforts are needed to understand the entire and non-
trivial system in its ultimate form before the system can be successfully developed. 
System  designers  need  experience  to  understand  the  implications  of  their  design 
choices. But this experience can only be gained by making mistakes, learning from 
them,  and  having  a  mechanism  to  modify  and  evolve  systems  over  time  as  the 
understanding of both user and designer  grows  and as requirements and technology 
evolve. 
 
In his paper, Hobday (1998) analyses the complexity of this activity especially in large 
and advanced projects where a large number of stakeholders are involved. One of the 
main  problems  is  that  the  development  of  these  systems  requires  coordination  and 
collaboration based on non-market mechanisms to success. It requires multi-firm ex-
ante  agreements  on  complex  technological  tasks,  throughout  the  stages  of  design, 
development  and  manufacture.  The  coordination  process  requires  mechanism  for 
communicating design and architectural knowledge and for dealing with feedback from 
users and other stakeholders since small changes in one part of the system can lead to 
large changes in others. The quantity and complexity of alternative system architectures 
pose  significant  coordination  problems  for  suppliers,  especially  when  the  different 
stakeholders  have  to  agree  ex-ante  on  the  path  of  innovation  such  as  regulators 
imposing the use of certain standards. Presumably, the larger the number of tailored 
components and subsystems, the more difficult the architectural choices will tend to be. 
In  this  environment,  focusing  devices  are  needed  to  cope  with  the  combinatorial 
explosion,  i.e.  the  large  number  of  alternative  design  paths  for  firms  to  make  any 
realistic  estimate  of  how  to  proceed.  In  the  development  of  complex  products  the 
problem of narrowing the design choice can be daunting, especially under conditions of 
rapid  technological  change,  unclear  user  requirements  and  multiple  customised 
components.  The  organisational  and  managerial  complexity  of  these  projects  favour WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  136 
large  companies  that  profit  of  the  synergies  of  developing  similar  projects  and  the 
accumulated knowledge to master these processes and their risks. 
 
Leader innovators, defensive innovators and imitators 
 
Innovation in the security market means that the survival and  growth of companies 
depend upon their capacity to adapt to the rapidly changing external environment or to 
change it. Within these limits, the firm has a range of options and alternative strategies. 
It  can  use  its  resources  and  scientific  and  technical  skills  in  a  variety  of  different 
combinations.  It  can  give  greater  or  lesser  weight  to  short-term  or  long-term 
considerations. It can form alliances of various kinds. It can license innovations made 
elsewhere.  It  can  attempt  market  and  technological  forecasting.  It  can  attempt  to 
develop a variety of new products and processes on its own. It can modify science and 
technology to a small extent, but it cannot predict accurately the outcome of its own 
innovative efforts on those of its competitors, so that the hazards and risks which it 
faces  if  it  attempts  any  major  change  are  very  great.  Freeman  (1986:  chapter  8) 
distinguishes  three  sort  of  strategies  related  to  innovation:  leader,  defensive,  and 
imitators. 
 
A firm wishing to be ahead in the introduction of a new product or process must have a 
very strong problem-solving capacity in designing, building and testing prototypes and 
production plants. The innovating firm may have to bear the brunt of this educational 
and training effort (still the new knowledge not socialized). In these firms the generation 
and processing of information occupy a high proportion of the labour force, but these 
activities are the life-blood of the offensive innovative firm. 
 
First movers may enjoy of important advantages when the product succeeds, especially 
if imitators cannot regain easily and quickly market share. Strategic behaviour of first 
movers will focus on slowing down and delaying the diffusion of its technology through 
appropriate patenting and other protective measures. A more clever conduct may be the 
licensing  of  the  owned  technology  to  third  parties,  increasing  the  chance  that  the 
product becomes an industrial standard when network effects are relevant. The large 
security investment in the United States makes that first movers often come from this 
country. 
 
The defensive innovator does not wish to be the first, but neither does she or he wish to 
be left behind by the tide of technological change. He may not wish to incur the heavy 
risks of being the first to innovate and may imagine that he can profit from mistakes of 
early innovators and from their opening up of the market. Defensive R&D is probably 
typical of most oligopolistic markets and is closely linked to product differentiation. For 
the oligopolistic, defensive R&D is a form of insurance enabling the firm to react and 
adapt to the technical changes introduced by competitors. The defensive innovator must 
be capable at least of catching up with the game, if not of leap-frogging. The defensive 
innovator can wait until it sees how the market is going to develop and what mistakes 
the pioneer make (e.g.  profiting of opportunities of improving design  or production 
techniques), but they dare not to wait too long or they may miss the boat altogether. 
This innovation strategy has been particularly characteristic of European security firms 
in many market segments, but not in all as for example smart cards. 
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The third conduct is imitative and dependant strategies, in which companies are content 
to follow way behind the leaders in established technologies, often a long way behind. 
At  least,  they  would  like  to  differentiate  their  products  by  minor  technical 
improvements. Imitators may enjoy advantages in managerial efficiency and in much 
lower overhead costs, arising from the fact that they do not need to spend heavily on 
R&D, patents, training, and technical services, which loom so large for the innovation 
firm. Unless the imitators enjoy significant market protection or privilege they must rely 
on lower unit costs of production to make headway. Production engineering and design 
are  two  technical  functions  in  which  the  imitators  must  be  strong.  This  pattern  of 
conduct  is  seen  in  many  foreign  suppliers  of  security  equipment  and  components 
coming from Eastern Asia (Frost & Sullivan, 2006a:5-31 and 2004:7-41). 
 
Incentives and restraints to invest in R&D 
 
Market  conduct  on  R&D  depends  on  incentives  that  industry  finds  for  expending 
resources in this activity that are basically driven by expected benefits. Hence if this 
activity is expensive and uncertain, market demand is low, and the innovation is not 
applicable  in  other  economic  sectors  innovative  products  and  services  will  slowly 
unfold. Investment in R&D is also related to market structure being some empirical 
support that there is greater investment in more concentrated industries. This may be 
due to advantages of large size, a large market share, less chance than competitors will 
appropriate the revenue that flows from successful innovation
198, or some market power 
because in all these cases the chance of earning large profits will become an incentive to 
finance risky R&D programs (Martin, 1993:381)
199. This issue will be analysed in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
 
Marketing and advertising 
 
Marketing  and  advertising  convey  information  on  product  quality  or  performance 
reducing search cost of consumers and helping them to make better choices. They stifle 
product  differentiation  associated  with  a  lack  of  information  and  encourage  the 
production  of  high  quality  goods.  By  so  doing,  they  foster  competition  and  market 
efficiency  (Tirole,  1988:108).  However,  these  activities  may  also  enclose  strategic 
behaviour when they are aimed at artificially increasing product differentiation, create 
market power and deter entry or induce exit of competitors. In sum, impact of these 




Advertising is a method of differentiating, in the eyes of the consumer, the products of 
one  firm  from  those  of  competitors.  It  is  a  method  of  reducing  the  scope  and 
effectiveness of price-competition by attaching a strong element of goodwill to each 
firm (Martin, 1993:136). Advertising may be used to deter entry if for some reason it is 
less effective or more costly for an entrant than an incumbent. Higher costs for the 
                                                 
198 Patents and IPR rights may help to solve this problem, because they may provide some monopolistic 
power to leading firms. This explains the insistence of organizations like EOS (2009:24) on this issue. 
On the limitation of this method see footnote 184. 
199 This corresponds to the Schumpeterian view that society ought to be willing to accept static market 
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entrant  than  for  the  incumbent,  creates  the  possibility  of  limit  pricing  and  entry 
deterrence (ibid.:141). 
 
Advertising in the security industry does not play a central role as other markets where 
sales campaigns based on television, radio or press are essential due to the sensitivity of 
demand to advertising and little product diversity. This advertising aims for making the 
consumer familiar with the brand name
200. Only the advertising of security products for 
individual or residential markets may play a more prominent role (e.g. Securitas Direct). 
In  general,  security  goods  and  services  are  search  goods,  i.e.  goods  whose 
characteristics  can  be  explicitly  described,  and  hence  customers  are  less  swayed  by 
advertising. In particular, large companies and the Public Administration usually have a 
good knowledge of products and services endowed with high levels of technological 
competence. Customers will value also other attributes like market share or installed 
base; reputation of product quality, and past performance in the provision of security 
solutions. 
 
Advertising is mainly made by means of promotional brochures, web pages, specialized 
magazines and tradeshows; and for sophisticated equipment presenting scientific results 
in congresses as a mean to increase reputation. In sum, advertising in this sector is 
moderately used and is more oriented to inform customers. Hence the resource waste 




Small industrial and residential markets also demand selling activities to convince the 
customer of the goodness of a proposal
201. These activities tend to increase for large 
purchases where the security solution will be tailored to user needs. Pre-sales activities, 
before  a  request  for  proposal  is  issued,  as  well  as  the  elaboration  of  impeccable 
proposals may be essential to demonstrate that the bidder is able to produce what the 
customer needs and attain the best value for money. It requires specialised departments 




202 as a special kind of marketing 
 
Government action needs enough knowledge and information to make sound decisions 
to increase security of citizens, from establishing new regulations to selecting the best 
alternative to solve a security need. When such action generates appropriable rents, it 
can be expected a wasteful industry allocation of resources to supply information to 
influence the government outcome (Spulber, 1989:82). In the limit, competition will 
drive  information  production  to  the  point  where  private  expenditures  equal  publicly 
created rents (ibid.:83). Since firms will not account the negative externality of this 
behaviour on other firms, investment in this activity may be excessive from the social 
point of view. 
 
                                                 
200 The advertiser does not convey information, but seeks to establish, by repetition a brand identity. 
201 Free trials and money-back guarantees may be examples of this kind of strategies. 
202 This term can be defined as ‘the expenditure of scarce resources to capture an artificially created 
transfer’ (Spulber, 1989:82). WORKING PAPER 43 
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When  government  has  knowledge  shortfalls,  industry  may  behave  strategically  and 
provide  biased  information  with  a  negative  effect  on  market  through  the  wasteful 
misallocation of resources in developing non-optimal solutions
203 that do not enhance 
security, this becoming a source of poor market performance. 
 
The  industry  interest  in  increasing  revenues  and  profits  may  work  together  with 
bureaucracy maximizing interests to promote security programmes whose utility may be 
questionable when compared with other societal needs.  It is a well proven fact that 
bureaucracies  aim  to  maximize  their  budget  as  a  way  to  increase  their  power  and 
influence.  In  their  analysis,  they  may  easily  depart  from  reality,  overestimating  the 
benefits and underestimating the cost of their preferred policies. In these cases, cost 
considerations or informed prudence may not play the due role in the decision process, 
whereas  biased  threat  and  consequences  assessments  –where  dangers  may  be 
exaggerated  and  fears  exacerbated–,  groundless  technology  capability  to  get  rid  of 
insecurity, and undervalued costs and risks of developing and deploying the foreseen 
solution may play the main role. Such conduct may be more common than expected as 
can  be  seen  in  many  failed  pilot  projects  described  in  chapter  IV  as  for  example 
biometric solutions, Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysers or RFID tagging systems. 
 
Such behaviour may find a strong ally in the social groups economically involved in 
security production since large expenditures mean more activity, more income, large 
facilities,  more  employees,  and  more  profits.  As  a  result,  a  budget-maximizing 
bureaucracy  would  be  inefficient,  allocating  excessive  resources  to  security  and 
providing too large output. These social groups may thereby benefit at the expense of 
the whole community. 
 
The  industry  may  underpin  this  behaviour  when  it  provides  pseudo-rationalistic 
methods  instead  of  objective  assessment  with  the  aim  to  influence  in  the  resource 
allocation decision (Freeman, 1986:190). The problem is that technological fashions 
and preferences of industrial designers could capture bureaucrats will over society and 
citizens wishes. These methods may succeed in building preferences in an environment 
of bounded rationality and asymmetric information where not all information is known 
or  taken  into  account  by  the  decision  maker.  If  the  industry  is  able  to  produce 
persuasive  information  or  convincing  testimony  that  is  not  balanced  with  the 
competitive supply of information by individuals of opposing views, there could be a 
chance of an inadequate decision making with an adverse impact for the whole society 
(Spulber,  1989:85)
204.  Only  the  political  mechanism  –through  adequate  publicity, 
transparency  and  (parliamentary)  debate  where  countervailing  views  and  arguments 
may be pondered about facts, values and uncertainties–, is able to reach consensus and 
restore the citizen sovereignty which the market mechanism can no longer assure. Only 
in  such  case,  it  can  be  assured,  without  serious  doubt,  that  government  decisions 
                                                 
203 Steward and Mueller (2009) and Mueller (2009) papers present examples of non-optimal security 
investments where costs are not commensurate with benefits. 
204 The  report  of  the  Group  of Personalities  (2004)  that  requested  an  annual  EU  budget  on  security 
research of €1 billion to equate USA estimated expenditure may be a paradigmatic example. White 
paper  of  associations  can  be  a  vehicle  to  provide  this  testimony,  as  for  example  the  European 
Organisation  of  Security  (EOS)  document  Priorities  for  a  future  European  Security  Framework 
(2009). On the large influence of industry in setting the agenda of the European Security Research 
Program see Hayes (2009). WORKING PAPER 43 
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Bundling, i.e. the sale of two or more products together is a method to increase brand 
fidelity. This practice is used in the security market as for example a stand-alone DVR 
integrated with a monitor for video surveillance; or the embedding of security software 
in new PC like Symantec, or McAfee (IDC, 2009:34). However, bundling in security is 
usually associated with some sort of integration between the different products, where 
end-users benefit from higher performance and better price. This trend is reinforced by 
the appeal of buyers that want the convenience of one firm taking full responsibility of 
the security solution (one stop shop) since it reduces the transaction cost of purchasers 
in terms of supervising just one contractor. This appeal is very common as for example 
the area of buildings’ security where the access control, the fire system, the intrusion 
detection, and other monitoring systems are integrated to offer an effective and seamless 
solution to the end user. Such a bundling mainly favours system integrators and value 
added resellers. 
 
Bundling  has  important  strategic  effects  and  may  allow  a  firm  to  use  the  leverage 
provided by its power in one market to foreclose another market (Tirole, 1988:335). 
Bundling may allow cross-subsidization between different products and services as a 
market strategy. This may be a common case in the security market when contracts 
include the supply of a system together with the provision of operation and maintenance 
services
206.  For  instance,  home  alarm  equipment  may  be  offered  for  a  low  price  or 
leased, when a long term remote surveillance service contract is signed (see EU merger 
4986). 
 
Unbundling trends may however emerge as industry evolves and matures. The increase 
of the market size and the development of standardised products that share a common 
interface  (e.g.  IP-based  cameras  and  sensors)  may  allow  sophisticated  end  users  to 





Many transactions in the security market are complex operations which involve large 
duration contracts. The conduct of industry in the execution of these contracts is another 
area with impact on market performance. This is because contracts are incomplete and 
hard to enforce. This raises a variation of the classic moral hazard economic problem, 
known as the principal-agent where one party, called the agent (the industry) acts on 
behalf of another party called the principal (the purchaser). In this context the agent has 
more (private) information about his or her actions or intentions that the principal does, 
because the principal cannot perfectly monitor the agent (plans, milestones, review and 
audits imperfectly monitoring agent conduct). In such a case, the agent may have an 
incentive to behave opportunistically (i.e. seeking self-interest through manipulation of 
                                                 
205 However,  the  creation  of  citizen’s  groups  able  to  wield  countervailing  views  may  be 
disproportionately expensive in comparison with industrial groups (Tisdell and Hartley, 2008:117). 
206 Rivals would then have to set up their own service department to come into the market increasing the 
cost of entry and expansion. WORKING PAPER 43 
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information or misrepresentation of intentions) not fully honouring the contract (Martin, 
1993:212). 
 
Service contracts are certainly subject to this problem
207, but this negative behaviour 
may unfold in the development of systems where the system is defined on paper, prices 
are estimated on budgets and uncertainty regarding the desired outcome is high
208. In 
such a case, the allocation of technical and financial resources may misfire and may 
result in overcosts, delays, underperformance and even complete failure. Three main 
types of contracts are used in order to manage (and balance) risk between the purchaser 
and the supplier: fixed price, a target cost fee incentive; or cost plus contract. The first 
and second case implies a tough budget constraint since the company will have to pay 
from  its  own  funds  the  extra  cost  of  the  project.  The  supplier  will  only  take  these 
contracts after attaching a risk premium to the price (Williamson, 1971). Moreover, they 
may have a negative impact on the quality of the outcome. The last one implies a soft 
budget constraint since the company will be paid whatever the project costs. In this case 
the industry will afford greater operational flexibility, especially for the introduction of 
design changes that may be quite useful when the end product is poorly defined, yet the 
incentive to be efficient may be compromised and the project may easily derail into a 
limbo  of  never  quite  completed  objectives  and  cost  overruns  (Markowski  and  Hall, 
1998:21).  These  problems  seem  to  be  rather  common  as  the  recent  report  of  GAO 
(2010) about the DHS shows. Evidence in Europe is scarcer, but the delays and overcost 
of the Galileo program may be a good paradigm. 
 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
Market  restructuring  is  often  made  through  mergers  and  acquisitions  of  companies. 
According to Schwartz (1984) firm’s desire to merge is a consequence of managers’ 
growth maximizing behaviour tempered by life-cycle effects (firm age, technology age, 
patent / sales ratio) and constrained by cost of capital or cash flow availability. Yet, 
other  factors  as  rationalisation,  economies  of  scale,  market  expansion,  and  profit 
increase may play a role. According to Frost & Sullivan (2008: 51) these concentrations 
may  help  to:  (a)  access  to  geographic  regions  and  countries  through  local/regional 
companies with a strong brand recognition, (b) access to innovative technologies that 
complete  the  product  portfolio
209,  (c)  access  to  key  end-user  sectors  and  get  the 
knowledge to compete in that space. Other important reason could be the acquisition of 
a  key  supplier  within  the  value  chain.  But,  probably  the  main  rational  of  these 
operations is their capability to easily surpass the entry (and sometimes the exit) barriers 
of a new market, that would be inevitably associated to large and uncertain investments, 
by means of purchasing a company already operating in the market. 
                                                 
207 This could  have been  the case of 9/11  where  hijackers  were able  to smuggle aboard box-cutters 
because security companies could have unnoticeable degraded the quality of their service to be more 
competitive (see page 85 of the 9/11 Commission Report). The Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act 107-71 Nov. 19, 2001 tried to amend this situation based on federal government screeners and a 
new programme to qualify private screeners. It also set a security fee on passengers between $2.50 
and $5.00. 
208 Since budgets are usually based on a cost plus a fee, companies are more interested in raising budgets 
rather than seeking cheaper but riskier alternatives as for example those often available from SMEs. 
209 Start-up companies are strong in technology but poor in marketing and installed based. They are 
attractive to a large corporation since the latter are weak in new technology, but strong in the other 
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Successful  M&As  are  socially  beneficial  when  the  new  company  becomes  more 
efficient, but if competition weakens too, it is unlikely that those benefits will be passed 
on to consumers in the form of lower prices. This explains that industrial concentrations 
are  subject  to  the  scrutiny  of  national  competition  authorities  to  assess  if  they  may 
create dominant positions that may significantly impede effective competition. This role 
is performed by the EU Commission when the concentration has a European dimension. 
 
The following table shows some of the main M&As in the security market in the last 
decade. The last column of the table points out if the operation was deemed of European 
dimension. Despite efforts to identify the most relevants, the list cannot be considered 
exhaustive. Large incumbents such as GE, Honeywell, Siemens, Tyco, UTC and Bosch, 
have been very active acquiring small and mid-sized players with a good foothold in 
local markets, or with attractive products. This kind of vertical M&As predominates in 
comparison with horizontal operations. 
 
Acquirer  Ctry  Company  Ctry  Year  Price  Comment  EU 
TYCO  USA  ADT  USA  1997      M.915 
Honeywell  USA  Pittway  USA  1999  $2.100  Includes Ademco.   
ADT Security 
Services Inc. 
USA  Cambridge 
protection 
industries 





USA  Sensormatic 
Electronics Corp. 










UK  Heimann Gmbh  GE  2002  £237   X-ray detection.   
Bosch Security  GE  Philips CSI  NL  2002    Communication, 
Security  and 
Imaging. 
 
OSI Systems    Ancore Corp.  USA  2002  $14.44  Cargo  container 
scanners. 
 
UTC  USA  Chubb  UK  2003  $1,018  UTC  Fire  & 
Security. 
 
Honeywell  USA  Ultrak  USA  2003    CCTV business.   
Schneider 
Electric 
USA  TAC  SW  2003    Building  automation 
including security. 
 
Group 4 Falck   DK  Securicor, plc.  UK  2004    Guarding services.  M.3396 
Bosch Security  GE  VCS  Video 
Communication 
Security AG 
GE  2004    IP cameras.   
Cross Match 
Technologies 
USA  Smith  Heimman 
Biometrics Gmbh 
GE  2005       
EADS  EU  Nokia PMR  FI  2005    Professional  Mobile 
Radio. 
M.3803 
Gemplus  FR  Setec Oy  FI  2005  €49  Electronic 
credentials. 
 
Halma  UK  Texecom ltd.  UK  2005  £26  Security  sensors  and 
alarms. 
 
Honeywell  USA  Novar, plc  USA  2005    Intelligent  building 
systems. 
M.3686 






GE  Bewator  SW  2005    Access  control  and 
CCTV business 
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Technologies 
UTC  USA  Kidde, plc.  UK  2005  $3,000  Kidde  owned 
Guardall 
Integrated  with 
Chubb. 
M.3688 
UTC  USA  Lenel  Systems 
Int. Inc. 
USA  2005  $400  Security systems and 
software developer. 
 
GE Security  USA  VisioWave  SW  2005    Digital  video 
cameras  and  video 
content analysis. 
 
Sagem  FR  Orga-Gunther 
group 
GE  2005    Smart cards.   
Oberthur Card  FR  Set Card  SP  2006    Secure cards.   
Alive Tech. 
Inc. 
USA  Geometrix  USA  2006    3D face recognition.   
ADI Global 
Distribution 
UK  Gardiner Groupe  FR  2006    ADI  is  a  global 
distributor  of 





USA  C-VIS  GE  2006    Face Recognition   
Extreme 
CCTV 
CA  Forward  Vision 
CCTV 
UK  2006    Intelligent  PTZ 
cameras. 
 










GE  GET Group  BE  2006    Access control.   
HID Global 
(Assa Abloy) 
USA  Fargo 
Electronics, Inc. 
USA  2006  $337   Identity  card 
issuance systems. 
 
Bosch  USA  Telex 
Communications 
USA  2006  $420  Communication 
equipment. 
M.1840 
HID Global  USA  Integrated 
Engineering 
NL  2007    Access  control. 





GE  Extreme CCTV  CA  2007  C$93  Surveillance Systems   
UTC  USA  Initial ESG  UK  2007    Security  and  Fire 










USA  Activeye  USA  2007    Video  analytics 
software. 
 
EQT V Ltd  INT  Securitas Direct  SW  2008    Security services.  M.4986 
EADS  EU  Plant CML  USA  2008    Emergency  and 






USA  Cieffe, S.p.A.  IT  2008  €14  IP video surveillance 
solutions. 
 
Symantec  USA  MessageLabs  UK  2008    Messaging  and  web 
security services. 
 
Sophos  UK  Utimaco  GE  2008  €214  Security  and 
encryption. 
 
BAE  UK  Detica  UK  2008  $1,100  ICT Security   
ASSA ABLOY  SW  Simon Voss  GE  2008    Wireless  electronic 
locking  and  access 
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USA  AV  Digital 
Audio  Video-
technik GmbH 
AU  2008    Public  address  and 
notification  sound 
systems. 
 
G4S  UK/DK  Touchcom  USA  2008  $33  Installation  and 
maintenance  of  web 





USA  Labcal  CA  2008    Mobile  and  wireless 
biometric  solutions 
for identification and 
authentication. 
 
Authentec  USA  Atrua 
Technologies 
USA  2009  $4.9  Fingerprint sensors.   
SAFRAN USA  USA  General  Electric 
Homeland 
protection 
USA  2009  $580   Creation  of  Morpho 




UTC  USA  GE Security  USA  2010  $1,800  Security  systems  for 





FR  L-1  Identity 
Solutions 
USA  2010    Biometrics.   
3 M  USA  Cogent Inc.  USA  2010  $943  Biometrics.   
Table 21. Main mergers and acquisition in the security market since 2001. 
Price in millions. 
 
This table shows the more relevant mergers  and acquisitions in the security market 
occurred in the last decade. It has been compiled across the study and confirmed on the 
internet. As can be seen from the table, there are a considerable number of mergers, 
being its number close to the defence market in the same period (Marti, 2009). This is a 
signal that the security market is becoming more European and international. 
 
RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This  chapter  has  analysed  the  conduct  of  market  agents  with  special  emphasis  on 
industry  stakeholders  and  the  identification  of  those  behaviours  that  may  have  an 
adverse impact on market performance through rivals exclusion, weakened competition, 
and reduced efficiency. 
 
Competition plays a relevant role to assure a good allocation of resources. Collusive 
practices do not easily success and few cases are foreseen where there could be a real 
risk of this practice. Some kind of predatory practices may appear in large projects 
financed  by  the  Administration.  Standards  and  innovation  can  be  another  form  to 
exclude  rivals  from  the  market.  Finally,  vertical  restraints  could  not  always  be 
associated with an increase in market efficiency. 
 
Industry may prefer to reduce chances of rivals using different product strategies, being 
the main research, development and innovation. Whereas R&D may be beneficial to the 
end customer –in terms of better performance– and the firm –in terms of increased 
profits–, high uncertainty, large sunken costs, and low expected profits due to the small 
market size may discourage efforts in this activity. This may require the helping hand of 
government. 
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Leadership, defensive innovation and imitation are three clearly discernible behaviours 
of companies in this field. If they wish to survive despite all their uncertainties about 
innovation, most firms shall be on an innovative treadmill. They may not wish to be 
offensive  innovators,  but  they  can  often  scarcely  avoid  being  defensive  or  imitative 
innovators (Freeman, 1986: 170). 
 
Industry conduct on advertising seems to have a positive effect on market performance 
due to better informed customers. Marketing practices, especially excessive lobbying 
may, however, have a negative effect in terms of wasted resources and leverage in the 
choice of non-optimal solutions from the societal point of view. 
 
Bundling is another practice which often raises entry conditions. Some sort of bundling 
that combines security products and services have been found during the survey. Its 
main effect is to raise entry conditions to new companies. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions and concurrent divestment are common place in the security 
industry.  These  operations  facilitate  market  restructuring  and  reconfiguration  which 
may  result  in  increased  efficiency.  However,  due  to  their  potential  impact  on 
competition they are strictly regulated by the EU and member states. New entrants in 
this  market  however  seem  fewer,  and  often  industrial  facilities  merely  change  of 
company name. WORKING PAPER 43 
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VIII. INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE 
 
This chapter tries to assess the performance of the security market, evaluating to what 
extent the industry is able to provide innovative and highly valued security products and 
services in an efficient way (i.e. at lowest cost that the state of the art allows), while 
adequately remunerating their shareholders. In some sense, market performance is the 
ultimate arbiter on how well market forces are doing. While cases in which performance 
may be impaired by basic conditions and the structure and conduct of the market have 
been given in previous chapters, we will try here to analyse this question in more depth. 
 
Market  performance  has  many  dimensions.  We  will  focus  on  three  aspects  namely 
allocative  efficiency,  productive  efficiency  and  dynamic  efficiency.  We  will  discuss 
specific questions related to the security market, not addressing more general questions 
on  market  performance  of  the  whole  European  industry,  as  could  be  the  case  of 
rigidities in the labour market. Assessment nonetheless is not easy. Whereas enough 
information is available to make a qualitative assessment, quantitative assessment is 




Allocative efficiency measures the extent to which resources are properly allocated to 
satisfy the market demand –i.e. the needs of society in terms of products and services– 
spending the lowest amount of resources being no alternative arrangement that could 
make better off this provision. 
 
This problem can be split into two. On the one hand, it should assess if society demands 
the right products and services in the right quantity to increase its security. On the other 
hand, it has to analyse if industry is allocating efficiently their resources to provide the 
requested  products  and  services  at  the  best  value  for  money.  In  the  first  case,  an 
improper  choice  may  discard  other  arrangements  to  safeguard  society  of  potential 
threats with higher pay off. This is an important question that has been analysed in 
detail in chapter  III. As we have seen there,  conditions of bounded  rationality may 
hamper the decision process resulting in a non-optimal choice. In chapter VII we have 
seen also that industry may have a non-positive influence in the decision process. In this 
chapter, we will only address the second case. 
 
Proper allocation of resources in the industry is hampered by many reasons. Monitoring 
by supervisors is imperfect, supervisors have some discretion in the way they carry out 
their jobs, and because work involves disutility, employees will engage in slack and not 
carry  out  their  jobs  with  due  efficiency.  They  will  not  minimize  costs.  The  more 
competitive the market environment, however, the greater the pressure on employees up 
and down the firm hierarchy to minimize cost (Martin, 1993:227). Such fact explains 
the general thought that social welfare goes up as the number of competing firms grows 
(ibid.:229). 
 
Since incentives to allocate resources efficiently come mainly from competitive markets 
where entry conditions are not particularly costly, the evaluation of allocative efficiency 
focuses mainly in analysing market concentration and entry barriers that may negatively 
impact on competition, create market power and allow industry to unjustifiably increase WORKING PAPER 43 
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prices above marginal cost (monopolistic pricing) providing a premium that is costly 
and a kind of resource waste from the social point of view in terms of less output and 
higher prices (also known as deadweight loss). Such market power is also questionable 
since it impedes an equitable distribution of market benefits across society. Resources 
devoted to create or preserve this market power may be seen as a source of inefficiency 
insofar these resources have alternative use in producing more goods and services at a 
smaller price. 
 
Looking at the structure of the security market, as has been seen, few monopolies can be 
observed in the supply chain. Competitors are often few (oligopoly) in market segments 
where economies of scales are relevant. However, these firms do not cover the whole 
market and frequently a considerable number of medium size companies and still a 
large number of small companies operate in the fringe. Whereas such concentration may 
help to achieve a dominant position, where higher prices and some deadweight loss may 
incubate,  in  a  market  essentially  driven  by  technological  progress,  incumbent  firms 
must engage in intense rivalry (e.g. Smiths Detection, GE, L-3 in CT scanners) to keep 
pace with progress and not lose market share. The result is that performance is much 
closer to the competitive market than examination of number of firms and concentration 
ratios alone would suggest (Martin, 1994:132). Conversely, such market concentration 
may  be  more  worrying  in  markets  where  innovation  is  low,  product  or  services 
differences play a marginal role and there are some entry barriers, because the risk of 
collusion may be higher. Security services firms could approach to this situation, yet 
more research is needed to assess if there is a real chance for this practice. 
 
The concentration level is also high in the market segments of suppliers of governments 
and  large  organisations.  This  case  is  also  of  concern  since  there  may  be  very  few 
companies  (or  even  a  single  one)  able  to  present  a  proposal.  Even  being  few,  the 
selection of the optimal proposal may be compromised since solutions are so different 
that comparisons are not easily made. In addition, because acquisitions are based on 
system requirements, the system performance, cost, and development risks can only be 
forecasted.  In  this  situation,  buyers  may  be  at  disadvantage  in  relation  to  suppliers, 
because  they  may  lack  of  enough  information  to  make  a  proper  choice.  This 
environment adds further uncertainty to the optimality of the final choice. The situation 
of bilateral monopoly after the awarding and the large substitution cost may favour 
some  market  power  of  the  supplier.  Incomplete  contracts,  adverse  selection,  and 
principal-agent problems may negatively impact on allocative efficiency. Yet the high 
transaction costs associated, as the imposition of penalties to suppliers by governments, 
when they do not observe contractual clauses, limit a better allocation. 
 
Collusive practices between bidders in high-end markets however have little chance to 
unfold for the reasons that we have mentioned in chapter VII. Only consortia may be a 
method to avoid competition and share the benefits of awarding across members with an 
agreed  distribution.  Yet,  this  kind  of  agreements  are  only  allowed  under  the  strict 
conditions stated in article 101 (3) of TFEU. 
 
Resource allocation and excess capacity 
 
The  capability  to  respond  to  a  security  incident  requires  many  times  some  kind  of 
excess  production  capacity.  For  example,  contracts  can  be  signed  with  drug-
manufacturers for assured access to the necessary quantities within a certain timeframe, WORKING PAPER 43 
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instead of a large and less efficient stockpiling. However, as long as the industry has to 
invest in infrastructure to deliver the required quantities within the needed timeframe, 
that it is not routinely used, a misallocation of resources from the economic point of 
view appears that may negatively impact on the industry performance as an overhead 
cost (NRC, 2002:99). On this basis, the demand for such capability might be so remote 





The assessment of productive efficiency tries to answer to the following question: are 
goods or services provided at the lowest average cost? Productive efficiency is mostly 
related with industry size. The average cost curve of many security goods and services 
in relation to the units produced tends to have a U-shaped form, where cost decrease –
due to economies of scale, scope and learning– until it reaches the minimum efficiency 
scale or MES and then starts to grow since diseconomies of scale (e.g. management) 
begin to unfold. The question is to assess if companies are operating too short (or too 
far) from MES. Concentration may be desirable to reach a higher productive efficiency 
when competition is not significantly impeded. Even (natural) monopolies or duopolies 
may be preferred when economies of scale are so high that a market with more than one 
or two companies will be too inefficient such as for example the satellite market. 
 
At first sight, the structure of the industry is often organised to meet this productive 
efficiency.  This  is  the  case  of  massive  equipment  suppliers  as  for  example  CCTV 
manufacturers  like  Panasonic  or  Sony;  or  security  components  suppliers  such  as 
Honeywell or Bosch which have a large size and market share. Small size companies, 
conversely, are more frequent when these economies are smaller and other factors have 
stronger influence on efficiency. The lower size and concentration of this industry in 
comparison with defence may be due probably to a considerable lower value of the 
minimum efficiency scale cause by a smaller cost of developing products. 
 
The  reduced  demand  of  security  equipment,  however,  set  limits  to  productive 
efficiency, because the demand is too short to achieve the scale where production costs 
are minimised. This is the case of some market segments such as cargo and baggage 
inspection equipment. 
 
A detailed assessment of the adequacy of industry size is an interesting exercise that 
should  be  made  to  identify  if  current  market  structure  is  negatively  impacting  on 
productive  efficiency,  as  seems  to  be  the  case  of  small  suppliers  in  the  residential 
market. Yet, this is a complex task that requires a more in-depth analysis. 
 
DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OR RATE OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
 
The third question to evaluate is dynamic efficiency, i.e. the capability of the industry to 
exploit new technologies, develop new products, or improve production processes that 
drive  ahead  quality,  innovation  and  timeliness  as  well  as  drive  down  prices.  Such 
efficiency strikes at the very foundation of profits and output, rather than their marginal 
improvement.  A  highly  dynamic  market  is  always  desirable,  and  may  be  especially 
necessary to counter the innovative capability of terrorism and organised crime. 
 WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  149 
There is a wide debate on the literature about the efficiency of large and small firms in 
the invention and innovation process. Freeman (1986:137) argues that small firms may 
have some comparative advantage in the earlier stages of inventive work and the less 
expensive, but more radical innovations
210. Small firms tend also to be more flexible to 
find and exploit research results and putting innovation into use. But large firms have 
an  advantage  in  the  later  stages  and  in  the  improvement  and  scaling  up  of  early 
breakthroughs. 
 
According to Martin (1994:368) large firms may enjoy advantages due to economies of 
scale in the R&D processes, because the R&D output rises more than proportionately 
with size. In the end, this is a question about the production function for knowledge. 
Large firms can undertake costly and time consuming developments which are beyond 
the  resources  of  a  small  firm
211.  They  enjoy  advantages  where  large  numbers  of 
different specialists are needed to solve a problem or expensive instrumentation and 
sophisticated equipment is essential. Large firms also have a comparative advantage 
where there are several possible alternative routes to success, with uncertainty attached 
to all of them, but benefit for the simultaneous pursuit of several (Freeman, 1986:138). 
In addition, large firms are best prepared to support inevitable R&D failures and delays 
until outcome becomes profitable. Firms with a large market share or large diversified 
firms will be more willing to invest in R&D because they will earn more profits due to 
large revenues or they will be more likely to apply a successful innovation in some of 
the markets in which they operate. 
 
As  a  conclusion,  it  can  be  said  that  both  kind  of  firms  have  advantages  in  the 
innovation race. The analysis made on the European security industry shows that many 
market innovations have been dealt by small companies as can be the development of 
IP cameras by Axis Communications. Successful innovative SMEs have been later on 
purchased by larger companies for subsequent innovation and market take over. Yet, 
large research projects (especially government financed) are geared by large companies 
either as a prime contractor or as a consortium leader. 
Box 8. Company size and innovative efficiency 
 
The role of incentives 
 
The evaluation of dynamic efficiency shall consider if the market, by itself, provides 
adequate incentives. Product or process innovations in general result in better or cheaper 
products  that  will  compete  more  successfully  with  rivals,  increasing  (or  not  losing) 
revenues, benefits and sometimes market share. Yet incentives will be mainly driven by 
the expected benefits that industry forecasts. This means that a short demand, large 
development complexity, large development time, and expensiveness of the innovation 
process will slow down technological progress. This is the case of the security market 
where uncertainties about the performance or the operational effectiveness of the new 
technology or product –especially when requirements are very strict as for example a 
low  false  alarm  rate–  combined  with  uncertainties  related  to  the  development  and 
                                                 
210 The search of drastic innovation of small firms and new entrants can be explained by the hope of these 
firms in acquiring a position on the top of the heap, whereas incumbents with a large market share 
may show excessive inertia trying to protect their past investments through marginal improvements in 
existing technology, when the threat of new products is not seen too high (Martin, 1994:366). 
211 The complexity of the innovation (measured in the absolute number of components of the system) is 
one factor which will limit the type of innovation which a small firm can afford (Hobday, 1998). WORKING PAPER 43 
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production costs will slow down dynamic efficiency, especially if demand is highly 
sensitive to price. This results in innovation barriers where returns are seen too risky or 
too  remote  in  time  for  being  financed  internally.  Even  with  a  moderate  level  of 
uncertainty, the security market may not be enough attractive if demand is weak, due for 
example to a fragmented market, to assure a certain level of profit and the product has 
no  application  in  other  markets.  Such  restraints  might  explain  the  sluggishness  of 
innovation in the security market in some areas. 
 
When incentives are weak, it can be said that there exists a failure in the innovation 
market (Tirole, 1988 and Arrow, 1962) since it is unable to allocate the appropriate 
resources to innovation. State intervention can break this impasse providing adequate 
incentives to achieve social optimum through the financing of industry or government 
led R&D projects; and subsequent procurement can simply act by providing assurance 
of  future  demand  for  the  embodied  innovation.  Large  government  contracts  of 
equipment are able to underwrite private financing and create industrial leaders quickly 
(IPTS, 2005:63). Experimental government projects, therefore, drive the first phase of 
many new technologies, a case that is also true in the security field as for example 
biometrics for national identity cards and passports, or secure containers. 
 
Distortive effects of State industrial support 
 
However, State intervention is not costless. It will involve the outlay of R&D aids as 
well as administrative costs of their management. Furthermore, it will have a potential 
distorting effect on competition that may have undesired effects on the market. Since 
amount  of  aids  are  bounded,  the  whole  industry  cannot  be  helped.  Only  some 
companies will be granted with aids, whereas others will not receive such aids. The 
advantages  provided  by  these  aids  to  beneficiaries  may  crowd  out  the  market  of 
competitors. This may be especially true in large projects where the financing of more 
than  one  project  is  impeded  due  to  the  amount  of  aid  required.  In  these  cases,  the 
likelihood of success of rivals will be significantly reduced or even disappear if research 
and development costs are too high to be privately financed. In this vein, excessive 
market concentration may be favoured. 
 
When market segments are under development, the learning curve drives down costs as 
a  function  of  experience.  Suppliers  which  benefit  from  government  contracts  that 
involve innovation have a higher chance in bidding for future contracts and reduce their 
costs in advance of open market competition. Being the first producer, economies of 
learning  by  doing,  will  help  to  improve  production  processes  and  become  efficient 
earlier that competitors preserving the initial advantage. The awarded company may 
take all the market, and obtain a monopolistic position, due to the advantages achieved 
during the early phases of a product life. Long-term contracts and sheer demand may 
perpetuate this monopolistic capture. Such competitive advantages may be exploited to 
sell  later  on  products,  based  on  the  knowledge  and  capabilities  acquired,  in  other 
countries or private markets. 
 
A final remark is that this support may induce firms to maximize subsidies, rather than 
become  more  efficient.  Methods  to  reduce  these  potential  distorting  effects  on  the 
market are commented in the next chapter. 
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with  no  counterpart  in  Europe  is  the  U.S.  Support  Anti-Terrorism  by  Fostering 
Effective Technologies (SAFETY) Act. This act passed in 2002 lowers the liability risk 
of manufacturers that provide security products and services designated as ‘Qualified 
Anti-terrorism Technologies’. The act aims to remove hesitant companies to market 
antiterrorism technologies because of two concerns: the cost of potentially devastating 
jury verdicts should the technologies fail, and the cost and scarcity of adequate liability 
insurance.  Around  200  companies  have  obtained  SAFETY  Act  certification. 
Certification  criteria  are  based  on  the  technical  capability  and  efficacy  of  the 
technology,  the  economic  effects  of  deployment  versus  non-deployment  and  the 
evaluation of insurance needs (Carafano, 2008). 
 
The Act is incentive for industry because it opens the door to less pervasive tests to 
verify that security products have enough quality and value. Hence, it helps to speed up 
technological progress since the time to market may be considerably shortened. Yet, 
the Act seems to be controversial, because it may help to unfold low value products 
that do not really increase overall security. 
Box 9. A U.S. method to promote market innovation 
 
Standards and network effects 
 
Standards, as has been seen at the end of chapter III, are essential to support innovation 
and  technological  progress.  Network  externalities  in  particular  are  only  achievable 
through the development of interoperability standards. The lack of coordination of the 
supply  side  to  produce  standards  may  delay  innovation  and  progress.  Solving  this 
market failure may require the intervention of the State. As we have seen European 
institutions are very active in the development of standards, yet as perceived by industry 
efforts seem to be insufficient. 
 
Standardization  facilitates  dynamic  performance  in  terms  of  improved  innovation, 
reducing unnecessary diversity, and enlarges production due to the benefits associated 
to network externalities. –the higher the usage by the society, the more popular the 
product becomes. Yet, there is a risk that such benefits are only captured by a small 
number  of  firms  capable  of  exercising  enormous  market  power  (Cave,  2005).  Such 
market power might impair, as we have seen, on allocative efficiency. 
 
The life cycle of technology 
 
The evolution of technology has a relevant influence on market structure, as can be seen 
by the accelerating rise and decline of high technology industries of which the security 
industry is not an exception. For this kind of industry, it is more interesting to use 
models of the evolution of industrial structure over time, from entry of the first firms 
early in the industry life cycle to exit as the industry winds down, rather than steady-
state  models  of  market  structure  applicable  to  more  traditional  economic  sectors. 
Abernathy  and  Utterback  (1975),  Freeman  (1986:  chapter  8),  Keppler  and  Graddy 
(1990), or Cave (2005), provide a framework with some nuances that may be applied to 
assess  the  dynamic  efficiency  of  the  security  industry.  They  distinguish  three  main 
stages or development phases. 
 
Phase 1. This is the initial exploration phase where advanced science, new technology 
and invention, realised through imaginative entrepreneurship, are applied to satisfy in a WORKING PAPER 43 
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new way and with superior performance customers needs. During this gestation phase 
there is a widespread uncertainty on user needs, relevant technologies and attributes of 
the new product. Users tend to play a major role in suggesting the need and the ultimate 
form of the innovation. Production is inchoate, unstandardized and based on manual 
operations or operations that rely upon general purpose equipment. Early adopters tend 
to be experimental, relatively risk neutral and a have a relative high-income (public 
sector, large companies). These factors combine to produce inelastic demand and high-
return of investment. The capital is scarce and under tight control (e.g. via exploratory 
procurement  arrangements,  or  business  angels)  and  there  is  a  small  number  of 
pioneering  firms,  often  of  small  size,  in  some  cases  spin-off  of  incumbent  firms. 
Pioneering  firms  benefit  of  two  positive  effects:  learning  by  doing  and  reputation 
effects. Learning by doing assures that the cumulative experience gained will be able to 
deliver solutions with higher functionality and performance and a better matching of 
user needs at lower average cost than subsequent entrants (if the delay to achieve such 
features is large, due for example to patents or difficulty to copy a technology, the 
industry  could  end  up  in  a  virtual  monopoly).  Reputation  will  be  the  result  of  a 
demonstrated track record and a large installed base. 
 
Phase 2. Over time, the initial uncertainties abate as dominant designs emerge (this 
depending on product complexity and variety on buyers’ preferences). The success of 
these designs will reward pioneering firms with exceptional sales growth and temporary 
monopoly profits displacing less efficient rivals (those with the highest costs and lowest 
quality). This will trigger a market growth phase during which a swarm of secondary 
innovators will attempt to enter attracted by the demand growth (this depending also on 
the easy of imitation). As a consequence demand will grow and become more stable and 
the customer base more diverse and larger. The practicalities of marketing, distribution, 
maintenance, advertising, etc. will favour the standardization of products. Availability 
of capital increases from mainstream venture capitalists, mergers, acquisitions, strategic 
alliances and so on
212. The band wagon effect is a vivid metaphor of this stage and it 
relates to a rapid diffusion process which occurs when it becomes evident that the basic 
innovations  can  generate  super-profits  and  may  destroy  outmoded  products  and 
industrial processes. 
 
Phase 3. The last stage is the consolidation, maturation or shake-out phase during which 
market  saturation,  the  approach  of  technical  advances  to  limits  (innovation  slowing 
down and becoming more incremental), and the competitive effects of swarming and 
changing cost of inputs, may all tend to reduce product price and profitability, and with 
them  the  attraction  of  future  investment.  During  this  phase  demand  becomes  more 
elastic and pressures shift to cost saving innovation in process technologies (i.e. the 
production tends to become elaborated and tightly integrated through automation and 
process control becoming industry more capital intensive) and to exploit economies of 
scale  in  order  to  raise  productive  efficiency.  The  production  volume  will  rise  and 
ultimately lead to business failures (companies able to accumulate more capacity able to 
charge a low price due to economies of scale and outplace rivals) and a concentration of 
the market to the mature phase where returns raise again. The process will continue 
until the number of companies levels off and market share stabilises
213. During this 
                                                 
212 Table 21 provides a confirmation in the case of digital video surveillance. 
213  Processes tend to be so  well integrated that changes becomes very costly, because even a  minor 
change may require changes in other elements of the process and in the product design. The benefits 
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phase capital is more likely to be raised through equity markets, with successful firms 
launching Initial Public Stock Offering (IPO). 
 
The life cycle of technology can be applied to understand the formation and evolution of 
some  security  market  segments,  understand  problems  in  the  different  phases  and 
eventually design measures to solve such problems. For example many home alarm and 
intrusion detections systems can be considered to be in the third stage with a stable and 
mature demand  as well as  firms in the market; fingerprint identification and  access 
control as well as digital CCTV, inspection equipment, PMR are more in the second 
phase  with  some  dominant  design  being  successfully  marketed  and  the  market 
experiencing a considerable demand growth and a swarm of imitators; finally biological 
agent detection systems, face recognition or command and control systems seems to be 
more in the initial stage where still dominant designs do not emerge, markets are small 




An  initial  assessment  on  dynamic  performance  would  suggest  that  innovation  is 
reasonable good in the security market in many market segments where new products 
often appear as a response to competition and buyers demand. Furthermore, the price 
fall of security equipment (e.g. passenger baggage scanning equipment) observed in 
different  documents  shows  that  technology  advances  in  terms  of  better  quality  and 
smaller prices are passed on to consumers. However, this assessment is too short of 
evidence and a more quantitative analysis is clearly needed. 
 
Incentives  for  a  good  dynamic  performance  have  been  analysed.  A  short  market 
demand, complex and risk research, IPR right not being well protected, government 
incentives  improperly  applied,  and  tipping  effects  –i.e.  the  tendency  for  the  market 
demand to shift toward a product that has gained a small initial lead drying up the 




A way to assess industry performance is to measure some indicators related to its health 
and competitiveness from the static and dynamic point of view. Candidate values can be 
market revenues (growth), firm value in the stock market
214, labour productivity (gross 
value  added),  profitability  (return  on  sales  or  return  on  equity),  export  sales  ratio 
(international success of EU security equipment), or import penetration (inability of the 
industry  to  provide  competitively  products  and  services).  R&D  expenditures  as  a 
fraction of revenues may indicate an industry committed to innovation, yet this value 
should be commensurated with the level of R&D success. Yet, not all these values are 
easy to collect. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(Abernathy  and  Utterback,  1975).  Hence  incumbents,  in  this  phase,  may  be  more  interested  in 
protecting these fixed capital investments and in delaying the introduction of new technologies. 
214 A growing value over standard index means an industry that is highly valued by investors due to its 
proven efficiency and promising future earnings. On the contrary, falling share prices, management 
and board changes, sales of unprofitable parts of the business and ultimately bankruptcy may suggests 
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As we have seen during the study we have identified a growing market in many market 
segments.  For  example  security  and  investigation  activities  had  an  average  annual 
growth during the period 2003-2008 of 6.8% (Eurostat, 2010). Labour productivity for 
security services can be obtained from Eurostat sbs_na_1a_se_r2 table. It was value at 
€23,000 in 2008. Labour productivity of the security equipment is not available, but a 
good  proxy  could  be  the  general  value  for  the  European  industry  which  is  around 
€55,000  in  2008  (Eurostat,  2010).  Eurostat  ebd_all  table  shows  that  wage  adjusted 
labour productivity in the machinery and equipment market, a market  very  close to 
security, productivity is around 140% in 2007 (129% in 2004). We have also seen that 
Europe is able to export its security equipment to many other countries, this indicating a 
competitive industry. However, we have also seen than Europe is also a net importer of 
security equipment, this indicating, in combination with a less technological advanced 
industry, that the European industry is not as competitive as market demands. 
 
The EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard database has been a good source to 
assess this industry in more detail. As can be seen in the 2008 database, many European 
industries  involved  in  the  security  market  are  in  the  top  50  R&D  investors  as  for 
example Robert Bosch, Siemens, EADS, ST Microelectronics, Infineon Technologies, 
Safran (Sagem), Thales. Other twelve companies involved in the security market are in 
the top 1000 list. Non-EU security companies are also large investors in security such as 
Panasonic, Sony, Cisco, Samsung, Motorola, General Electric, LG, or Honeywell. This 
may confirm the hypothesis of a market where R&D plays a large role. 
 
Based on this table, we have also calculated the average operating profit of the 1000 
industries and we have compared it with the average profit of the security industries. 
The  values  obtained,  however,  do  not  show  a  significant  difference  (6.4%  against 
5.1%). The slightly lower value of the security industry certainly is not an indicator of 
an efficient market, or a market where entry conditions may create some market power 
which could have a negative effect on market performance. 
 
RESUME AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has made an initial analysis of the security market performance. As has 
been seen, this market shows a reasonable competition to assure a good performance 
forcing the industry to allocate efficiently its resources, search for productive efficiency 
and innovate in order to survive and prosper. Suppliers tend to be enough large to assure 
a good competition, whereas large size assures a good performance in the production of 
massive  equipment.  Yet,  there  are  cases,  were  efficiency  of  the  market  can  be 
compromised. This may be the case of public procurement where only a few number of 
companies are able to bid, or the case of manned guarding companies which exhibit a 
large concentration whilst innovation is rather low. Fragmentation is high in installers 
and  small  size  guarding  companies.  Such  fragmentation,  however,  may  impair  the 
productive efficiency. 
 
The market incentive to increase dynamic efficiency in terms of better and innovative 
products is hampered by expected benefits. Small size markets and the complexity of 
innovation do limit the willingness of industry to strive for a good dynamic efficiency. 
Government intervention may help to solve this market failure, however not without 
cost and distortion. Standard able to achieve network economies may be also subject to 
market failure. In both cases, State intervention may be helpful. A model that explains WORKING PAPER 43 
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dynamic efficiency applicable to the security equipment market with examples has been 
also shown. 
 
A short analysis has been made of performance indicators. However, this analysis is too 
preliminary and requires further work to derive more reliable conclusions and potential 
industrial policies. WORKING PAPER 43 
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
After having made a complete survey of the European security industry, this chapter 
tries to briefly sum up the main findings of the survey. It describes the main market 
features and examines the most relevant market trends. The different vision of security 
in the USA and the EU and its impact on the market is assessed with some detail. Some 
conclusions that can be derived from the collected information and the analyses already 
made are presented. As an afterthought, areas of potential policy are briefly evaluated. 




The industry that supplies goods and services to combat terrorism and organised crime 
exhibit some features that can be resumed in the next points. 
 
A market composed of very different types of industries 
 
The  security  market  includes  very  different  types  of  products  and  services  that  are 
supplied  by  very  different  stakeholders  in  terms  of  technology,  cost  structure,  size, 
manufacturing  methods,  supply  chain,  revenues,  customers,  etc.  Therefore  patterns 
applicable  to  this  economic  sector  are  not  many;  and  they  only  emerge  in  specific 
market  segments.  Electronics,  information  and  communication  technologies  are 
probably  the  key  and  more  pervasive  technologies  integrated  in  nearly  any  kind  of 
security equipment. This is because many security solutions rely on screening and early 
warning  where  these  technologies  play  a  key  role.  The  wide  capabilities  of  these 
technologies seem often to promise security without burden nor cost. 
 
A demand not only driven by the threat of terrorism and organisation crime and 
technology 
 
The demand of security goods and services seems to be mainly driven by the threat of 
terrorism and organised crime as well as their capability to counter these threats in an 
effective way. Yet, the bounded rationality of human beings for performing complex 
cost-benefit analysis as well as interdependencies and externalities may compromise the 
chance of an optimal resource allocation to achieve security. However, when security 
practices become well accepted rules by society –where ethical issues can play its role– 
demand  becomes  more  stable  and  more  subject  to  overall  society  growth,  as  for 
example trade flow, travel flow, construction, etc. 
 
Security product often applicable to other societal needs 
 
Security equipments and services are often applicable to solve societal needs unrelated 
to  security.  For  example,  remote  home  surveillance  services  may  be  used  also  for 
healthcare and warning of home accidents. Personal identification cards used in borders 
may also be used to exert vote rights, request health services or manage bank funds. 
Technologies in this market also tend to show a higher duality than defence equipment. 
Equipment originally developed for civilian needs is also applicable to security needs 
like X-ray screening system. Adaptation seems also to be less complex than civilian 
technologies  applicable  to  defence  needs  since  products  are  often  less  complex  and WORKING PAPER 43 
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operate in a less harsh environment. Therefore, technological spin-offs and spin-ons 
seem to be more likely in this market. 
 
Equipment industry located in more industrialised EU member states 
 
The EU equipment security industrial base is mainly located in the more industrialised 
member states, namely United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy
215, whereas others 
states  play  a  comparatively  smaller  role.  Many  of  these  industries  operate  with  a 
European  (and  global)  dimension.  These  companies  have,  apart  from  representation 
offices, production facilities (e.g. Siemens, Bosch) in other Member States as well as 
abroad. 
 
Products  and  services  that  benefit  of  large  economies  of  scale  of  development  and 
production determine a market with a short number of large companies and European or 
World champions. Being economies of scale not so large medium size companies are 
more numerous. For example CEIA, one of the largest world suppliers of airport metal 
detectors, is not too much bigger in personnel than an SME. Distributors and installers 
of home and small business alarm systems tend to have a smaller size and sometimes a 
very small size. 
 
Major suppliers division of large industrial conglomerates or business groups 
 
Major  security  suppliers  are  divisions  or  business  units  of  large  diversified 
conglomerates that operate in more that one market as for example EADS Defence and 
Security, SAGEM Defence and Security, Thales Security Systems, Ericsson Security 
Systems, ELSAG Datamat (Finmeccanica), or Detica and Chubb (UTC) owned by BAE 
Systems. This industrial structure has sense since these companies operate in areas with 
similar technologies, such as electronics, information and communication technologies, 
where synergies can happen easily. Yet security is not frequently the principal business 
of these organisations. 
 
A market of small size 
 
The security market is of small size when compared with the whole size of the economy 
( 0,48% of the European GDP in 2007) and other economic sectors (8,81 % of the total 
revenues of the ICT market). The growth rate in the last years has been good with a 
value higher that inflation, but the impact of general economic downturn is having a 
negative  impact  still  unknown.  In  short,  protection  against  terrorism  and  organised 
crime is a real concern, but it does not represent a large business opportunity for the 
industry. 
 
The revenues in some market segments combined with the risks and costs of developing 
the  demanded  products  and  services  creates  few  incentives  for  new  entrants  and 
innovators  due  to  low  expected  profits  in  comparison  with  richer  opportunities  that 
other  commercial  markets  present  to  many  promising  technologies  today.  This  may 
result in slow-pace technological progress due to the limited availability of resources 
and  expertise.  For  example,  the  development  of  integrated  circuits  are  essential  to 
miniaturize solutions and reduce equipment price, but it is less attractive than the design 
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of chips for mobile communications, gaming, or personal digital assistants that today 
are massively produced and sold. 
 
Security services have the largest market share 
 
Security manned services probably share the big part of the cake, close to one half. 
Electronic surveillance equipment based on CCTV is the most important part of the 
security equipment demand. Perimeter control, access control systems, and computer 
security are the other relevant market segments. 
 
Research, technology and innovation is a key feature 
 
A  demand  quite  elastic  to  new  products,  whose  quality  and  performance  enhances 
security,  promotes  a  market  driven  by  innovation  and  technological  progress.  This 
means  that  research,  development  and  technology  play  a  relevant  role  in  nearly  all 
market segments, since user’s needs often demand goods and services on the verge of 
the  state  of  art  and  industrial  proficiency.  For  example,  some  technologies  such  as 
sensors used in inspection and detection of CBRNE have a large maturing process due 
to the need of a low false alarm rate. While, in many cases, technology may be brought 
from other areas to be finally integrated into the security solution, in other cases tailored 
research is essential to improve product performance such as for example biometric e-
passports. Radical or disruptive performance is the basis of competition in brand new 
markets, whilst incremental performance and process innovation drives more mature 
markets. The ownership of advanced proprietary technologies, whether related to the 
product design or the manufacturing process, often lays down the competitive position 
of companies. The presence of security related companies in the EU Industrial R&D 
Investment Scoreboard is an indicator that research, development and innovation play a 
key role in this market. Yet, the diversity of the industry may show large variations 
across market segments and company size. 
 
A large supply chain 
 
The supply chain for development or production of security equipment is usually large, 
especially  in  complex  solutions.  It  may  include  public  bodies,  research  centres, 
universities,  laboratories,  standardisation  bodies,  SMEs,  system  suppliers  and  prime 
contractors. This chain is becoming more international as a way to increase best value 
for  money.  Many  components  and  intermediate  products  in  the  supply  chain  have 
additional use in other sectors and often the security market is not the main buyer (e.g. 
communication systems). Two forces shape this supply chain: technical specialization 
tends to deverticalize the market, whereas system complexity tends to increase the size 
of the supply chain. On the other hand, regarding the supply chain of manned guarding 
services, it seems to be rather simple. 
 
A market where network economies play a relevant role 
 
The security market is characterised by network economies and externalities. In such 
markets,  competition  rules  may  not  be  enough  to  achieve  optimum  allocation  of 
resources to provide the goods and services that society demand. Coordination from the 
demand and the supply side may be suitable to achieve a better outcome. From the 
demand  side,  it  may  require  coordination  of  security  measures  as  for  example WORKING PAPER 43 
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agreements on the provision of security services and the equipment to use. From the 
supply  side,  it  may  require  the  development  of  industrial  standards  that  certifies 
equipment  minimum  performance  or  assures  interoperability.  In  these  cases,  the 
development of voluntary governance mechanism (Williamson, 1985:chapter 1), state 
intervention  or  supranational  agreement)  is  necessary.  Since  the  outcome  of  State 
intervention may result in mandatory regulations with strong social or economic impact 
as for example transport, a careful analysis is required to assess the costs and benefits of 
such measures in order to maximize social welfare. 
 
A market where the government plays a key role 
 
The government plays in this market an essential role as entrepreneur, aid provider or 
sponsor of the industry through aids and the finance of research, purchaser of solutions 
that will increase society security, and regulator when the market mechanism does not 
assure automatically the desired security level, or deliverable products or services do 
not assure minimum quality standards. Anyhow, private security needs largely shape the 
demand in this market. 
 
A market largely internationalised where the USA plays the leading role 
 
The security market is largely internationalised, operating many industries on a world 
basis.  In  this  market,  the  United  States  industry  plays  a  leading  role.  Many  U.S. 
companies operate in Europe (e.g. GE, Honeywell or L-3), but the opposite is also true, 
and some European companies like Siemens, Bosch, or Sagem successfully operate in 
the USA market despite potential barriers
216, playing also leading positions in the world 
market. 
 
Whereas U.S. leading role can be explained by the general economic and industrial 
leadership of this country, it is also a consequence of the powerful investment in new 
security  solutions  supported  by  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  that  provides 
powerful  incentives  to  the  industry  for  innovation.  This  provides  competitive 
advantages to its industry over European and other world industry. 
 
Far East security industry is becoming also very competitive in some market niches 
such as CCTV cameras, biometrics and computer security, for example NEC Argentina 
won  the  Bolivian  voting  cards,  and  Hyundai  has  supplied  the  Egypt  AFIS  system. 
Whereas competitiveness is mainly sustained by low price of electronic components due 
to labour cost advantages, in other areas competition is becoming more based on the 




Areas of future growth 
 
Security  is  an  evolving  concept.  Growth  of  the  market  depends  on  the  threats  that 
society perceives, the policies applied to increase the feeling of security, the adaptation 
of governance structures to effectively deal with these matters, but also on the evolution 
of technology to reduce these threats. The kind of terror attacks and the kind of illegal 
                                                 
216 See ECORYS (2009:63). WORKING PAPER 43 
 
  160 
activities  of  organized  crime  will  have  a  deep  impact  on  future  market  needs
  as 
dramatically  showed  9/11  attacks.  Hence  changes  in  the  market  demand  and  the 
industry can be expected if security incidents become more frequent and dangerous as 
well as threats cannot be countered with current equipment due to changes in tactics and 
means  of  these  groups.  Being  the  case,  novel  products  and  services  and  new 
manufacturers are expected to appear in the market, other things being equal. As long as 
the  technologies  are  available,  products  will  appear  easily.  However,  products  with 
breakthrough performance and falling price, able to remove important vulnerabilities 
and  deter  from  potential  attacks,  will  require  large  investment  in  research,  if  their 
development cannot be nurtured by discoveries coming from other economic sectors. 
 
Small and medium sized companies as well as the residential market will continue to 
spend  resources  in  security,  though  their  sensitivity  to  price  will  only  trigger  their 
demand when security goods and services are rather inexpensive. This demand will be 
mainly leaned to the protection against crime and theft. 
 
Governments and large organizations managing or operating critical infrastructures will 
continue to be the main purchasers of security in the next years, stimulated by security 
concerns,  which  materialise  in  programmes  like  the  EPCIP.  Surveillance,  physical 
protection, and access control will continue to be the major contributors to abate the risk 
of  terrorism  and  organized  crime.  Inspection  equipment  for  baggage  and  cargo  will 
continue to grow as trade continues to expand. Progress on CBRN protection equipment 
seems to be uncertain as long as this threat does not clearly manifest. 
 
New  technologies  that  show  a  growing  trend  in  the  next  years  are  digital  video 
surveillance, smart cards, biometric systems, and RFID. Biometrics and smarts cards 
seem to be the future technology that will override the older type of identification cards 
based on a magnetic stripe. The new technology will help to expand the identity market, 
a basic enabler of many services that will not need face-to-face relation for their supply 
from access control to e-government and e-finance. 
 
The  expansion  of  these  technologies  depends  on  uncertain  conditions  like  R&D 
progress, user acceptance, affordability, adequate standards, and regulations that being 
not met may hinder their growth. Moreover, progress in these areas may be more driven 
by other societal needs and goals and non-exclusively with the fight against terrorism 
and organized crime like the abovementioned e-government and e-finance. 
 
New EU member states may be especially demanding of security equipment due to 
quicker economic growth, raising cost of labour-intensive security services and small 
installed base. 
 
Security and defence companies 
 
The new perception of security threats in the European Union devaluates those threats 
related  to  territorial  defence  and  armed  conflicts  based  on  sophisticated  and 
technologically  advanced  weapons,  while  rises  threats  generated  far  away  of  the 
European borders proceeding from State failure and disintegration and threats which 
may  facilitate  radicalisation  and  promote  terrorism  and  organised  crime  (Pullinger, 
2006). 
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This environment hence restrains the need of traditional defence in favour of security. 
Such a change has attracted the defence industry to offer its solutions to undergo the 
new threats posed by terrorism and crime. This is facilitated by the commonality of 
many  technologies  used  for  defence  and  security,  the  large  experience  of  defence 
companies  in  managing  large  and  complex  programmes  aimed  at  achieving  new 
capabilities, and the good knowledge of the end customer. 
 
This is seen by the defence industry as an opportunity to diversify their portfolio, gain a 
foothold in this market, and increase its share of the security business in the company 
turnover (Dowdall, 2005). The EU (2009) report on the security research programme 
shows clear evidence of the defence industry competence to become the main recipient 
of funds. Furthermore, many research organisations like the Swedish Defence Research 
Agency  (FOI),  VTT,  SINTEF,  Dutch  Research  Institute  (TNO),  CEA  or  Qinetiq 
traditionally working for defence are now turning their focus to security issues. This 
industry is mainly involved in programmes like border protection, maritime surveillance 
or CBRNE
217. This trend probably will continue in the future and may even increase if 
defence budget shrinks and security budget grows faster. 
 
The permanent need of research and development 
 
Research, development and innovation will continue to play a relevant role since threats 
of  terrorism  and  organised  crime  poses  big  challenges  to  the  industry  in  terms  of 
equipment performance, effectiveness and affordability. While this market could profit 
of overall technological progress, it will also need R&D activities to advance in specific 
areas  and  integrate  new  and  more  powerful  technologies  in  future  products.  Some 
security  solutions,  such  as  explosive  detection  or  chemical  and  biological  agent 
detection, will need of fundamental advances in science and technology to solve current 
shortfalls and deficiencies. Moreover, since terrorists’ behaviour will not be static in the 
face of enhanced security measures and will be inventive in developing new ways to 
circumvent them, a permanent R&D capability seems essential to continue defeating the 
new  threats.  Yet,  incentives  may  not  be  enough  for  industry  to  achieve  desirable 




This survey has shown that the security industry can provide goods and services that 
integrated with the adequate procedures can largely enhance the security of citizens and 
consequently the welfare of society. Yet, security equipment and security services have 
inherent limitations to remove insecurity and the root causes of terrorism and crime. 
Equipment may fail, be poorly integrated or be wrongly operated. And services may not 
follow  best  practices.  Social  engineering  and  human  negligence  may  easily  create 
breaches and put security at risk. It should not be forgotten that security solutions have a 
socio-technical nature mixing technical and non-technical design. Departures to attend 
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the  human,  political,  social,  operational  and  organisational  aspects  of  solutions  will 
doom technology to failure and give easily pace to vulnerabilities. 
 
The industrial impact of a different vision on security on each side of the Atlantic 
 
The strategic outlook, the threat perception and the role of technology for improving 
security clearly differs between the USA and the EU when we compare the different 
approaches followed on each side of the Atlantic. The 9/11 attack boosted investments 
on security in the United States. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
and  the  Homeland  Security  Advanced  Research  Projects  Agency  (HSARPA)
218,  an 
agency similar to DARPA but focused on security, demonstrate a clear pledge to reduce 
security shortfalls pushing technology ahead
219. The DHS large budget has allowed the 
financing of many research and development programmes (e.g. protection of big cities 
against a WMD based  on detector  equipment installed in the main highways). This 
approach goes beyond European efforts to increase its security, this suggesting a more 
prudent,  less  ambitious,  and  probably  more  rational  approach  on  this  side  of  the 
Atlantic. 
 
Industrial  differences,  consequently,  are  closely  related  to  the  different  vision  of 
security  to  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  which  translates  into  different  demands  and 
different  industrial  responses,  rather  than  irreversible  gaps  in  industrial  capabilities. 
Namely,  Europe  has  a  strong  position  in  many  enabling  sectors  of  security  like 
aerospace,  defence,  telecommunications,  software,  biotechnology  or  pharmaceutical 
(Ecorys, 2009:x). However, the U.S. approach has an inherent adverse effect on the 
European security industrial base. The large DHS budget is pushing ahead technological 
solutions due to the generous financing of R&D and acquisition programmes that gives 
its industry advantages in terms of products with higher performance and lower cost
220. 
This financing facilitates the quick development of products ready for the market and 
the creation of new champions. In such context, it can be expected that U.S. companies 
will  attempt  to  achieve  above  normal  profits  marketing  their  products  worldwide, 
having a good chance to compete with success with less developed European industries 
and to consolidate a solid export position. Moreover, the higher expertise of the U.S. 
industry  is  an  asset  when  international  standards  are  defined,  because  it  may 
progressively impose (de facto) normative  and  operational standards  worldwide that 
inevitably will favour the U.S. industry (See COM (2004) 700: page 21 and the e-seals 
for containers). 
                                                 
218 This agency funds R&D of homeland security technologies to support basic and applied homeland 
security research to promote revolutionary changes in technologies that would promote homeland 
security;  advance  the  development,  testing  and  evaluation,  and  deployment  of  critical  homeland 
security  technologies;  and  accelerate  the  prototyping  and  deployment  of  technologies  that  would 
address homeland security vulnerabilities. 
219 This may be less motivated by the outcome of an objective assessment of security investments and 
more  by  a  wider  strategy  with  emphasis  on  technological  leadership  that  provides  long-term 
competitive  advantages  in  the  world  trade  (Krugman,  1996:110).  Such  strategic  behaviour  (i.e. 
maintain a hedge towards Europe) could mean a limited chance of collaboration when sharing with 
Europe the positive externalities of a large R&D budget is not seen as a priority for doing business. 
The European Commission and the United States signed the 18
th November 2010 an Implementing 
Arrangement  for  cooperative  activities  in  the  field  of  homeland/civil  security  research.  The 
Arrangement does not create financial obligations. 
220 In a market where marginal costs fall as output increases, a large demand that increases the output of 
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In sum, whereas Europe receives positive externalities of the USA large investments in 
security, it can also be said that the European industry operates in a somehow adverse 
environment, because the chance to differentiate by means of large R&D investment 
may be small due to limited resources. This environment may impact negatively on the 
exporting capability of the European Union in foreign markets such as South America, 
Asia  or  Africa  when  American  companies  also  bid.  In  such  case,  follow-up  and 
defensive innovative strategies like better adapting early discoveries, i.e. cherry-picking 
the best bits and avoiding the mistakes already made, combined with other strategies, 
such  as  product  differentiation  or  better  manufacturing  and  commercialization 




Benefits of consolidating the European security market 
 
A  market  like  security,  where  economies  of  scale  and  network  economies  are  so 
relevant, will benefit of a true European dimension, since a larger number of customers 
will make easier the attainment of such economies and will provide a more stable (i.e. 
less cyclical) demand  for many security  solutions. Such a market will reinforce the 
European industrial base. 
 
As we have seen, the security market in Europe cannot be considered fragmented by 
national  borders,  yet  barriers  exist  that  impede  a  stronger  competition  such  as 
differences  in  national  regulations  and  standards  and  the  traditional  preference  of 
national suppliers in large public purchases. Probably, there is still room to improve a 
level playing field. A wider market will create incentives for industrial concentration to 
achieve a European dimension, a desirable feature since it is also recognised that the 
number of companies operating in the sector is often too high. Consumers will benefit 
of stronger competition and a more efficient industry in terms of better, innovative and 
less expensive goods and services. 
 
The increasing competition across EU Member States will lead to the concentration of 
sales  in  the  hands  of  the  largest  and  more  efficient  firms  (Martin,  1993:192).  Such 
transformation  could  involve  market  restructuring.  While  long-term  benefits  will  be 
positive, the restructuring process may create short-term imbalances in terms of plant 
closures and job losses of the less efficient firms. 
 
Benefits of EU security research 
 
R&D competition may be desirable for certain security equipment even if duplication or 
parallel research appears (Porter, 1990:636) when such uncoordinated innovation efforts 
are subsequently coordinated by markets (Metcalfe, 2002:2) which will in the end value 
the innovation. But this approach may be less justified for large and complex systems 
purchased  by  governments  where  national  budgets  are  too  strait  to  finance  such 
research.  In  such  cases,  cooperation  of  member  states  in  the  field  of  research, 
development  and  innovation  may  have  sense  since  it  will  facilitate  the  pooling  of 
resources, the creation of more powerful research teams and the appearance of synergies 
and economies of scale, which will increase the likelihood of a better and less expensive 
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solution.  Examples  of  such  kind  of  systems  are  border  protection,  maritime 
surveillance, patrol aircrafts, or satellite surveillance. A coordinated research will also 
help  to  cover  potential  research  gaps  and  control  duplication  that  may  result  in 
excessive resources waste when programmes are large
222. 
Coordinated research, however, does not come without cost. Barriers and rigidities to 
collaboration  from  the  demand  and  the  supply  side  may  be  a  source  of  suboptimal 
solutions with a true adverse impact on the market. For example, these developments 
call for the harmonisation of requirements from different end users, in order to simplify 
the complexity of the product, and may need previous agreements on best practices or 
standards. Such harmonization has a considerable cost in terms of time and resources. 
The  formation  of  international  consortia  may  also  take  time,  and  bargaining  on  the 
agreed  distribution  of  work  may  predominate  over  the  efficient  criterion  in  the 
allocation of resources (Hartley, 1995:457). As a conclusion, it can be said that joint 
research  may  not  be  always  the  best  solution.  Furthermore  adequate  governance 
infrastructure is needed to achieve such coordination
223. 
 
ESRIF (2009: 202) advocates strongly for ‘... Field labs are needed for the validation 
(verifying  whether  it  is  fit  for  purpose),  i.e.  realistic  environments  for  the 
demonstration, validation and optimisation of innovative systems for security tasks or 
meeting  points  where  end-users,  security  authorities,  industry  and  the  research 
community can have access to the technological solutions relevant for their daily work’. 
While not explicitly said, the text assumes field labs of European dimension. This kind 
of initiatives certainly will have a positive effect on quality and cost, yet it may face 
with reluctance of Member State that may still consider security, a concept closely tied 
to national sovereignty (Enders and Sandler, 2006:142). 
 
Benefits of reusing defence and civilian expertise 
 
The challenges of security require the amassing of expertise, know-how and resources 
to succeed in the development of solutions. For example, the large experience attained 
in the defence field in the area of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well 
as command and control can fertilise the development of many security solutions such 
as the already known as ‘Network Enabled Capabilities’. Advances in many areas of the 
civilian sector may also be reused in the field of security. In particular advances of 
electronics, information and communication technologies financed by other sectors may 
push ahead the development of new and improved systems such as smart cards, RFID 
tags, mobile communications, etc. 
 
Profiting of integrating security in civilian products and services 
 
It is reasonable to believe that the EU has enough technological and industrial base to 
develop security systems and solutions, but without commercialization prospects, the 
development  of  these  systems  is  very  unlikely.  Since  pay-off  of  many  protective 
measures, especially against terrorism, is hardly measurable, due to the difficulty to 
assess the threat and its consequences before and after the measure is implemented, the 
need to improve and spend in security may be lacking. 
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To overcome such problem a likely successful strategy would be to focus explicitly on 
technologies that, in addition to counter terrorism and organised crime, have broader 
applications. Research with multiple uses like defence or the civilian market may have, 
therefore, sense and will bring higher and more tangible pay-offs. 
 
This  approach  would  help  to  reduce  vulnerabilities  and,  at  the  same  time,  enhance 
reliability,  productivity,  quality  of  services,  or  the  provision  of  new  commercial 
capabilities as examples shown in chapter III. Such strategy needs a careful assessment 
of  advantages  of  the  research  for  security  as  well  as  to  other  economic  fields. 
Introducing security requirements in the early stages of the design of a new system may 
help to reduce costs instead of introducing them later on (ESRIF, 2009:17). However, 
markets do not reward always such behaviour. Rather, markets reward first movers –
that is, those companies who are first in bringing a new product to market. This means 
that  it  is  more  important  to  get  into  the  market  early  rather  than  first  investing  in 
improving product security (Anderson, 2001a). 
 
The complexity of properly allocating resources to security 
 
Protecting society from terrorism and organised crime is hard to achieve. Measures are 
always expensive and resources limited. Determining how much to spend and in which 
areas is always difficult. Furthermore, asymmetry of information and the inability to 
protect everything, since hardening of every target is unrealistic for the economic point 
of view, give always advantages to terrorism and organised crime to find and hit a weak 
spot. The damages that a terrorist group may cause are in most cases considerably larger 
than the cost of organising and performing the attack, and sometimes disproportionately 
higher as the 9/11 has shown. 
 
One  of  the  ultimate  objectives  of  terrorism  is  to  impose  economic  hardship  on  the 
targeted country. This strategic rationality has been manifested in explicit statements by 
Osama bin Laden, among others. For example, he crowed about the positive exchange 
ratio between the cost of the September 11 attacks and the cost of its consequences to 
the United States (Davis, 2009:xxxiii). 
 
A big challenge is that these threats claim a significant fraction of the discretionary 
resources that might otherwise be invested in ways that pay broader dividends over 
time. In such a case, the impact of those expenditures may be disproportional to the 
costs caused  by the attack themselves. Security and preparedness measures shall be 
warily designed so that the resources devoted to them do not end up generating the very 
costs that a terrorist aims to impose. This argument brought by Jackson et al. (2007b) is 
analysed also by Sandler (2009) when he ponders the security spending of USA on the 
order of magnitude of tens of billions of dollars, compared with the money saved from 
reduced damages in the order of millions. Stewart and Mueller (2009) also raise this 
question when they evaluate USA homeland security spending and estimate cost per life 
saved  (using  the  value  of  a  statistical  life)  to  determine  the  rationality  of  these 
expenditures and assess alternative investments to mitigate the risk of other hazards 
(e.g. vehicle and road safety, health programmes or flood protection) that could be more 
cost-effective (i.e. more lives saved). 
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The allocation of resources to security should be optimal and decisions should be based 
on a balanced analysis of benefits of mitigating the risk and its consequences against 
both the economic cost of developing and deploying some security solutions. Hence, 
tolerating  some  level  of  insecurity  is  economically  rational  when  costs  outweigh 
benefits.  While  no  mathematical  formula  can  reveal  the  appropriate  balance  and 
decisions are made in an environment of bounded rationality, principles of transparency, 
accountability,  and  informed  judgement  may  help  to  avoid  large  imbalances  and 
resources misallocation. This may require of adequate information to take into account 
the  full  range  of  costs  and  benefits  combined  with  analytical  methods  and  tools  to 
evaluate  program  performance  in  order  to  support  the  final  decision
224.  Rational 
decisions,  rather  than  emotional  based  decisions  based  on  alarmism  and  excessive 
weighting  of  worst  case  scenarios  without  assessing  its  likelihood  (Sunstein,  2002), 
should rule decision making in security investment to avoid hyperbolic overreaction to 
improbable  contingencies.  As  Mueller  (2005)  states  ‘If  terrorist  force  us  to  redirect 
resources  away  from  sensible  programs  and  future  growth,  in  order  to  pursue 
unachievable but politically popular levels of domestic security, then they have won an 
important victory that mortgages our future’. 
 
The field of information security is being especially rich on research on how much to 
invest in computer security. Gordon and Loeb (2002) present an interesting paper to 
assess  the  optimal  investing  amount  to  protect  a  given  set  of  information.  Their 
analysis suggests that, under plausible assumptions, investment in information security 
may well be justified only for a midrange of information vulnerabilities. That is little or 
no  information  security  is  economically  justified  from  extremely  high,  as  well  as 
extremely low, levels of vulnerability since the reduction of the expected loss will not 
justify  the  investment.  It  also  suggests  that  to  maximize  the  expected  benefit  from 
investment to protect information, a firm should spend only a small fraction of the 
expected loss due to a security breach. The argument seems still valid when applied 
ceteris paribus to general investment in security. 
Box 10. How much is enough in security investment 
 
Potential areas of industrial policy 
 
The security market, as has been shown, is subject to inefficiencies and failures with an 
adverse  impact  on  its  performance  in  terms  of  expensive  products  with  low 
performance, innovativeness, or international competitiveness. Reasons may be due to 
lack  of  coordination  between  agents,  barriers  to  competition,  industry  strategic 
behaviour,  low  innovation  incentives,  excessive  risks,  low  initial  demand  due  to 




Governments may play an important role in changing market dynamics consistent with 
the  public  interest  when  failures  and  inefficiencies  appear.  Yet,  government  action 
should be grounded on sectoral studies to implement adequate solving measures and 
                                                 
224 On a critique of DHS methods for evaluating program performance and effectiveness, see Thomson 
(2007) and GAO (2010). 
225 No general document on EU security industrial policy has been identified, as opposed to defence 
where some official documents exist. This suggests that little attention has been already paid to this 
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should consider costs and benefits to ensure that intervention is both proportionate and 
appropriate. 
 
Lack of information may be a main source of poor market performance such as for 
example  reliable  data  about  vulnerabilities  and  attacks.  A  policy  option  could  be 
therefore the collection and publication of information to foster better investments, as 
for  example  CERT  teams.  As  Tirole  (1988:109)  states  when  deciding  whether  to 
become informed, a consumer takes only the private cost and the private benefit into 
account, but he or she does not take into account the fact that, by being better informed, 
he induces (or allows) the firm to credibly offer the high quality. So it can be inferred 
that increasing the number of informed customers favours efficiency. Thus consumers’ 
information should be encouraged beyond its privately optimal. However, as Spulber 
(1989:64) advices, the welfare gains from improved information flow to participants 
must be compared with the costs of government production of information. The need of 
policy action in markets with asymmetric information may thus depend on the trade-off 
between the costs of information production and the costs of inefficient transactions. 
 
The tipping tendencies of economic competition, described in the previous chapter, like 
too  few  firms,  excessive  market  dominance,  slow  or  distorted  technological 
development,  high  prices  for  hardware  and  software,  possibilities  for  overt  or  tacit 
collusion among suppliers and integrators (Cave, 2005) may be also a source of poor 
performance  in  market  segments  where  network  effects  play  a  critical  role  such  as 
biometrics and RFID. 
 
State  R&D  financing  and  public  purchases  may  help  to  keep  up  with  new  security 
threats through the development of efficient and affordable countermeasures. Yet, this 
support is not easy to provide. As NRC (2002:351) states ‘the facilitation of technology 
development will be a complicated task for governments. It is very difficult to define 
goals for such programmes, support the necessary scientific and engineering research, 
facilitate the maturation of technologies into robust products, and eventually ensure that 
these products are implemented by appropriate users’. The main challenge is to allocate 
resources to potential innovations that do match with market needs, whilst avoiding the 
tipping tendency that R&D financing may help to increase. 
 
Providing this support, while keeping up a fair competitive environment, is not an easy 
task  not  being  enough  openness,  transparency,  objective  awarding  and  rigorous 
monitoring  of  aids.  Additional  measures  required  include:  (a)  precompetitive  R&D 
engagement, (b) multiple-sourcing arrangement something that may be inefficient in 
natural monopoly markets; (c) a careful design competition on major procurements; (d) 
technologically  neutral  requirements  or  based  on  open  standards,  (e)  open  and 
transparent supply chain management, and (f) the inclusion of some form of compulsory 
licensing of IPR option arrangements in procurement contracts based on fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) criteria (Cave, undated, 2005). 
 
The  motivation  to  provide  aids  mainly  resides  in  the  public  interest  of  enhancing 
security  when  market  mechanism  fails.  This  would  mean  that  decisions  should  be 
focused  mainly  on  security  projects  with  large  impact  and  benefits  to  society,  that 
otherwise would not take place. It would also mean that aid intensity should be tamed 
by the size of demand, commercialisation prospects in other economic sectors, or spin-
offs with large impact on the economy. This probably explains that much research in WORKING PAPER 43 
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security  today  is  oriented  to  dual  technology  markets  such  as  ICT,  robotics, 
biotechnology  or  aerospace,  which  are  believed  to  the  essential  for  the  future 
competitiveness  of  the  European  industry  in  world  markets  (Tisdall  &  Hartley, 
2008:177). It may well be that such believe may discretionarily outplace projects that 
could embed higher social gains. 
 
Coordination  may  be  especially  required  for  setting  (interoperability)  standards  and 
fixing minimum security requirements since they might be essential to boost market 
demand
226. The support for their development may be important when private agents 
show too much inertia. Monitoring is also required to avoid strategic behaviour aimed at 
reducing opportunities of competitors during the development of standards. This may be 
the case when industry led standard consortia hide collusive practices; when a provider 
with  large  market  share  deliberately  makes  its  equipment  incompatible  with  rivals 
offering, or when the holder of a key patent effectively controls all those who use it. An 
RTD policy, where access to research results is open, could promote diversity; balance 
scale and scope economies with economic efficiency; restrain vertical foreclosure whilst 
encouraging appropriate integration; and inspire further product and process innovation 
(Cave, 2005). 
 
THE NEED OF FURTHER ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
 
This study shall be seen as another step to  abate ignorance regarding the European 
security  industry.  It  has  shown  the  often  elementary  knowledge  we  have  on  this 
(complex)  economic  sector  and  the  scant  information  that  impedes  a  better 
characterisation and further progress in the understanding of this market. Datasets are 
not  enough  rich  to  discover  evidences,  make  inferences  and  empirically  confirm 
hypotheses. Many hypotheses have been only suggested, pending to be fully tested, and 
there  are  insufficient  evidences  to  refute  or  sustain  some  interesting  conjectures.  In 
short, evidences found are often too anecdotal to be useful. 
 
Consequently,  efforts  are  needed  to  gather  on  a  durable  basis  such  information  (in 
particular quantitative data), allowing that researchers exploit it to better understand the 
structure  and  behaviour  of  this  industrial  sector  and,  thereby,  identifying  more 
accurately potential performance troubles in the market. Compiling such information 
involves an important, but necessary, effort to progress in the research and to avoid 
skewed conclusions that may sustain inappropriate industrial policies. 
 
Main information shortfalls are the accurate measure of market demand across market 
segments  and  customers,  imports  and  exports,  and  government  research  and 
development financing. From the supply side a better characterization of the industry is 
needed in terms of turnover, employees, sales by relevant markets, suppliers, customers, 
R&D investment and other economic indicators. Only a rich information base may open 
the door to econometric studies that are badly needed in this area. 
 
For the future, there is no shortage of research questions in the security market. For 
example better knowledge is needed on cost structure in development and production 
and the role of economies of scale, scope and learning on each market segment. More 
                                                 
226 Failures to achieve standards have occurred in the past. For example a pan-European identification 
card has not been achieved, thus limiting e-government solutions on member states. It seems that there 
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progress is needed in unveiling differences between security, defence and civilian firms 
as well as assessing linkages and synergies between these firms, fruit of the exchange of 
knowledge  and  technology.  Finally,  more  insight  is  needed  in  characterising 
government role and procurement policies and potential non-optimal decision making. 
A more precise characterization of the conduct of market agents is also needed. Finally, 
econometric studies on market performance using different indicators would help to 
determine more accurately the health of this industry. WORKING PAPER 43 
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ACRONYMS 
 
ACE  Automated Commercial Environment 
AFIS  Automatic Fingerprint Identification System 
AIDS   Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
AIS  Automatic Identification System 
ASTM  American Society for Testing and Materials 
ATM  Automatic Teller Machine / Air Traffic Management 
BAA  British Airport Authority 
BSL  Biosafety Level (1, 2, 3, 4) 
CAD  Computer Aided Design 
CBRNE  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive 
CCTV  Close Circuit TeleVision 
CEN  European Committee for Standardization 
CENELEC  European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
CFCA  Community Fisheries Control Agency 
COTS  Commercial Off the Shelf 
CT  Computer Tomography 
DARPA  Defence Advanced Research Project Agency 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DVR  Digital Video Recorder 
EDA  European Defence Agency 
EEA  European Environment Agency 
EMSA  European Maritime Safety Agency 
ENISA  European Network and Information Security Agency 
EPCIP  European Programme on Critical Infrastructures Protection 
EPOSS  European Technology Platform on Smart Systems Integration 
ERFP  European Research Framework Programme 
ERP  Enterprise Resource Planning 
ESRAB  European Security Research Advisory Board 
ESRIF  European Security Research Information Forum 
ETSI  European Telecommunications Standard Institute 
EU  European Union 
EUROCAE  European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment 
EUROSUR  European Surveillance System for Borders 
EUSECON  European Security Economics 
FRONTEX  European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Members States of the European Union. 
GAO  Government Accounting Office 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
GSM  Global System for Mobile Communications 
HEPA  High Efficiency Particulate Arresting 
HEU  High Enriched Uranium 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
IATA  International Aviation Transport Agency 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organisation 
IC  Integrated Circuit WORKING PAPER 43 
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ICT   Information and Communication System 
IED  Improvised Explosive Device 
IMO  International Maritime Organisation 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights 
ISO  International Organisation for Standardisation 
ISP  Internet Service Provider 
ISPS  International Ship and Port facility Security Code 
IT  Information Technology 
ISDEFE  Ingeniería de Sistemas de Defensa 
JRC  Joint Research Centre 
LAN  Local Area Network 
LCD  Liquid Crystal Display 
LRIT  Long Range Identification and Tracking 
MANPADS  Man Portable Air Defence System 
MES  Minimum Efficiency Scale 
NACE  Statistical classification of economic activities in the European 
Community. 
nec  Not elsewhere classified 
NIJ  National Institute of Justice 
OCR  Optical Character Recognition 
OEM  Original Equipment Manufacturer 
PASR  Preparatory Action on Security Research 
PC  Personal Computer 
PDA  Personal Digital Assistant. 
PMR  Professional Mobile Radio 
PIRA  Provisional Irish Republic Army 
POS  Point Of Sales 
PPE  Personal Protective Equipment 
PTZ  Pan, Tilt and Zoom 
R&D  Research and Development 
RF  Radio Frequency 
RFID  Radio Frequency Identification 
RPG  Rocket Propelled Gun 
RTD  Research, Technology, Development 
SCADA  Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
SIS  Schengen Information System 
SSL  Secure Socket Layer 
SME  Small and Medium Enterprise 
TCP / IP  Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol 
TETRA  Terrestrial Trunked Radio 
TFEU  Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
UAV  Unmanned Air Vehicle 
UNO  United Nations Organisation 
US-VISIT  U.S. Visitor and Immigration Status Indication Technology 
VIP  Very Important Person 
VIS  Visa Information System 
WMD  Weapon of Mass Destruction 
WP  Working Package WORKING PAPER 43 
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